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Abstract
This dissertation studies Western big-budget video games of a genre often
referred to as “open world.” By tracking the concept of the “frontier” as a settler colonial
(and later neoliberal) signal for space that invites access, I argue these games are both
expressive of and cater to settler and neoliberal cultural anxieties regarding extermination
and desires for accumulative dominance. Furthermore, these games exhibit their settler
colonial and neoliberal ideologies through their narratives, gameplay mechanics, and
productive contexts. That exhibition of ideology comes in several formulas of settler and
neoliberal cultural production identified by various fields of scholarship. This
dissertation, drawing from Indigenous studies, video game studies, post-colonial and
Marxist theory, studies the Grand Theft Auto and Red Dead Redemption series,
Assassin’s Creed 3 and the so-called “Ubisoft formula” generally, as well as Horizon
Zero Dawn to argue a few central points about big-budget Western open world games:
(1) they are what I call artificial frontiers, and as such are the preeminent entertainment of
settler colonial cultural mores and the sustained eliminative and accumulative logics of
those mores’ historical frontierism; (2) they reveal, reflect, propagate, accommodate, and
assuage settler colonial anxieties and desires; (3) they exhibit (though attempt to obscure)
the genocidal logic and exploitative relations of Western settler colonialism and
neoliberalism; consequently, to some extent this dissertation argues the video game
industry’s social function shows the compatibility of settler-influenced neoliberalism
with fascist ideology.
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Summary for Lay Audience (350)
This dissertation argues that the big-budget, Western-made video games of the “open
world” genre draw from the concept of the “frontier” for their success. By studying the
Grand Theft Auto series, Red Dead Redemption series, Assassin’s Creed III, and Horizon
Zero Dawn, I assert the genre’s features make them “artificial frontiers” because they
cater to the same cultural anxieties and desires “the frontier” has historically produced
and continues to “play” with. As the frontier is historically a space of imperial genocide,
modern video game companies design these games as power fantasies. These power
fantasies normalize the economic, racial, and political problems of Western culture, and
seek to soothe the fears and wants that context produces. Finally, I argue that these
fantasies reveal how the ideology of these extremely popular games is similar to fascist
ideology.
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Introduction
One person’s play session of the console video game Grand Theft Auto III
(GTAIII) may look substantially different from another’s. Every player controls an avatar
and the screen’s view of it in the digital world, as if operating the player’s character and a
spectral camera tethered to it. Set in a fully 3D environment, the player can make the
avatar walk, run, jump, hit virtual denizens, shoot guns, and drive vehicles. A small
“minimap” in the lower left of the screen looks like a GPS map of the detailed digital city
players explore, a realized space complete with wandering citizens and traffic. When the
game is paused, players can view a full map of the city. Both maps include icons that
represent various things, such as points to save the game and store vehicles, as well the
start points for missions which push a central narrative. One player may decide to simply
play every mission as it becomes available, interested in the story about clashing criminal
empires. One player may decide to eschew this narrative entirely, simply choosing to
steal a passing car and run down random city denizens. Another player may hop in an
ambulance and play an optional timed activity to aid injured people—an activity which, if
accomplished well enough, eventually grants the avatar the ability to sprint on foot at full
speed without tiring. Another player may do all of these things in whatever order and
emphasis they desire. GTAIII, then, features “gameplay” 1 that privileges player
autonomy within a large, heavily detailed world, open to players’ individual desires. That
gameplay and large world are the foundations of what is often referred to as the “open
world” genre of video games.2

“Gameplay,” at a basic level, is the systems and structure of a game’s interactivity. It can also refer to the
“feel” of that interaction, and is thus a concept that can be both objectively or subjectively described.
1

Other related terms/genres are “sandbox” or “free-roaming.” Modern examples of these games share traits
from common understandings of all three. I will use “open world” primarily because of how the term is
2

2
The open world genre has become wildly popular, and a great number of Western
mainstream, big-budget video games employ mechanics that fit into its broad
conventions. Genres, as well as their constituents and limits, are always sites of
contention. This is especially true for video games. Film and television genres, for
example, must contend with criteria as wide ranging as narrative, aesthetic content, the
people whose vision and labour they represent, and the regions and eras in which they are
produced. Video game genres must contend with these, too, but they must also add other
important criteria, such as the hardware that plays them, the digital frameworks that
structure them, and the forms of player interaction available in the games themselves.
One could argue there are early “open world” games (such as Adventure in 1980, or Elite
in 1984) that feature the freedom to explore the game’s spatial representations in ways
less structured (or at least more open-ended) than their contemporaries. The expansion of
open world games in large part relates to game designers’ longstanding attempts to push
past a form bound to “levels,” instead encouraging player exploration of game spaces that
became more detailed as technology advanced and consumer expectations rose. Grand
Theft Auto III, released in 2001, is popularly said to be one of the earliest and most
influential examples of the genre’s contemporary big-budget development and structure.3
The open world games of this tradition, following GTA, typically feature large,
explorable game spaces that give players the “freedom” to choose where to go and when.

typically employed in development and consumer contexts, and for the conceptual weight of its particular
word choice.
IGN, one of the most popular video game hobbyist websites, featured GTAIII in a 2007 article, “Top 10
Most Influential Games” (Geddes and Hatfield). In it, GTAIII is said to have “spawned entire genres,
buzzwords, and cultural phenomena.” Similarly, in the years following GTAIII’s release, any game that
featured the hallmarks of the open world genre were often called “GTA clones” among video game fans
online (Reparaz).
3
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These games generally offer primary linear “story” missions to advance the central plot,
but they also allow autonomous exploration and interaction, and provide ample
opportunities for optional activities meant to flesh out the world and allow the player to
gain more power. Open world games are often played in a first- or third-person
perspective.4 For the most part, the most popular open world games between 2000 and
2020 feature third-person perspective exclusively or optionally, which gives a better view
of the player’s animated traversal and mastery of the game space, as well as a wider—and
thus more empowered—field of vision. All the games focused on in this dissertation
feature third-person perspective,5 are attributed to Western studios, 6 and are big-budget
open world games.
Hobbyist media measures the open world genre’s richly detailed game spaces,
breathlessly comparing the sizes of digital worlds to real-world kilometer equivalents in
what Cameron Kunzelman calls a “map size fetish” (“Why is GTAV So Conservative?”).
These massive open world environments require large budgets to accommodate the large
teams and advanced technology to make these digital spaces invitingly detailed and
lifelike. The incredible expense to create these games is an apparently acceptable risk for
the companies that develop and publish them, as big-budget open world games are among
the most high-grossing commercial narrative products in the world. Multiple recent open
world games, like The Witcher 3 have sold tens of millions of copies worldwide, and

First-person perspective refers to a view where the player’s view is through the “eyes” of the player
character (PC), whereas in third-person perspective, the view is like a camera that floats a few tethered but
mobile feet behind the PC, or gives a view from behind and over the PC’s shoulder.
4

5

See chapter two for further discussion on third-person perspective.

I say “attributed” because of the international nature of big-budget open world game development. See
chapter one for a delineation of the outsourcing and international development chains that Western-based
companies use to develop open world games.
6
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Grand Theft Auto V (GTAV) has, by 2020, sold more than 135 million copies.7 If, as some
scholars have argued, games satisfy generalized, simplistic categories of desire for
players, the open world genre offers a potent fulfilment of many of these desires. Nick
Yee’s quantitative research on the motivations of game players delineates some of these
categories, borrowing from previous literature.8 One central category, “achievement,”
refers to players’ desire to gain in-game power, currency, abilities, and so on. Another
category, “immersion,” refers to a player’s investment in the story, interest in exploring
the game world, and so forth. Both are considered important motivations in open world
game design. Yee’s findings (2002, 2012) are well-reflected generalities in Jugo Hamari
and Janne Tuunanen’s survey of quantitative research into player motivations.9 Open
world games are, in many ways, the video game industry’s most distilled attempt to
appeal to these motivations for an increasingly expanding consumer base.
GTAIII and many of the most successful contemporary mainstream open world
games influenced by it have been designed by Western studios. As such, the genre is
unsurprisingly quintessentially “Western,” both in productive materialism and in style.
With gameplay foundations of the exploration and mastery of a large game space, open
world games are artificial frontiers for players. These frontiers are often populated by
largely brainless denizens that are often destructible set pieces more akin to vehicles,
landscape, and buildings than to the characters whose survival is linked directly to the

7

See CD Projekt Group for Witcher 3 sales, and Minotti for GTAV sales.

8

Yee mostly draws from Richard Bartle’s “taxonomy of player types” and scholarship inspired by it.

Yee’s research is focused on Massively Multiplayer Online games [MMOS] (which are discussed further
in Chapter One) rather than the single-player open world genre this dissertation focuses on. That said, the
MMO genre (and indeed, most recent MMOs) follow very similar design principles as exclusively singleplayer open world games, and vice versa.
9
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story missions and cutscenes.10 The point of an open world game, mechanically, is to
traverse space and grow in power. Reviewers and critics often use the term “playground”
for open world settings, largely because the games themselves encourage a degree of
locomotive experimentation and give the illusion of player “freedom”; this freedom is the
abovementioned autonomy of desired gameplay within what is necessarily still limited
structure and possibility. These frontier spaces are, like many video games, playgrounds
for power fantasies. Keza MacDonald’s review of GTAV, for example, notes the game’s
advancement of open world genre characteristics as a “tremendous freedom,” perfect for
“whetting your appetite for independent exploration” in an “astonishingly well-realised . .
. living world.” This artificial freedom and the independence to dominate the game’s
massive, detailed space fulfills both players’ sense of “achievement”—or, broadly,
power—and “immersion.”
This dissertation is concerned with what power is at play in open world games
and, more specifically, what its resultant immersive fantasies illustrate about popular
commercial, political, and cultural mores. After all, as Daniel Heath Justice (Cherokee)
points out, fantasy “presumes some measure of falsehood . . . too readily transformed
into pathology and neurosis,” and “also presumes a kind of arrogant certainty over what
is real and unreal, true and false, legitimate and delusional” (n.p.). Linking these neurotic
fantasies to the continuing literal power of settler colonial cultures reveals functionalities
of both the games and the settler colonial assumptions regarding settler colonial
legitimacy itself. Informed by and bringing together different fields—from the social,

10

Cutscenes are, simplistically, cinematic portions of games where the player has little to no input or
control.
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political, and storytelling theory of Indigenous studies, to video game studies, to postcolonial and Marxist theory—I will analyze open world games’ settler colonial codes
(both literal and figurative) as well as their treatment of Indigeneity. My dissertation thus
argues a few central points about big-budget Western open world games: (1) they are
what I call artificial frontiers, and as such are the preeminent entertainment of settler
colonial cultural mores and the sustained eliminative logics of those mores’ historical
frontierism; (2) they reveal, reflect, propagate, accommodate, and assuage settler colonial
anxieties and desires; (3) they exhibit (and attempt to obscure) the genocidal logic and
exploitative relations of Western settler colonialism and neoliberalism; consequently, to
some extent this dissertation argues the video game industry’s social function shows the
compatibility of settler-influenced neoliberalism with fascist ideology.
As this dissertation merges different scholarly fields, I must navigate and
streamline discourses, bodies of literature, and lexicons that are common in particular
disciplines but may not be obvious outside of them. As such, this introduction will
explain the specific values that are central to my analysis, as well as reference starting
points for further reading on other, less formative subjects. First, I discuss the concept of
the “frontier” and its constitutive settler neurosis between inside and outside, both
territorially and psychoanalytically. Next, I consider the structure of settler colonialism
and the ways in which its reliance on a “logic of elimination” creates a contradictory
appropriation of Indigeneity and disavowal of genocide. Then, I highlight how this
neurosis relates to the play of video games. I move onto an outline of how this
dissertation treats the concept of Indigeneity, and then turn to the more mechanical
aspects of my methodology: the reading, playing, and critical approaches that ground my
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analysis. Finally, I emphasize this dissertation’s core aims: how these games function as
settler cultural reproduction, and what that reproduction tells us about the modern
structure of settler colonialism itself. A breakdown of how each chapter contributes to
this overall goal ends this introduction.
The Inside/Outside Frontier
I have already characterized open world games as artificial frontiers, but it is
important to describe (1) what “frontier” represents as a term and a concept and (2) how
it fits into the wider framework of settler colonialism, simplistically understandable for
now as a particular type of imperialism. Andrea Mura, in his psychoanalytic
differentiation between “border” and “frontier,” calls a border the “solid and hypertrophic
line of separation between inside and outside,” and a frontier the “the more permeable
organisation of the limit in neurosis” (64). The neurosis he refers to is the anxiety
produced by resisting or rejecting the permeability of every social and psychological
“inside” and “outside.” No individual or social “inside” is hermetically sealed; all that is
internal is always changed and even defined by the very existence of and interactions
with an “outside.” As this implies a lack of control over the domain of the “self” (or
“society”), a kind of threat to self-sovereignty, neurosis is the result of attempting to seal
that “inside” from “outside,” to turn frontiers into borders.
Mura cites Dario Gentili’s work (in Italian) on the relevance of these concepts
(and their concurrent neurosis) to historical expressions of imperialist expansion and
culture. Gentili points out that the finis was a crucial concept for pre-Imperial Rome, one
of finitude and confinement, associated with the “straight line” that demarcates a
territory’s boundary. Mura says “a better rendering in English is provided by the term

8
‘border’” (71-2). This characterization of the border as a “straight line” of boundary is
echoed by the Charter of the United Nations and the Western model of national
sovereignty, a legacy of the Westphalian treaties of 1648. As Laurence Peters puts it, the
principles of these “treaty doctrines . . . undergird modern-day international relations”
(70). These principles relate primarily to each nation’s sole jurisdiction over their
“internal affairs” and the supposed equality of sovereign-to-sovereign relations.
However, these principles only work with the finitude and confinement of borders, with
hard lines that determine the distinct division between a nation’s inside and outside: the
domain of their sovereignty and that which lies beyond.
Gentili’s work, Mura says, suggests that “post-republican Rome” was less
interested with their borders, their finis, and far more concerned with limis, “the kind of
defensive lines that were located in the peripheries of the Empire,” a term best translated
to English as “frontier” (72). The frontier’s expanse was a source of imperial anxiety due
to its porous nature. At the frontier, sovereignty was uncertain, and the “outside” (of
“barbarian” culture and population, invasion and uprising), was at once already inside the
frontier and always capable of entering it or pushing deeper. For post-republican Rome,
then, the frontier was a space that demanded the construction and maintenance of a
border so as to make sovereignty clear and defensible. The frontier must be definitively
“won” and thus become a border. In other words, the outside must be made inside, and
cleansed of the anxiety-producing alterity of the outside. But the frontier was not simply a
source of anxiety for Rome. It was also a source of identity, income, and, of course,
territory. Imperial Rome was culturally and economically defined by its expansion, and
the “frontier” is a concept that carries with it the promise of more outside to make inside,
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a dangerous but profitable prospect. Mura suggests there is significant overlap between
the Roman imperial concept of the frontier and Frederick Turner’s once enormously
influential “frontier thesis.”
Turner’s “frontier thesis” was once the most popular American historical
interpretation of American society, and remains deeply influential. The thesis suggested
that American particularity was the product of frontier experiences. As one of the most
famous passages from Turner’s The Frontier in American History puts it:
American democracy was born of no theorist's dream; it was not carried in the
Susan Constant to Virginia, nor in the Mayflower to Plymouth. It came out of the
American forest, and it gained new strength each time it touched a new frontier.
Not the constitution, but free land and an abundance of natural resources open to a
fit people, made the democratic type of society in America for three centuries
while it occupied its empire. (294)
For Turner’s America, as for post-republican Rome, it was the imperial occupation of the
frontier that forged its state, culture, and imperial future; America was made by turning
that perilous inside/outside space into a confined whole. But of course, the lands that
were to become the United States of America are not the lands of Europe and North
Africa; the European colonial powers, and states founded by their settlers that would later
diverge from those powers, are not Imperial Rome. Rome’s project of imperialism was
reliant on the existing populations of its frontier as a source of labour (economic, martial,
and otherwise); the settling-America, by contrast, “occupied its empire” with the surplus
populations of colonial powers.

10
My use of “surplus population” is drawn from Marxist theory addressing the
development of capital and the consequential management of population (and labour).11
Broadly speaking, surplus populations are the under- and un-employed, the economically
deprived population not using its potential labour for any number of contextual reasons.
The European powers that engaged heavily in imperialism and the settlement of the socalled New World had growing surplus populations for which colonization provided a
profitable and presumably less dangerously insurrectionist outlet.12 Indeed, the vast
majority of early European settlers came from deeply impoverished backgrounds, and the
transfer of these populations to the Americas was the genesis of Western indentured
servitude.13 In the settler colonial context, these surplus populations become settlers and
are no longer surplus in settlement. This is a crucial part of the settler project, and one
which the existing populations of Indigenous people are always-already “outside.” As
Frantz Fanon articulated, the metaphorical “zone where the natives live is not
complementary to the zone inhabited by the settlers. The two zones are opposed, but not
in the service of a higher unity” (37), and thus exist in a state of “reciprocal exclusivity.”

The concept, as developed in Marxist theory, first appeared in Engels’ The Condition of the Working
Class in England. Engels described the unemployed and underemployed in industrializing England as the
“reserve army of labour,” a precursor/equivalent concept to “surplus population.” Though the concept
categorizes a population under industrialized capitalism, I am using it here to refer to a more generalized
category. This is not to over-simplify or detract from the specificity of the term as it is used in the
scholarship, but rather to build upon it. Scholars such as Michael McIntyre (2011) exhaustively relate the
concept to racial categories, and the development from colonial imperialism to modern capitalism. By
mobilizing the term “surplus populations” to reference events before industrial capitalism, I highlight this
related development (from imperialism to capitalism) as an undergirding settler logic regarding population
and labour management.
11

12

While a certain level of surplus population is desirable in (proto-)capitalist economies (to allow for
constant expansion of production with a ready and wage-starved demographic), a too-high level is
dangerous to a state in any form. A large population without means to sustain themselves is a population
amenable to rebellion.
13

See Salinger (1997) for a summary on the context of early settler indentured servitude and her focus on
its “exploitative nature” (338) in favour of trading interests.
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Fanon argues that no true “conciliation is possible,” for the Indigenous is “superfluous”
(38) in a framework that refigures another (formerly surplus) population into a newly
labouring population for the economic benefit of the colonial power.
Rome’s frontiers (and later, its legions) were not overwhelmingly populated (or to
be populated) by people from the Italian peninsula, but rather by those Indigenous to
those frontiers. The American frontier, though, was already a settlement project of
European surplus populations. By the time America’s frontier turned to borders, the
varied Indigenous peoples that lived within those borders became an even more
troublesome surplus to be managed.14 To put it back in psychoanalytic terms, settler
states figured those populations as a fraught trace of the frontier’s “outside” that exists
“inside”: a neurosis. This is not uniquely American, however: it is an integral part of
settler colonialism’s particularity, which contrasts with other kinds of colonialism and
imperialism. Rome’s imperial project to supposedly civilize the “outside” to be part of
the Roman “inside” has more in common with European colonialism in other parts of the
world, such as the Indian subcontinent, than it does with settler colonial projects. Though
just as oppressively paternalistic in both theory and practice, these imperial projects did
not have the same mechanics or aims as settler colonialism; indeed, neither did the
bordered settler nation states they would spawn, carrying the same strain of Westphalian
sovereignty.
14

This phenomena of Indigenous Peoples becoming surplus labour to be aggressively exploited as part of
elimination is broadly understood in scholarship for many settler states across disciplines, if not recognized
in these specific terminologies. As Glen Coulthard (Dene) writes regarding the Canadian context, “It is now
generally acknowledged among historians and political economists that following the waves of colonial
settlement that marked the transition between mercantile and industrial capitalism . . . Native labor became
increasingly (although by no means entirely) superfluous to the political and economic development of the
Canadian state. Increased European settlement combined with an imported, hyper-exploited non-European
workforce meant that . . . Canadian state-formation and colonial-capitalist development required first and
foremost land, and only secondarily the surplus value afforded by cheap, Indigenous labor” (12).

12
It is tellingly in that same vein of surplus populations that Indigenous peoples
feature in Turner’s frontier thesis; in Turner’s vision, Indigenous peoples are there-andnot-there, a neurotic outside/inside. This is certainly apparent in the passage quoted
above, in which Indigenous peoples are conspicuously absent from the “free land”—
unless of course they are figured among the land’s “abundance of natural resources”
(294). In any event, they are apparently not a “fit people” for the land they have lived
upon for thousands of years. But Turner does not wholly eschew Indigenous peoples this
way throughout; they are in fact a constitutive part of that frontier, the danger it
represents, and the trial and challenge that forges America. When Turner talks about
early settler “trade” as the meeting between “savage” and “civilized,” he characterizes the
contact as the “disintegrating forces of civilization enter[ing] the wilderness” (13). When
Turner notes Indigenous peoples as anything but a military challenge, he is
characteristically evasive in depicting their reality, obfuscating the active role of settler
populations and institutions as the disintegrating forces themselves. The agency of these
changes is depersonalized and abstracted. When Turner considers “the effect of the trader
on the Indian,” he says the “trading post left the unarmed tribes at the mercy of those that
had purchased fire-arms,” while saying nothing about the armed settlers themselves, and
the proxy wars their states engaged between Indigenous peoples (13). By the time Turner
moves on to the “rapidity” of the trader’s “advance,” the “disintegrating forces of
civilization” once again slips comfortably into abstraction, where settlers merely meet,
and the abstract frontier does the work that undoes Indigenous peoples:
Every river valley and Indian trail became a fissure in Indian society, and so that
society became honeycombed. Long before the pioneer farmer appeared on the
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scene, primitive Indian life had passed away. The farmers met Indians armed with
guns. The trading frontier, while steadily undermining Indian power by making
the tribes ultimately dependent on the whites, yet, through its sale of guns, gave to
the Indian increased power of resistance to the farming frontier. (13)
For Turner, the frontier itself is agency, and while the settler trader is dependent upon
Indigenous peoples, the trader is merely a stepping stone of progress towards the settler
farmer. The settler farmer needs the land the Native occupies, and he needs it as “free
land.” As such, these newly empowered and resistant “Indians” become the martial
obstacle between settler trader and settler farmer that is so closely associated with the pop
cultural Western image of the “Indian,” pitted in ongoing conflict against the “Cowboy.”
This progression is a natural one for Turner, a progression whereby the violent
dispossession of Indigenous lands is not an activity of agency, but of teleology, where
“primitive” life disintegrates before “civilized” life. The reality, of course, is much more
complicated.
Turner’s focus on this transition from trading frontier to farming frontier does,
however, gently acknowledge just how much Indigenous people (or at least, their
knowledge and ways of life) were critical to the teleology of settler nationhood:
the Indian trade pioneered the way for civilization. The buffalo trail became the
Indian trail, and this became the trader's “trace;” the trails widened into roads, and
the roads into turnpikes, and these in turn were transformed into railroads. The
same origin can be shown for the railroads of the South, the Far West, and the
Dominion of Canada. (14)
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What this gentle acknowledgement lacks is a crucial awareness of Indigenous peoples’
critical role in sustaining that early trading frontier entirely, and how settler farming
depended upon Indigenous stewardship or Indigenous dispossession, and often both. One
microcosmic example: William Bradford, governor of the young Plymouth colony, noted
that the colony’s survival was dependent on the teachings of Tisquantum, a member of
the Patuxet tribe. Bradford highlighted that Tisquantum was instrumental in the colony’s
survival, as he taught the settlers “how to set their corn, where to take fish, and to procure
other commodities, and was also their pilot to bring them to unknown places for their
profit” (81). It was Tisquantum’s aid in agriculture that is most prevalent in Bradford
dubbing him a “special instrument sent of God for their good” (85). Tiquantum showed
settlers how to grow crops in this so-called New World, “both the manner how to set it,
and after how to dress and tend it” (85), as well as how to properly prepare the exhausted
soil for further cultivation. Though just one anecdote, Bradford’s account is emblematic
of the contemporary settler record’s stark awareness of how critical Indigenous peoples
were to the very possibility of settler agriculture (and thus profit). This awareness must
evaporate for Turner’s (and the settler cultural standard’s) frame of historical
development. As Thomas Wessel so pointedly phrases it, “[w]hile Indian agriculture
failed to gain much notice in historical texts, the subjects of those texts were well aware
of its importance” (14). Even as broad-strokes historical summary goes, Turner’s thesis
(and its relevance to current Western conceptions of the frontier) drastically
oversimplifies and elides when convenient for its teleological progression. Turner’s
trading frontier and farming frontier make way for the “Indian frontier,” where America
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is forged by an even more simplistic contest against Indigenous peoples who are armed
and increasingly resistant to the hostility of the settler project’s disintegrating civilization.
Turner’s explication of the “Indian frontier” is when Indigenous people return to
his narrative as an agent rather than a spectral, passive presence like the “free land” itself.
Here, they become the trial over which the “fit people” of American settlement must
triumph:
The effect of the Indian frontier as a consolidating agent in our history is
important. From the close of the seventeenth century various intercolonial
congresses have been called to treat with Indians and establish common measures
of defense. Particularism was strongest in colonies with no Indian frontier. This
frontier stretched along the western border like a cord of union. The Indian was a
common danger, demanding united action. Most celebrated of these conferences
was the Albany congress of 1754, called to treat with the Six Nations, and to
consider plans of union. Even a cursory reading of the plan proposed by the
congress reveals the importance of the frontier. The powers of the general council
and the officers were, chiefly, the determination of peace and war with the
Indians, the regulation of Indian trade, the purchase of Indian lands, and the
creation and government of new settlements as a security against the Indians. It is
evident that the unifying tendencies of the Revolutionary period were facilitated
by the previous cooperation in the regulation of the frontier. In this connection
may be mentioned the importance of the frontier, from that day to this, as a
military training school, keeping alive the power of resistance to aggression, and
developing the stalwart and rugged qualities of the frontiersman. (15)
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In this unintentionally ironic depiction of violent settler expansion from “farming
frontier” into “Indian frontier,” settler expansion is posed as “resistance to aggression,”
which powerfully illustrates the kind of forgetting necessary for this notion of national
identity. Indeed, the last “Fact” against the King of England listed by the United States’
Declaration of Independence is that he “endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our
frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare” into conflict with
American national sovereignty. This too, of course, is a forgetting and strategic elision of
Indigenous peoples’ own choices of alliance in pursuit of sovereignty in order to position
them as obedient wards of an imperial power. Many scholars, such as Jo-Ann Episkenew
(Métis), argue that many Indigenous groups living around what would become the USCanada border chose to ally with the British against American independence because of
the comparatively brutal American settler campaign for Indigenous territory, directly
executed by or to the pointed indifference of the nascent American government (22).15
The warfare associated with the “Indian frontier” is not cleanly separable from the
farming and trading so integral to Turner’s earlier stages. Indigenous trading becomes
competition rather than crucial; Indigenous agriculture and territory become targets for
settler invasion and occupation.
Wessel’s insistence that Indigenous agriculture was of utmost importance in the
texts of settlers themselves is once again relevant:
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This is not to suggest the settler colonial project of Canada was innocent of this essentially genocidal
relationship to Indigenous peoples. Episkenew goes on to highlight how the comparatively broadly violent
American approach merely gave the proto-Canadian state apparatus more leverage for treaties less
favourable to Indigenous peoples. These Treaties were to be largely broken by the developing Canadian
nation.
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Much of the conflict between Indians and whites on the frontier revolved around
the agricultural year. French invasions of Iroquois lands in New York coincided
with the early harvest when troops could wreak the greatest damage on Iroquois
fields. In 1779, General George Washington ordered John Sullivan to march on
the Iroquois and specifically noted the need to destroy their growing crops at a
time when it was too late for replanting. Kentucky frontiersmen nearly made it an
annual event to attack the Shawnee along the Wabash in the late summer, sure in
the knowledge that if they did not destroy Indian corn-fields, the Shawnee would
attack them when the harvest was in. Persistent destruction of Indian fields
reduced many tribes to relying almost exclusively on the hunt and conforming to
a life whites insisted the Indian savages represented. Debilitated and destitute
tribes became an easy prey to the land-grabbing schemes of frontier governors
who insisted that the Indians made no use of the land. Engrossment of Indian
lands to make way for white farmers remained the most tragic circumstance in
which agriculture linked Indian and white destinies. (14)
Wessel’s summary highlights historical facts from which Turner must turn away. Though
the exact progression of Wessel’s scenario is not universal in the settler colonial context,
it is emblematic of how the frontier manufactures the conditions of its own apparent
necessity. Savagery is operationalized by settlers in the frontier (through violence,
destruction, and theft of land), but figured solely as the domain of Indigenous peoples
whose conditions have been changed by that frontier’s settler-made parameters. This
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supposed savagery then warrants settlers’ civilizing measures to correct the “Indian
problem.”16
Just as the Declaration of Independence must make “savages” out of Indigenous
resistance, and just as Turner must figure settler invasion as “resistance to aggression,”
the settler conception of the frontier is a topography anxiously both inside and outside. It
is, simply, a terrain for a nation inside of borders to emerge. In the context of
historicizing settler colonialism, the frontier is about the creation of a national mythology
and identity. In the context of an accurate rendering of the frontier’s actual conditions, it
is less about creating “the settler,” and more about creating “the Indian,” the surplus
population to be removed, the “outside.” The frontier is a space of conditions meant to
frame peoples who were once critical to survival as savages existentially opposed to that
survival. So when Turner’s frontier thesis moves beyond this contest between settler and
“Indian,” it carries with it this misunderstanding, this critical gap. The gap becomes the
building neurosis of Turner’s frontier thesis. This neurosis recognizes the settler project’s
“disintegrating forces” as the genesis for the “social ills” of the American settler nation
state, but is unable to connect this process to the original conflicting reliance upon and
dispossession of Indigenous life and lands. In other words, once the frontier has become
the border, Turner must turn his attention to the “new frontiers” of America without
confronting how its newfound sovereignty of “inside” constituted itself by trying to
eliminate the “outside” of Indigenous sovereignties. This elimination was never
complete, and the nation continues to exist with those “outsides” within its borders. As
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See the following chapter for references to scholarship on a specific instance of this progression,
particularly Hubbard (2014) and Smits (1994).
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such, it is in the full expression of this neurosis, this unchecked contradiction, where
Turner’s often explicitly racist and ahistorical thesis exhibits the analysis of American
society and identity that still resonates in popular culture today.
Having conquered the frontier of literal land, argues Turner, America developed a
sensibility that excels in surmounting broad national obstacles. This argument carries that
crude forgetting, that core neurosis regarding Indigenous aid and, more importantly,
Indigenous death, displacement, and survival. Turner says that in the “to-day” of 1893,
Americans look “with a shock upon a changed world” (293), where the primary goal of
territorial expansion has been replaced by conservation along very particular
economically-minded lines:
The national problem is no longer how to cut and burn away the vast screen of the
dense and daunting forest; it is how to save and wisely use the remaining timber.
It is no longer how to get the great spaces of fertile prairie land in humid zones
out of the hands of the government into the hands of the pioneer; these lands have
already passed into private possession. No longer is it a question of how to avoid
or cross the Great Plains and the arid desert. It is a question of how to conquer
those rejected lands by new method of farming and by cultivating new crops from
seed collected by the government and by scientists from the cold, dry steppes of
Siberia, the burning sands of Egypt, and the remote interior of China . . . The cry
of scientific farming and the conservation of natural resources replaces the cry of
rapid conquest of the wilderness. We have so far won our national home, wrested
from it its first rich treasures, and drawn to it the unfortunate of other lands, that
we are already obliged to compare ourselves with settled states of the Old World.
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In place of our attitude of contemptuous indifference to the legislation of such
countries as Germany and England, even Western States like Wisconsin send
commissions to study their systems of taxation, workingmen’s insurance, old age
pensions and a great variety of other remedies for social ills. (293-4)
That America is a “settled state” has unintentional double-meaning here, one not so
comparable to the “Old World” nations in question. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the
consolidation of American settlement turns the settler’s gaze to the progenitors of the
settler project for mimicry, and to far-flung locales for scientific advancement. Siberian,
Chinese, and Egyptian17 agriculture springs to the forefront for the “rejected lands” that
are the “Great Plains,” where Indigenous peoples successfully farmed multi-seasonal
crops for deep stretches of time.18 It is interesting as well that these “rejected lands” are
where many of the largest and most populous reservations within United States borders
are located. Thus by the time the settler state fashions itself after the colonial powers, it
must have forgotten its constitutive genocide, and the real aids, impacts, and losses of its
own construction. The new frontiers, here associated with a “cry” for “science” and
solutions to “social ills” of the settler economy and labour, are not fashioning American
institution and identity, but the tests left for America to surmount. The original American
frontier, for Turner, is where the contest aimed at Indigenous death and displacement is
naturalized as a process of “civilization.” The “new frontiers” of this settled civilization
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It is also worth pointing out that the three listed locales are sites of imperialist conflict. The steppes of
Siberia has its own history of Russian imperialist invasion against Indigenous peoples, such as the Yakut.
10 years before Turner delivered his thesis, England invaded Egypt to reassert control during growing antiimperialist sentiment. 10 years after he would deliver it, the anti-imperialist Boxer Rebellion would begin
in China.
See Paul Minnis’ People and Plants in Ancient Eastern North America (2010) for an extensive survey of
the archaeobotanical data and academic literature of Indigenous farming in the Great Plains.
18
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are where Indigenous aid and pre-existing civilizational modes (like agriculture, trade,
and statecraft) evaporate as factors (original or continuing) in that same process.
Indigenous peoples did not evaporate, but their continued existence within the American
“inside” must be evaded for this frontier ideology to remain consistent. This forgetful
frontier ideology is not coherent (and therein lies the neurosis), but it is consistent. The
settler psychology of the frontier is a particular iteration of the same expansive, extractive
relationship based on possession as it was for Imperial Rome.
Mura points out that Aldo Schiavone’s work also connects the Imperial Roman
conception of the “frontier” with Turner’s. The frontier’s retrospective historical
incoherence makes it more a “state of mind . . . rather than a legal, material and
institutional concept” (Mura 72). It is, as Schiavone puts it, “not so much a line where
one stops, but rather an area that works as an invitation to access” (5). It is via this
“invitation to access” that the concept of the frontier is mostly potently and ubiquitously
represented in popular media and Western consciousness. In the expansionist mode of
American nationhood, or the so-called Wild West, the frontier is the invitation to lands,
invitation to expansion, extraction, and “exploration.” The invitation is fraught with
concurrent dangers, dangers which make the contest worthwhile—not to mention
lucrative. When the lines of American borders reach from coast to coast, the “frontiers”
become a new invitation to “conquer . . . rejected lands” with scientific farming (Turner
294), and so on. The Indigenous peoples displaced and destroyed by disease, warfare, and
increasingly divisive policy are at once over-present and spectral. Turner recognized that
the earliest stages of the frontier required “Indian” aid and trade just as the Roman
frontier was “semi-permeable . . . allowing for intense exchange and integration of social
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and economic activities” (Mura 72). The American frontier then progresses, and invites
access that requires the disappearance of Indigenous peoples for settlement, territory, and
agriculture to grow settler surplus labour. Turner fashions this as a defensive battle,
where once indispensable Indigenous life becomes fodder for American contest. Finally,
the frontier becomes the new venue of access (for teleological scientific and civilizational
progress), and Indigenous life is helpfully absent from the equation. But the frontier is
always “semi-permeable,” and its continued existence in Western cultural production
necessitates the neurosis of the “outside”—an outside it never fully eliminated and still
exists within the hard lines, the borders of the settler “inside.” The frontier’s graduation
to a fully conceptual space is the pure expression of a universal invitation to access. Mura
points out that the imperial mindset is a “single one with no outside: hence Ovid’s
emphasis that ‘Roman space is both the city and the world’” (73). This remains true for
the settler conception of the frontier. The settler colonial concept of the universal frontier
differs from the Roman one particularly in its positioning of Indigenous lives, a neurosisproducing continuance outside the “single one.”19

Mura’s article wants to reclaim some of the characteristics of the frontier, uncoupled from these
imperialistic anxieties (neurosis). My use of his study does not necessarily counter this entirely, but does
suggest such uncoupling is impossible in the settler colonial context that Turner writes in and has defined.
The concept of the frontier is one here associated with inevitable and constant permeability, which is an
inescapable psychological and political reality. Mura’s psychoanalytic framing of borders highlights them
as a response to the anxiety produced by the conceptual frontier’s permeability continuing after the physical
frontier’s closing. Mura appears to embrace the permeability of the frontier and dispense with that
permeability’s constitutive “invitation to access.” As the following section’s description should make clear,
and what each chapter should in some way demonstrate, the peculiar psychology of settler culture is
distinct in expansive genocide as constitutive of its frontier. Thus Mura’s frontier analysis shows the
conceptual “access” shared by Turnerian and Roman imperial frontierism, but fails to recognize the
substantive differences that makes settler colonialism uniquely neurotic and genocidal.
19
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The Structure: Settler Colonialism
In this dissertation, my use of “settler colonialism” is informed by a wide range of
literature from Indigenous, Settler Colonial, and Post-Colonial Studies. Patrick Wolfe’s
“Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native” is perhaps the most academically
influential in establishing the term’s continuing relevance. Wolfe’s argument is especially
relevant for my purposes in two ways. Firstly, it treats settler colonialism as a dynamic
and global phenomenon20 that is distinct from other kinds of colonialism in its aims,
character, and resulting symptoms. As such, the cultural trends I will identify are legible
in that wide historical context. Secondly, Wolfe positions settler colonialism not as a
completed series of historical points on a timeline, but as a continuing and reconstituting
set of relations and institutions. As he famously puts it, settler colonial invasion is a
“structure not an event” (388). As such, Wolfe’s conception does not envision a
necessarily explicit conspiracy of interests in the different examples of settler colonialism
around the world, but instead identifies a shared logic of colonial powers with similar
aims. Furthermore, settler states that develop institutions and populations of ethnic
colonizer origins (such as Canada and the United States) grow from this logic and
dynamically retain it. In other words, as mentioned above, British colonial territoriality in
India differed from the structure of its dominance in North America or Australia. In
settler colonial countries, modern settler state history is born of, in Wolfe’s words, a
“logic of elimination” that views Indigenous inhabitants as obstacles to territorial control,
resource extraction, and authority over labour.
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Australia, the United States, and Israel are three settler states that Wolfe details in that article.
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Beyond this précis, it is important to more substantively delineate how the settler
colonial structure differs from other colonial projects. I have introduced the notion of
surplus populations already, and the logic of elimination is the notable outcome of the
settler relationship to Indigenous surplus populations. While non-settler projects use
Indigenous populations as labour and long-term stewards of colonial military and
economic expansion, the settler project must eliminate Indigenous populations to achieve
“settlement” of the land. As David Lloyd and Wolfe put it, “colonial settlement provided
an outlet for the Malthusian excess, industrial society’s surplus poor, who departed their
Dickensian slums for Indigenous people’s stolen homelands” (112). Once these settler
populations differentiate themselves from the European colonial power into settler states,
the settler colonial structure and its logic of elimination are reshaped but nevertheless
continue. The logic takes many forms, including assimilation alongside death,
displacement, and containment. Despite a still-oppressive relationship structured by a
logic of elimination that continues, contemporary settler states often engage a
nationalistic “contradictory reappropriation of a foundationally disavowed Aboriginality”
(Wolfe 389) in their cultural identities. This is an important modern aspect of the anxious
neurosis delineated above. Since the elimination is not complete, settler states pivot to
cannibalizing Indigeneity as part of their characters. The outside still present, the settler
inside half-acknowledges genocide as a tragic past event, while ignoring the continuing
logics of elimination (in containment, in divide-and-rule, “Indian status” legislation, etc).
Just as with Turner, the frontier experience and battles with Indigenous peoples are
figured as past events rather than a key component of a continuing structure.
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Lorenzo Veracini has also contributed important work on settler colonialism, with
some distinct differences from Wolfe’s definition, in Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical
Overview, his synthesis of many studies of settler colonialism. For Veracini, what
differentiates settler colonialism from other colonialisms is not just that the colonizers byand-large remain on the land they colonize and do so by importing their own
governmental systems. Veracini is more interested in the host of other procedural and
long-term historical structures. He draws heavily from Wolfe’s assertion that settler
colonialism’s foundational trait is the “dispensability” of Indigenous populations on the
colonized land (Settler Colonialism 9). The people who make up those populations are
disposable, but their very existence, control, dispersal, extermination, and identities (as
legitimate claimants to the land), however, are foundational to settler colonial societies.
Turner believed it was the contest with Indigenous peoples that built a kind of national
American character, and in a sense Veracini’s argument agrees. But it is not a “character”
of rugged self-sufficiency as Turner portrays, but rather economic enrichment shaped by
the very institutional and economic realities for which Indigenous lives and lands were
and are figured as an invitation of access, a colonial territoriality.
Veracini notes several important “approaches” to understanding settler
colonialism’s development:
specific positioning in world trade patterns (settler economies operate in “areas of
recent settlement” and concentrate on a limited number of “staple” commodities),
the development of “settler capitalism,” the transformation of local biota and
landscapes, and a specific demography, where indigenous peoples are swamped
by invading Europeans, and other migrations. Specific patterns of land tenure,
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appropriation and distribution, a predominance of individual initiative over statecentred activities, and, conversely, state promotion and organisation of the settler
enterprise[,] . . . particular spatial politics of exclusion[,] . . . specific reproductive
regimes (the possibility of reproducing familial patterns is one fundamental
defining feature of settler colonial regimes), and . . . a structural “logic of
elimination” (13).
The “logic of elimination,” as borrowed from Wolfe, manifests as settler colonialism’s
active processes that “strive for the dissolution of native societies” in order to erect “a
new colonial society on the expropriated land base.” Here, “elimination is an organizing
principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence.”
The aim is gaining more land, and Indigenous peoples are thus an obstacle to be removed
(Wolfe 388). “Territoriality,” says Wolfe, “is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible
element,” and it is not always expressed as outright slaughter. As Wolfe says, “officially
encouraged miscegenation, the breaking-down of native title into alienable individual
freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion, resocialization in total
institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and a whole range of cognate
biocultural assimilations” (388) are just some of the ways settler colonialism attempts to
eliminate Indigenous peoples. These methods are not as obviously but no less effectively
genocidal than the frontier massacres that settler colonialism’s history in North America
(and elsewhere) includes. This highlights Veracini’s claim that settler colonialism’s
aggressive oppression of Indigenous peoples can be “invisible” in a way, particularly to
settlers. As Veracini says,
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settler colonial phenomena possess a mimetic character, and . . . a recurrent need
to disavow produces a circumstance where the actual operation of settler colonial
practices is concealed behind other occurrences . . . The settler hides behind the
metropolitan coloniser (the settler is not sovereign, it is argued; “he is not
responsible for colonialism” and its excesses), behind the activity of settlers
elsewhere, behind the persecuted, the migrant, even the refugee (the settler has
suffered elsewhere and “is seeking refuge in a new land”). The settler hides
behind his labour and hardship (the settler does not dispossess anyone; he
“wrestles with the land to sustain his family”). Most importantly, the peaceful
settler hides behind the ethnic cleanser (colonisation is an inherently non-violent
activity; the settler enters a “new, empty land to start a new life”; indigenous
people naturally and inevitably “vanish”; it is not settlers that displace them) . . .
Settler colonialism obscures the conditions of its own production. (Settler
Colonialism 14)
Just as the actual frontier manufactured the conditions of its own necessity literally—
such as the destruction of Indigenous agricultures as mentioned above—continuing settler
structure conceptually manufactures the conditions of its own necessity to justify the
further elimination in methods less overtly violent. Like Turner’s strategic omissions, this
forgetful and mythological historical narrative is a key component of the current settler
colonial neurosis. In a pedagogical study of “frontier logics” of Canadian teachers,
Dwayne Trevor Donald (Cree), potently highlights this neurosis, a cultural friction, in
similar terms for educators:
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Historical, social, and cultural understandings of the concepts of fort and frontier
have become conflated with ways of organizing and separating people according
to race, culture, and civilization; as a result, Aboriginal peoples and their ways
have been reduced to an existence outside Euro-Western civilization. The sociospatial separation of Canadian (insiders) and Aboriginal (outsiders) is a
naturalized idiosyncrasy of Canadian society that has been passed down
generation by generation in the form of an authoritative national historical
narrative . . . These influences leave many educators unable to comprehend the
historic and ongoing Aboriginal presence and participation within Canadian
society. (23)
Settler colonialism’s obscured conditions and production are why settler states so
easily advance their popular cultural awareness to a double-bind of disavowal and
appropriation. Anna Johnston, Alan Lawson, Veracini, and others have studied the ways
in which settler societies, despite the oppositional relationship to Indigenous peoples
generally and because of that obscured production of their own identities, engage in the
“contradictory reappropriation of a foundationally disavowed Aboriginality” (Wolfe
389). As Avril Bell notes, a great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the “settler
appropriation of indigenous authenticity to give substance and distinctiveness to their
own nationalist identity claims” (122). This is perhaps the purest expression of the
neurosis of settler colonial cultural production. The outside must be fashioned as inside
while the society at large still engages activities formed from a logic to expunge that
outside. As such, the ideology present in even fictional representations still walk this
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contradictory line of disavowal and appropriation, as it does in the game Red Dead
Redemption, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
Cultural Production, Games, and the Artificial Frontier
This neurosis based on obscured history and eliminatory logic, together with the
aforementioned aspects of settler colonial structure and cultural production, are important
frameworks for my analysis of the open world video game genre. The several settler
nations around the world today share many institutional, economic, cultural, and social
trends. Again, this is not (necessarily) as a result of concerted effort, but because the very
structure of settler colonialism conditions particular exigencies and prescribes their most
self-interested responses. As carriers of settler colonial cultural axioms, Hollywood’s
Western and American sensibilities have in many cases founded or inflected the
languages of cinema and its global iterations; that settler states have global reach means
their ideological neuroses also find a great deal of international commercial traction.
Video games too are carriers of settler colonial cultural axioms that are part-and-parcel of
the cultures that spawned the open world genre.
Wolfe’s focus on the structures of settler colonialism is especially useful for
studying video games. After all, one thing that separates video games from other fictive
media is that they are more literally “structural.” From theorists like Ludwig
Wittgenstein and Johan Huizinga and on to early influential video game theorists like
Jesper Juul, Espen Aarseth, and Frank Lantz, and works such as Katie Salen and Eric
Zimmerman’s Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals, games are defined by rules as
a structure wherein “play” takes place. To “play” a game is to, at some level, agree to a
structure and engage a limited agency therein. Video games are perhaps even more
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structural than other kinds of games. The function of game design is to structure the
modes and progression of interaction available to players, and it is these seen-and-unseen
programmatic and programmed systems that variously obscure or reveal themselves in
order to guide “play” in the ways designers intend. Salen and Zimmerman’s concept of
the “magic circle” is drawn from Huizinga’s work “as short-hand for the idea of a special
place in time and space created by a game” (95). As Zimmerman later put it, “Time and
space, and identity, and social relations acquire new meanings while [a] game is going
on. This is how playing a game is ‘entering a magic circle’ – there are meanings which
emerge as cause and effect of the game as it is played” (2). Yet how a video game is
played is reliant on its programmed rules. Edward Castronova argues that the circles of
virtual worlds are necessarily porous, specifically in the areas of “markets, politics, and
law” (148), as these affect the production and play. In other words, if games create their
own virtual time and space wherein play happens and meaning is made, then their rules
necessarily affect how that play and meaning is understood and expressed in the real
world. This is no less true for how the rules of the exterior, material world affect the
interior, virtual world.
The porous nature of frontiers and the apparent rigidity of borders, then, are
conceptually important characteristics to consider for analyzing the open world video
game genre. The magic circle, necessarily porous between player and played, is
paradoxically rigid in its programming that structures the great majority of players’
interactions. Big-budget open world games, with their focus on an apparent freedom of
movement and choice, appear to embrace the “invitation of access” more directly than
almost any other genre. Yet in actuality, gameplay is a highly structured affair, where
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thousands of hours of human labour have been spent to direct certain styles of play and
produce particular reactions and engagements from its audience. The gameplay of bigbudget open world games, as mentioned above, is centred on autonomous traversal of
space and power gains. To add to that formula as it has been expressed through more than
a decade of multi-million dollar examples, the open world genre’s gameplay is also
centred on violence and extraction. For many of these games, freedom of movement,
killing, resource extraction, and crafting are the aspects of gameplay that dominate the
player’s input. These artificial frontiers, though necessarily limited in size (albeit
significantly larger than other genres), feature limitless death, extraction, and production.
Violent exploration and a limited set of activities to gain power for that violence are the
core principles, the “invitation of access,” of the frontier. As such, the frontiers depicted
by the content of the games I analyze here are direct inheritors and propagators of the
settler colonial concept. The borders of the magic circle, the structure of the games’
programmed design exhibit the neurosis of settler culture. These artificial frontiers are the
play of the settler frontier’s conceptual continuance, and as this dissertation will argue,
are productively emblematic of the psychology and ideology that conducted, continues,
and disavows the exploitation of this imperial relationship.
In this dissertation, I argue that these games can neither transgress nor transcend
the settler neurosis, nor can they offer a substantial critique of settler structure—even
when they overtly attempt to do so. A frontier of a video game takes place within the
safety of the magic circle’s borders. As Castronova argues, the magic circle has a
necessarily porous relationship between players and the material realities of its
production and reception. But as Zimmerman’s re-articulation argues, the magic circle is
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play within borders. The borders, just as national borders, are not perfect sealants against
influence in either direction. This is not an anxiety-producing reality within the
boundaries of play, however. Play is not statecraft; play is the temporary, apparent
suspension of the rules of the material world for investment into the rules of an imagined
world. The neurotic anxious dangers of the frontier in the settler conception are muted
and artificial in a video game precisely because they are not real. The dangers of the
frontier (the universal “invitation to access,” logic of elimination, etc.) as a neurotic
construction, however, are inherent to the open world video game frontier. These aspects
are coded into their structures, written into their narratives. Open world games are
premised on the promise of the frontier, and are salves for the neurosis of settler
structure.
Dynamic Indigeneity
As the open world genre has its history in these Western cultural paradigms,
desires, and anxieties, their frontiers unsurprisingly deal with Indigeneity (fictionalized,
real, and allegorical) with increasing frequency. Indigeneity, as a category of identity, is
an integral part of the settler colonial imaginary21 that it plays and replays. Turner
believed the frontier experience (and, primarily, its role as the venue for “Indian” wars)
developed settler identity. This is half true, insofar as settler identity is constructed in
opposition to another identity it must create: the “Indian.” I use “Indigenous” adjectivally
to refer to an enormous number of different peoples, cultures, and languages, and
“Indigeneity” to refer to a category of identity, whereas I use “Indian” to refer to the

Manfred Steger and Paul James refer to “imaginaries” as “deep-seated modes of understanding [that]
provide largely pre-reflexive parameters within which people imagine their social existence—expressed,
for example, in conceptions of ‘the global,’ ‘the national,’ ‘the moral order of our time.’” (23)
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fictional figure/identity concocted by the settler relationship to Indigenous peoples. Both
of these terms require clearer, if not stricter definitions.
In this dissertation, I use “Indigenous people(s)” to refer to those people, nations,
tribes, and cultures that were the first to live on a particular land, now marginalized by
nation states (and attendant corporate apparatuses) of settler societies. Later chapters will
get more specific on how these categories relate to social structure, race, and genetics, but
here it is important to highlight that the relationship is dynamic. For many Indigenous
scholars, Indigeneity has more to do with community relationships (and the attendant
dynamic, nuanced, complicated elements that define those relationships) than DNA
testing (and its blunt attempt at mathematical racialization). A more specific definition
for what exactly “Indigenous” means, for a settler scholar like myself, requires careful
citation and theoretical restraint. This is not a move of hesitance but of principle formed
by my understanding of the work of many Indigenous scholars. For example, Taiaiake
Alfred (Mohawk) and Jeff Corntassel (Cherokee) theorize Indigeneity as a dynamic,
shifting category. They argue, “[g]iven that Indigenous identities are (re)constructed at
multiple levels—global, state, community, individual,” the “definitional authority” of
settler (and other) institutions use specification as a means of “political-legal
compartmentalization” (600). As Alfred and Corntassel put it, “demands for precision
and certainty disregard the reality of the situation: that group identity varies with time and
place” (600). This does not mean Indigeneity, as a category, is ethereal or spectrally
resists practical value.
My understanding of Indigenous identities, broadly, is somewhat akin to the
approach of Sean Teuton (Cherokee) and what he calls “realist theory”:
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social identities, for example, function like theories, processing data as they
appear, and, like theories, they are capable of producing normative knowledge of
the world. Built on our experiences, our identities are clearly constructed, but the
fact that they are theory mediated is not peculiar to identities; in fact, all inquiry—
scientific and otherwise—proceeds with inherent historical and social
attachments. (32)
As such, my use of the label “Indigenous” is intended to be dynamic but nevertheless
structural. As Teuton further states, such a concept “can be constructed but nonetheless
capable of producing stable accounts of the world. Identities can be politically and
epistemically significant and still not essentialist” (32). Expanding upon the simplest
notion regarding a people first occupying a land, Alfred and Corntassel provide a broader
set of criteria that is also part of my understanding: a “dynamic and interconnected
concept of Indigenous identity constituted in history, ceremony, language and land,” as
well as “relationships (or kinship networks)” (609), social structures that are historically
oppressed by settler nations around the globe. Though these histories, ceremonies,
languages, lands, and kinships may share many elements across countless cultures (as
they do between settler cultures, and between settler and Indigenous cultures), I assert the
importance of cultural specificity as principle as well as methodology. Often when I rely
upon broader uses of “Indigenous” or “Indigeneity,” I do so to elucidate how the
operation of settler conceptions multiply affect a myriad of culturally and historically
distinct peoples.
In analyzing the settler conceptions, I am indebted to many more Indigenous
scholars, such as Jodi Byrd (Chickasaw), Philip Deloria (Standing Rock Sioux), and
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Gerald Vizenor (Anishinaabe). Vizenor’s detailing of the American settler construction
of the capital I “Indian” identity as the authenticating obstacle to Manifest Destiny
(Turner’s “Indian frontier”) is central to my thinking throughout this dissertation, and I
will touch upon the work of all three scholars in the following chapters. For now, it is
enough to note I use “Indian” to refer to the fictional figure of simulated Indigeneity. The
games closely studied in this dissertation all feature this simulation, the aggregated,
simplified, and distorted simulations of Indigenous peoples.
Where This is Going and How I Do It
For this project, methodology includes more than the theoretical merging of
frameworks and terminologies mentioned above. While those are the conceptual lenses I
bring to my argument, my methodology for this project also involves (1) the work of both
close “reading” the games under discussion as well as an ongoing survey of hobbyist
media reception and video game industry standards, and (2) working through the games
themselves to inform my close reading and efforts to situate aspects of them in the above
merged framework. As such, a disclaimer is necessary: I have made editorial choices
regarding evidence and throughline. Either out of obsessive compulsion or determined
scholarship, I am a completionist for the games studied here. This makes me something
of an anomaly among players of open world games, which are designed to accommodate
a number of play styles, including those who play games with an outright hostility to
narrative. As a result, a great deal of these games’ content is missable. I am interested in
what these games’ designs prioritize in their structures (i.e., what is not missable if the
player wishes to finish the main storyline, what incentives are provided to experience a
part of the game that I am discussing). Nevertheless, simply because a particular part of a
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game is not experienced by even the majority of people who play it does not mean it
cannot enlighten us regarding broader trends. After all, every part of these games, in the
big-budget examples of this particular genre, has gone through numerous hands
(including massive Quality Assurance and testing teams) before it reaches a mass
audience. Thus the assumptions and ignorance I try to excavate can be as telling as the
more obvious evidence on the surface. I focus primarily on these games’ narrative modes
and symbolic languages, the context of their production and reception, and how their
designs privilege particular play.
As for games’ affective properties, I specifically target how these power fantasies
endeavour to satisfy the gamer motivations of “immersion” and “achievement,” and do so
by providing simulations of dominance and salves for colonial anxiety. As such, since
these games are developed with similar design principles—a proliferation of which I
highlight in the following chapter, and delineate in more detail in the second chapter—
my close readings are less interested in how these games feel, and more interested in how
these games deliver those interchangeable feelings through their symbolic and narrative
representations, as well as the contexts of their construction and delivery. Thus my
methodology, weighted more heavily on games as audio-visual narrative products and
their industrial/commercial contexts than the experiences unique to the medium, is
perhaps frictional with more formalistic analysis of video games. I am comfortable with
my methodological emphases, however, for a few reasons. Firstly, those shared, iterative,
and increasingly repetitive design principles are clearly motivated towards satisfying
those consumer desires for “immersion” and “achievement” by advancing their roles as,
broadly, immersive power fantasies. Secondly, I believe detailing the settler cultural
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context of these wildly popular products provides a theoretical framework useful not only
for understanding the material and psychoanalytical implications of those apparently
unique gameplay experiences, but also useful for further qualitative and quantitative
study of gamer experience. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, contrary to the more
extreme formalistic positions that suggest narrative content is at best secondary to video
game analysis, I maintain that this particular genre’s popularity, and its most popular
specific examples, remain in public consciousness with and through their narrative
trappings. These products, as cultural events part of a cultural framework, are stories of
settler colonial culture, and the stories that are written as part of them are necessarily
indicative of a wider cultural history, present, and future. As Jodi Byrd argues, settlers
tell themselves stories “in order to create these lands in their image, and their politics
continually return to the scene of the narrative in order to recast themselves as part of the
story. And not just in a supporting role, but rather as the central first-person narrator in
the story of America that depends upon vanishing the Indian as part of its denouement”
(“Tribal 2.0” 55). These games are just such playable narratives.
Using different games and their contexts, I assert that contemporary Western bigbudget open world games reveal ugly settler colonial cultural mores are unquestioned and
in fact constitutive logics of their narrative and design. This suggests these games play to
and cultivate the gaming “communities” of consumers, reviewers, and designers (insofar
as such things are legible categories) as systematically fertile ground for settler
colonialism’s modern expressions in neoliberalism and fascism (with their shared
emphasis on private property, particular economic relations, and violent dispossession). It
is not my position that these video games cause settler attitudes; rather, it appears rather
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obvious to me that settler cultures owe more to centuries of history (remembered,
misremembered, forgotten, and mythologized) than to the relatively recent advancement
of video games into the popular and monied industry it is today. It also appears just as
obvious to me that the narrative and technical formulas of these games would exhibit
symptoms of the settler neurosis both as product of those cultural trends as well as a
propagation thereof. As such, I am not interested in establishing an evidentiary,
quantitative basis for claiming these games program young players into accepting settler
colonial standards; after all, it appears unlikely such a thing could be proven as more or
less impactful in that sense than any other media, education, or social environment.
However, though I may reject the notion these games create settler attitudes, I am
certainly proposing they continue to propagate them and alleviate their constitutive
neuroses. This perhaps inspires an obvious counter-argument: video games are not
conclusively causally linked to changing certain aspects of real world behaviours. Studies
investigating this link have, until recently, focused on the effects of video game
violence—and these open world games are incredibly violent. These studies on video
game violence and its correlation to real world violence and aggression are largely
inconclusive.22 Some recent work even suggests that violent video games reduce crime
on a short-term basis, possibly providing an outlet—or merely a distraction—from realworld violent impulses and pursuits.23 In any case, if there is a relationship between
fictive played violence and real violence, the relationship is unlikely one of inspiration.
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However, that a great portion of the highest-grossing video games (aside, debatably, from
other genres like sports games) are still overwhelmingly violent in content at least
suggests that the reproduction of played violence is a self-sustaining trend.24 In a sense, I
am suggesting this genre and medium of popular culture does the same work as many
other settler media or institutions in representing hegemonic cultural trends, and is
similarly self-perpetuating. These games are part of a tapestry that covers the holes in
settler history’s wall, maintaining trends with their rehearsal and production: their play.
This play provides an outlet for the building neurosis of an increasingly faltering settler
societal status quo.
Video game violence may not produce real world violence, but it continues to
normalize video game violence. Similarly, and particularly since this issue is one of
broad cultural acceptance and awareness, rather than personal action or behaviour, settler
colonial structure in games normalizes settler colonial structure and comforts settler
anxiety in the real world. Further, the nominal critique of settler colonialism in some of
the high-minded games I will analyze is a gesture even more superfluous than the
symbolically and materially empty critique of violence that also turns up in ubiquitously
violent games. Even if violent games reduce violent tendencies,25 they likely do so by
providing a harmless venue for violent expression. For the network of epistemologies,
institutions, and politics that make up the structure of settler colonialism, events of
behavioural and bodily violence are merely a function rather than the full character. The
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modern day elimination of Indigenous peoples, as per Wolfe and others,26 is conducted as
much by the double-bind of legislating “Indians” into settler society at the same time as
legislating them out of that society’s metrics of success. These video games, and their
occasional critiques, are a similar double-bind: structures that functionally erase the
Indigenous Real, while assuming and cannibalizing Indian Unreal. It is the violence as
structure—the violence as cultural mindset—that gets reproduced, even though it is most
likely not causally relatable to individual racist violence; this violence, like settler
colonialism itself, is a self-perpetuating structure, not simply events of physical violence
in the real world.
So instead of merely establishing these games as a kind of settler propaganda, I
hope to mobilize the settler cultural traits that are apparent in these video games at a
narrative and structural level. In so doing, these close readings and analyses of production
and reception should reveal a few central points. Firstly, they will demonstrate how
settler culture has evolved from its origins in the relations of capital and colonialism, and
how this contemporary popular medium aids the cultural proliferation of that culture.
Secondly, these analyses explain the settler cultural anxieties and desires these gaming
expressions demonstrate and cater to, and how the expressions themselves exemplify the
settler colonial connection to neoliberalism and burgeoning modern fascism.
Consequently, they should offer some indication regarding how these largely
unchallenged norms perpetuate, distribute, and rehearse the settler neurosis that have
made “gamer” communities, the video game industry, and settler society broadly, fertile
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ground for fascist ideology in a current neoliberal form. These artificial frontiers and their
inside/outside settler neurosis make the patterns of the genre predictable but elucidating
in their expression. I will refer to this neurosis in the following chapters by its particular
expressions as an “anxiety” or a “desire” for some cultural lack. I am arguing open world
games are materially and representationally emblematic of settler colonial structure,
anxieties, and desires, and also highlight settler cultures’ own propensities for and
comfort with fascist principles. My project is meant to delineate this particular mode of
settler colonial cultural myth-making, displaying the cultural machinery of settler
colonialism with these machine-based fictions as microcosms of the settler structure and
imaginary.
Each chapter’s first section ends with a small breakdown of their respective
contents, but I will end this introduction with a quick outline of all three. Chapter 1, by
far the largest chapter, builds upon the theoretical foundations this introduction has set
up. Focusing on two open world series developed by Rockstar Games, this chapter
connects settler colonial structure to what I identify as neoliberal ideology, and highlights
how that structure and ideology is reflected in those games’ production, gameplay,
narratives, and reception. The first half of this chapter uses the Grand Theft Auto series to
expand upon Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter’s Games of Empire, analyzing
Rockstar Games’ work beyond the publication of that book. I argue Rockstar’s continued
development of the open world genre specifically validates the book’s arguments about
that company’s oeuvre as well as demonstrates the inextricability of capital and
colonialism; thus the games reveal settler colonial neoliberalism’s racializing logics
exactly as it attempts to obscure them. The second half of the chapter turns to the Red
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Dead Redemption series, its representation of Indigenous peoples, and how its settler
formulas of representation are indebted to the neoliberal-colonial connection and
historical development, as well as their role in assuaging the cultural anxieties produced
by both, normalizing their continuance. It ends with a discussion of the siege mentality
reproduced in the settler imaginary, which foregrounds my argument about settlerneoliberal compatibility with fascist ideology.
Chapter 2 studies Ubisoft Games and a specific title from their flagship Assassin’s
Creed series which explicitly features Indigenous peoples more heavily than any other
game of that series before or since. The game features a half-Kanien'kehá:ka protagonist,
and this chapter investigates how a big budget open world game that attempts a respectful
treatment of real Indigenous people still replays the very omissions and appropriations
that settler colonial culture has consistently reproduced since the “closing” of the actual
historical “frontier.” This chapter’s latter sections also argue the mechanical formulas of
gameplay for this genre can be understood as a modern expression of both settler identity
and the historical impulse of settlers to “play Indian.”
Chapter Three turns to Horizon Zero Dawn, and uses that game to show how the
previous chapters’ findings are reproduced in another award-winning game. I argue this
game eliminates real Indigenous cultures from its digital space to make room for artificial
Indigeneity that can be adopted by its consumers. Furthermore, I suggest this game
demonstrates how the genre is a power fantasy formula I term hypertopian, an expression
of the settler colonial imaginary’s sense of superiority, never truly excised from a culture
that obscures its logic of elimination rather than confronts it. Finally, with Walter
Benjamin’s analysis of technological spectacle, and Carl Schmitt’s nomos, I argue big
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budget open world game production and design not only suggests these games fulfill
similar social functions as spectacle did for Nazi fascism, but also that they reveal settler
colonial imaginary’s continuing genocidal logics encoded therein.
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Chapter One: Rockstar Games and the Settler Fantasies of the Neoliberal Frontier
Grand Theft Auto III, mentioned in the introduction as the game popularly
believed to have been one of the most influential in the conventions of the open world
genre today, was developed by New York-based video game publisher Rockstar Games.
Since GTAIII’s release in 2001, Rockstar Games has released at least six other games
featuring the same broad characteristics of the genre—such as GTA: San Andreas,
GTAIV, GTAV, and Red Dead Redemption, to name a few—that GTAIII popularized. As
such, Rockstar Games is influential not only as one of the originators of the modern bigbudget open world game, but also as the creator of some of the genre’s biggest-budgeted
and highest-selling examples for nearly two decades. As such, the company’s work
deserves close analysis for the productive, ludological, and narrative aspects of the genre
that this dissertation critiques. In this chapter, I contextualize Rockstar’s influential open
world games as rehearsals and propagators of historical settler frontier logics and
contemporary neoliberal advancements of those same logics. In doing so, I highlight how
those frontier logics and neoliberal ideology are inextricably related, and how Rockstar’s
open world games—produced in particular ways—specifically substantiate these
connections as entertainment products that cater to settler and neoliberal infatuations and
anxieties.
First, I begin by establishing some important analysis of ideological principles by
building upon Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter’s use of “Empire” and
“neoliberalism” with video games from their co-authored Games of Empire: Global
Capitalism and Video Games. I continue by sketching out Dyer-Witheford and Greig de
Peuter’s appraisal of entries of the GTA series. Then, I address GTAV and its online
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component, GTAOnline, simultaneously expanding on Games of Empire’s analysis while
arguing that one of Rockstar’s important ideological narrative maneuvers is the
extrication of racism from the relation of capital. Then, I trace the insights that scholars
of settler colonialism can bring to this analysis through study of another suite of Rockstar
games, the Red Dead Redemption games. Looking at the Red Dead Redemption
franchise, I argue that these games exemplify settler culture’s enmeshment with
neoliberal ideology and continued reliance on well-worn representational tropes of
Indigenous peoples. These tropes, as I noted in the Introduction, pose Indigeneity as a
useful metaphorical association for modern settler anxieties (a “reappropriation of a
foundationally disavowed Aboriginality” à la Wolfe [389]), and, relatedly, as a tragic
vanishing category of masculinity (a disintegration before civilization, à la Turner).
Together, the Red Dead Redemption games’ reliance on tropes of neoliberal economics,
settler identity, and representational clichés of Indigenous peoples are emblematic of the
open world genre’s conventions. Finally, I conclude the chapter with a brief look at the
Indian-as-zombie trope in Red Dead Redemption’s Undead Nightmare as identified by
Jodi Byrd (Chickasaw), and expand this argument by noting the open world games
influenced by this trope. The “state of siege” mentality of settler colonial frontierism
these depictions reveal is important to my arguments about fascism at the end of Chapter
3.
These readings essentially argue that the productive context and artistic
sensibilities of Rockstar, one of the genre’s most influential developers, evidence the
constitutive partnership of settler and neoliberal economic and cultural development;
indeed, while Rockstar’s influential design principles are expressions of this partnership,
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the developer’s market-leading position highlights that this partnership is intrinsic to the
open-world genre. What is especially noteworthy is the way these games narratively
extract racism from the relation of capital, and similarly extract settler frontierism and
private property from the relation of colonialism, primarily by obfuscating both relations’
worst inequities behind an excess of individuation and normalization of systemic
contexts. As Glen Coulthard (Dene) notes, capital and colonialism are “relations” most
effectively analyzed as “the sum effect of the diversity of interlocking oppressive social
relations that constitute it” (15); thus these games’ extractions serve to sanitize capital
and colonialism even as they are critiqued, and as such replay the historical and
continuing logics of the settler frontier, Indigenous dispossession, and neoliberal
economics. Outlining the productive, narrative, and gameplay formulas of an industryleader like Rockstar helps substantiate a few of this dissertation’s core arguments: bigbudget Western open world games are expressions, propagators, and demonstrations of
settler frontierism and neoliberal ideology. It also helps foreground one of this
dissertation’s core points to be more thoroughly detailed in Chapter 3: open world games,
as settler and neoliberal expressions, exemplify a coherence of fascist ideology with
settler neoliberal culture, and thus demonstrate the fascist seeds that rest in the soil of
settler and neoliberal worldviews.
The Grand Theft Auto Series: Neoliberal Production of Cynical Empire
The violent criminal fantasies of the GTA franchise before III had some similar
concepts to later games: a game world that could be explored, missions that can be started
at player discretion, and various optional activities that are secondary to the main story.
These early iterations of the franchise had a top-down view centred on the player
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character; III, however, moved the series into third-person perspective, bringing players
closer to the games’ increasingly detailed worlds. As the franchise progressed,
subsequent games featured greatly expanded worlds, stories, and optional activities, but
the general formula remained rather consistent. Similarly, despite massive changes in the
technology, shifting production practices, and the increasing narrative focus, the
gameplays structure, as well as the caricatural style of the franchise’s characters and
setting, retain some notable consistency. Even many of the optional activities that appear
in the first GTA are in the franchise’s most recent installment, GTAV, released in 2013.
The visuals and interactive possibilities are drastically different between the two, but
Rockstar Games’ oeuvre does not eschew the broadly gaming-formulaic simplistic appeal
of jumping cars over great distances and killing as many people as possible within a
given time limit. After all, though the franchise’s reception and production focused more
on storyline, dialogue, and characters with each successive entry, Rockstar Games’ bigbudget open world design principles must provide ample incentive and opportunity for
players only interested in mayhem in a vast, richly detailed digital world. To put it
bluntly, these games must appeal to a broad set of gaming interests to attract a wide
audience and justify their massive budgets.
Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter contextualize these design (and production)
principles with an analytical framework of “Empire,” partially drawn from Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri’s book of that name. Hardt and Negri use “Empire” to characterize the
modern international power apparatus, the primary function of which is capital
accumulation. Mostly centred on the economic, political, and social power of
corporations and the cooperation (or non-interference) of states, government bodies, and
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other institutions, Empire transcends the hard lines of borders to more effectively extract
and profit on resources and labour that would otherwise be traditionally thought of as part
of a national sovereignty. Hardt and Negri even use “frontiers” to describe this
international mode of capitalist accumulation:
In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and
does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and
deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire
global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid
identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks
of command. The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world have
merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow.” (xii-xiii)
Where Ovid figures the Imperial Roman view of “Roman space as both the city and the
world,” here too we have the frontier’s universal invitation to access writ large, but writ
without the aims of a specific or national imperial project. Instead, Empire is the shared
interest of large capital seeking greater capital. Empire is “deterritorializing” not because
these interests are disinterested in land-centric concerns; it is quite the opposite. The
resources and labour power attached to land is the primary concern of empire. Empire
deterritorializes (in the logics of privatization) precisely because it makes the world a
frontier, an invitation to access. All land, globally, is within the purview of Empire. There
is no “territory” to global capitalist interest; Empire transcends the borders of nation
states and makes the world a frontier. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter characterize this
figuration of Empire as “a new planetary regime in which economic, administrative,
military, and communicative components combine to create a system of power ‘with no
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outside’” (xii). All frontier, “Empire is governance by global capitalism . . . Its
decentered, multilayered institutional agencies include nation-states but extend to include
multinational corporations, like Microsoft and Sony, world economic bodies . . .
international organizations . . . and even nongovernmental organizations” (xx). This
decentralized, deterritorialized, deregulated, and privatized approach to global power is
broadly represented by the ideology of neoliberalism. As all modern settler nation states
are heavily invested in principles of neoliberalism, it is little wonder that Dyer-Witheford
and de Peuter refine and define their use of Empire this way: “By Empire, we mean the
global capitalist ascendancy of the early twenty-first century, a system administered and
policed by a consortium of competitively collaborative neoliberal states” (xxiii).
Neoliberalism can be thought of as the ideological framework of Empire as Hardt,
Negri, Dyer-Witheford, and de Peuter use it. The particular metrics of this ideology are
important. As the term’s broadening use in popular discourse may have muddled rather
than clarified its parameters, I feel a definition and expansion here is useful. In this
project, I draw primarily from David Harvey’s definition in A Brief History of
Neoliberalism:
Neoliberalism is in the ﬁrst instance a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The
role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to
such practices . . . It must also set up those military, defence, police, and legal
structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to
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guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if
markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social
security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if
necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. (2)
A Brief History of Neoliberalism gets to some of the inherent contradictions of this
ideology in theory and its failures in practice, but for my purposes it is enough for now to
simply state that neoliberalism’s core tenets of private property and market value as
insurmountably hegemonic ethical standards have entrenched themselves in a number of
settler political, economic, and social norms. Certainly, they run counter to other forms of
community governance, and their metrics have impacted Indigenous communities around
the world. These impacts are visible in past and current moments of settler structure,
visible in broken treaties, massacres, resource extraction, sequestration and reservations,
and in the assimilative but still eliminative processes that enforce principles of private
property, and so on. The less obviously genocidal methods (settler federally designated
“Indian status,” residential schools, and the reservation system itself, for just a few
examples) are still fundamentally aimed at eliminating Indigenous kinships and
sovereignty, as well as simply numerically reducing Indigenous populations that are
identified as such, in the hopes of freeing the land for privatization. As such,
neoliberalism is the ideological descendent of colonial capitalist economics. I will return
to this connection later in the chapter; for now, I gesture to Dene scholar Glen
Coulthard’s Red Skin White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition to
emphasize that the principles of neoliberalism are a product of the economics and “social
relations” of colonialism. Coulthard points out that settler states like Canada have enacted
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and continue to enact a “long-term goal of indoctrinating the Indigenous population to the
principles of private property, possessive individualism, and menial wage” (12), and that
“disciplining Indigenous life to the cold rationality of market principles will remain on
state and industry’s agenda for some time to follow” (14). He partially demonstrates this
point by quoting the 1890 Canadian commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1890 on the
Indigenous peoples under his authority: “The work of sub-dividing reserves has begun in
earnest. The policy of destroying the tribal or communist system is assailed in every
possible way and every effort [has been] made to implant a spirit of individual
responsibility instead” (qtd. in Coulthard 13).
Recognizing these principles of neoliberalism (and their connection to
settler/colonial history) is important for studying open world video games. After all,
Rockstar designs games that appeal to a broad set of gaming interests by catering to many
of these deeply entrenched, almost invisibilized aspects of neoliberal ideology. As
neoliberalism pervades the real cultural contexts generative to producing and purchasing
these games, it makes sense that the power fantasies they seek to indulge would parrot
neoliberalism’s central tenets. At the simplest level, the foundation of these fantasies is
mastery of a space. Naturally, the rugged heroic (or anti-heroic) individualist
entrepreneurialism of the player’s character is also a repeated characteristic. DyerWitheford and de Peuter write that “the military and the market” are the “two pillars” of
Empire (xiv), and their critique of the GTA series partially focuses on the violent
accumulation of capital that constitutes the structure those pillars hold up. Critical to this
analysis, however, is a recognition of the neoliberal ideology in these games’ productive
contexts, rather than simply their narrative or ludological content.
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Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter call “video games . . . a paradigmatic media of
Empire—planetary, militarized hypercapitalism” (xv), and “a school for labor, an
instrument of rulership, and a laboratory for the fantasies of advanced techno-capital”
(xix). Again, the ideological biases on display in the games only adds to this
characterization, though they are not wholly constitutive of it. For the economics of big
budget open world game production to be viable, production relies on the global frontier
of corporate reach. After noting that video games have become a globally successful
hobby, Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter write that “the internationalization of digital
games” is apparent in the “transcontinental value chains” (xvii) that make the big budget
examples possible. The game consoles are made all over the world, and the mineral
materials inside them “come from sources such as the mines of the Congo and end up in
the electronic waste dumps of Nigeria and India” (xviii). The internationalization of
production along disparate demand and reward has only intensified in the decade since
Games of Empire was published. Michael Thomsen, in his article “The Universe Has
Been Outsourced,” interviewed employees at Virtuos Ltd., a Chinese company to which
many large Western game developers and publishers outsource 3D asset production. This
outsourcing is ubiquitous in big-budget game development—indeed, it is practically a
requirement for developing the big-budget open world games that demand an incredible
amount of human labour. Virtuos contributed to the development of the game I discuss in
Chapter 3, Horizon Zero Dawn. Thomsen writes that “sixty-five of Virtuos’s employees
spent over two years building 11 of Horizon’s 32 enemy robot types; modeling many of
the bandit settlements spread across the game world.” They were also “only one of 18
different outsourcing companies that worked on the game” (n.p.).
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This outsourcing in big budget game production plays multiple cost-saving roles
in the economics of game development. Thomsen notes than an entry-level animator at
Virtuos will make approximately 11k USD a year, whereas a comparable position in the
US will pull around 50k USD a year. This outsourcing also has the added bottom-line
benefit of obscuring the labour and labourers from consumers and other studios. A
common term for these outsourcing studios in Western game development vernacular is
“asset farms,” a term taken as pejorative by many, including the founder of Virtuos,
Gilles Langourieux. In Thomsen’s piece, Langourieux says the terms “asset farm” and
“‘outsourcing’ [evoke] something which is commoditized, trivial to do, easy to do, so you
find locals to do it cheap and fast.” Langourieux’s point is not incorrect; the terms
certainly seem to connote trivial, replaceable labour in the industry parlance—labour that
is necessary but not specialized and thus not worthy of remuneration on par with those
directly employed by game developers. This is a perception that justifies literally
undervaluing that overseas labour, both monetarily in terms of workers’ salaries and
conceptually in terms of their value or necessity to the final project. Sometimes, large
video game corporations set up branches that do the work typically associated with these
“asset farms” alone; while this somewhat reduces the labour offloaded to contractors, it
still takes advantage of cheaper international labour, allowing corporations to tighten
their belts on already massive budgets. Ubisoft, a company that makes multiple big
budget open world franchises and is discussed in Chapter 2, founded a branch in
Shanghai in 1996. The bulk of Ubisoft Shanghai’s work is creating assets for multiple
other projects at once, leaving the apparent creative vision to their studios in
Western/Central Europe and North America. The managing director of Ubisoft Shanghai
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rebuffed the label “asset farm” in an interview in 2017 (qtd. in Kumar). The larger issue,
however, is not with the nomenclature, but rather with the labour practices the apparent
epithets obscure or take for granted. The problem is not that these words denigrate the
labour, but that the term reflects the standard perspective in the industry. It is a corporate
practice that elides accountability and transparency while undervaluing the labour of
hundreds of people required to make these artificial frontiers. Just as settler colonial
frontierism materially and conceptually forgets and obscures its manufactured conditions,
thus necessitating further frontierism, open world games obscure the immense labour
behind their characteristic free movement and choice, thereby manufacturing (through
marketing and availability) its mass uptake by consumers as part of the massive capital
investment necessary to produce it. This in turn justifies the escalating desire by
consumers and developers alike for more (obscured) labour to produce larger artificial
frontiers; the “internationalization of games” echoes the borderlessness of empire itself,
and the escalation of open world design and production echoes the self-perpetuation of
the frontier literally and conceptually.
That the labour is undervalued and obscured, predictably, benefits the leading
(mostly white, mostly cis-male) figures heading Western development studios and game
publishers. These leading figures are also typically hostile to unions, and the vast
majority of workers in the industry have no organized representation or advocacy.27
Neoliberal ideology is consistent with anti-union sentiment; the abstractly philosophical
individualistic, hyper-privatized, and de-regulated paradise that neoliberalism envisions
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See Garst (2018) on some recent attempts at unionization in the industry, as well as Shanley (2020) on
the growing pro-union sentiment among workers, and the steadfast rejection by some industry leaders.
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as the utopia for all human endeavour is naturally opposed to organized communal
advocacy and the regulations they historically demand to improve worker compensation
and labour conditions. Working conditions at the large companies making big budget
open world games are notoriously demanding. So-called “crunch culture” involves
employees working excessive hours for long stretches of time, damaging worker health
and creating the conditions for burnout. Indeed, Rockstar Games, Electronic Arts, and
Ubisoft have all had public reckonings with their working conditions. In 2009, Rockstar
covertly settled a 2.75 million USD class-action lawsuit launched by workers from their
San Diego branch for unpaid overtime wages (Gilbert). Barely a year later in 2010,
months before the first Red Dead Redemption was released, an open letter claimed the
San Diego branch of Rockstar developing RDR had been in crunch mode for nine months
with another three months still to go.28 In the internationalized neoliberal market, there is
always surplus population for any kind of labour already in global circulation. Rockstar’s
crunch culture, as it is with most game studios, has been enforced less by strict demands
than by social pressure, and most importantly, by the awareness that not rising to the
expectation of crunch could lead to nearly immediate layoff. True to neoliberal form,
Rockstar’s lack of regulations regarding crunch led to an atmosphere that necessitated
and compelled it. 29 Nearly every worker can be viewed as redundant; every position can
be quickly filled from the surplus population, or even by currently employed workers
desperate for the prestige accompanying a position with the globally successful
company—even if that prestige is overvalued in the industry’s obfuscated labour. In other

See Sinclair (2020) for the original open letter and Rockstar’s non-response, defense, and eventual
admissions and nominal attempts to change.
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See Schreier “Inside Rockstar Games' Culture Of Crunch.”
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words, the “redundancy culture” of the neoliberalized international value chain produces
“crunch culture.”
Lacking the protections of an organized workforce or (inter)national regulatory
bodies that labour organization typically produces, the video game industry is also
notorious for failing to credit people who contributed to a game’s development. Game
director Alex Hutchinson (who formerly worked for Ubisoft and Electronic Arts) and
game programmer Katharine Neil both claim the practice is part of the industry’s
“redundancy culture” (qtd. in Robinson, “Game Credits”), whereby “primary” Western
studios and outsourcers alike will often hire many workers to make a deadline, then fire
them after the deadline has been met. Many studios also see huge layoffs immediately
after a game ships, even when a game is significantly profitable.30 Not crediting all these
workers is part of the neoliberal economic ecology that keeps workers unable to insist
upon their market value. As Hutchinson says,
Whenever someone becomes known, they become potentially more expensive,
and worse, they become someone who could wrest some of the control over a
game or franchise away from the publisher . . . Games are still essentially in the
Hollywood studio system from the 1930s, where studios want complete control of
the product and they want to be perceived as the creators rather than the teams.
(qtd. in Robinson “Game Credits”)
Katharine Neil echoes that sentiment: “like film and TV—it’s about getting hired for the
next job and not looking like a liar on your CV . . . There are still no industry standards

See Schreier, “Why Game Developers Keep Getting Laid Off” for a rundown of some of these industrywide practices.
30

57
that developers can count on their employers adhering to” (qtd. in Robinson “Game
Credits”). The 1930s Hollywood system’s exploitation of “creatives” (actors, writers,
directors, etc.) was a catalyst for worker organization and the resulting regulations and
protections the industry has since developed (including standards for crediting, even for
non-union workers on union sets).31 This exploitation continues unabated in big budget
game development; this means credit goes to a select few, whose opportunities and media
spotlight are the result of work produced by those who may get no credit at all. This
structural failure dovetails with video game hobbyist media’s tendency to subscribe to an
auteur theory of art production, whereby works made by the labour of thousands are
credited to a handful of apparently brilliant figures.
This popular perception of auteur game production is perhaps best demonstrated
by the treatment of Dan and Sam Houser, the founders of Rockstar Games. Even after
multiple scandals regarding Rockstar’s labour practices and toxic workplace culture,
profiles repeatedly centre on Dan’s writing “craft” and Sam’s business prowess. This is
even despite the Housers’ tendency to eschew the spotlight, a notorious characteristic
mentioned in every effusive, deferential piece in which the writer is given access to
interviews—including an entire book on the Housers’ success.32 Dan takes centre stage in
popular media as the reclusive genius whose narrative craft has been an integral element
to the success of their franchises. Shortly before the highly anticipated sequel Red Dead
Redemption 2 was released in 2018, Vulture, a subsidiary of New York magazine,
published a glowing profile of the Rockstar’s New York studio that featured interviews
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See Vella (2008), Stuart (2012), Kharif (2020) for a cross-section of these profiles, and Kushner (2012)
for the book.
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with Dan Houser. In the profile, he is quoted mentioning 100-hour work weeks in the
game’s final months of crunch (Goldberg), a claim Houser would personally walk back to
gaming outlet Kotaku by claiming he was referring only to the demands on his personal
work schedule and that of his tight-knit writing team (Schreier “We Were Working”).
Though public perception may have gently moved towards concern for worker equity, the
perception of and exploitation made possible by the auteur persists, settled comfortably
on a foundational gargantuan neoliberal business model.
Dan Houser’s narratives are often replete with ham-fisted critique of many trends
in Western capitalist culture; that the games themselves are produced in some of the
industry’s most notably extravagant exploitation does not efface that apparent thematic
bent alone. The effacement of that apparent Houserian critique is also accomplished by
its fatalist content, and literally played out in mechanics ideologically consistent with the
neoliberalism in the guts of its creative outlook and production. With that background, I
now return to Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter’s analysis of some of the GTA games and
their neoliberal narrative sensibilities and gameplay logics. Dyer-Witheford and de
Peuter’s critique focuses on what they identify as a GTA’s cynical worldview of an
apparently ubiquitous and inescapable criminality of the human condition, most clearly
expressed by the capitalism it lampoons. Using Dan Houser’s self-stated aim of central
narrative “punch lines” for focusing his writing, Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter write that
the GTA series offers a “contradictory blend of insight into, and complicity with, urban
corruption . . . [T]he category of cynical ideology explains why the “punch line” that
Rockstar’s virtual cities deliver is, ultimately, that of Empire’s brutalism” (34).
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The GTA entries Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter’s book focuses on are GTA: Vice
City (2002), GTA: San Andreas (2004), and GTAIV (2008). Analyzing these games’
increasingly detailed depictions of urban spaces, Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter assert the
series “is informed by, and reinscribes, dominant relations of power. . . . GTA constitutes
space in ways that are not just generically urban, but characteristically imperial” (157).
Games of Empire lays out much of the historical and social context each game must elide
or ignore for its caricatures and critiques. In this sense, precisely what the games
represent in caricature and what they forget are ideologically weighted emphases and
omissions. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter describe the neoliberal tone of Vice City’s
1980s setting and its distinctly crafted “uneven socioeconomic landscape.” Protagonist
Tommy Vercetti’s aim, and thus the player’s goal, is to dominate the game’s Miami-like
setting, “to occupy it, activate it, and network it into a setting for optimal capital
accumulation . . . [the game] puts market imperatives and their rewards into playable
forms” (162). Contrary to claims that the GTA series’ narrative is little more than set
dressing for enjoyable gameplay mechanics, Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter argue that the
incentivized gameplay is “precisely the point on which the game’s narrative and the
algorithm intermesh perfectly: the play logic and the plot line of Vice City are thoroughly
neoliberal” (163). Playing through Tommy Vercetti’s rising-mafioso storyline also entails
buying up properties around the city. These businesses give the player passive in-game
income to spend on more properties, weaponry, vehicles, and so on. This passive income
mechanic is emblematic of this narrative-ludological-ideological enmeshment, of what
makes Vice City “properly neoliberal . . . as your financial tally rises, there is not a hint of
labor, just the abstracted, increasing magnitude of accumulated capital” (163). The player
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no longer need even play at labour; the game itself incentivizes its neoliberal logics of
accumulation, collecting the fruits of an invisible labour on the private property
purchased.
Focusing on the depiction of race in the neoliberal matrix of San Andreas, DyerWitheford and de Peuter look beyond some of the simplistic stereotypes that Rockstar’s
worlds are often replete with and instead read the game’s power fantasy happy ending on
its ideological principles. San Andreas ends with a revision of the 1992 Los Angeles
riots; the game elides the structural racism at the core of the city’s boiling race relations,
instead focusing on a single fictionalized crooked cop—who is Black—and a drug
dealer—who is also Black—as the primary antagonists and broadly representative of
corruption. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter connect this elision to the gameplay mechanics
of gang warfare and property ownership that lead to the game’s ending, clearly
representative of the apparently post-racial progressiveness of neoliberal ideology.
Beating “the system,” as in the game’s dialogue, is the murder of “a crack dealer from
[the protagonist’s] own [B]lack community with a cross-ethnic and mixed-gender
coalition of criminal capitalists” (169). Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter argue this climax is
“[f]ar from suggesting that ending urban collapse requires repudiation of neoliberal
policies,” but rather that “the game’s one semiutopian moment is the product of a path of
hybridized free enterprise” (169). This is a “fatalism” (169) for the dominant modes of
“pervasive oppression” (170), where the immediate power fantasy of murderous revenge
is part of the played freedom, and the very principles that have legislated Black death and
poverty are here framed as the only possible resistance.
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GTAIV demonstrated a large expansion of the franchise’s graphical technology;
less cartoonish and more hyper-realistic, Rockstar Games from GTAIV and beyond all
use this labour-intensive, heavily detailed approach to translating its caricatural writing
style to more realistic looking places and people. Rather than the cartoonish style of Vice
City that makes visual and narrative references to classic crime films like Scarface and
Goodfellas, with GTAIV onwards, Rockstar’s intentions were clearly more to compete
with the narrative merit and artistic aspirations of these classic films. The new hyperrealistic visuals and slightly more restrained game world reflect these intentions. Indeed,
even the changing priorities for voice and motion capture33 actors demonstrate this shift.
Ray Liotta, who plays the lead role in Goodfellas, a film heavily referenced in GTAIII
and Vice City, actually voiced Vice City protagonist Tommy Vercetti. From GTAIV
onward, however, the series stopped featuring known celebrity voice actors in character
roles. In Dan Houser’s words, “we don’t bring in name actors anymore because of their
egos and, most important of all, because we believe we get a better sense of immersion
using talented actors whose voices you don’t recognize” (qtd. in Goldberg). Without egos
to compete with the creative genius of Houser and company, Rockstar can create the
impression of a real, living world, one that can be believed and inhabited more than even
filmic counterparts.
Terming a game “immersive” is so common in marketing for and reviews of open
world games that it has become cliché—though its ubiquity has only cemented
“immersion” as a necessary quality for “good” open world design. As noted in this
dissertation’s introduction, “immersion” is taken up in quantitative scholarship as a

Motion capture (or “mocap”) is a process where actors’ bodily performances are captured and modelled
into graphics. This is a very common practice in big budget game and cinema production.
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common motivation for players’ engagement with particular games, but it is also a
natural consequence of the technological arms race that is the escalating “production
value”34 of gaming’s visuals. It is also a natural consequence of video gaming’s
substantial difference from other forms of media; player interactivity can take new
intensities of affective power if players are better able to suspend their disbelief and feel
“immersed” in the world. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter cite Rowland Atkinson and Paul
Willis’s “Charting the Ludodrome,” which studied and interviewed several players of
GTAIII, a representative before Rockstar’s intensification of their game’s immersive
qualities with GTAIV. Atkinson and Willis suggest that, for many players of these
detailed open worlds, there is a “bleeding of the game world—its gameplay syntax,
narrative structures and apparent representation of real places—into the real world for the
players” (835). Atkinson and Willis’s “ludodrome” is akin to Castronova’s refined
version of the magic circle: there is a porous relationship between player, the game world
inside the circle, and the world outside. Based on their interviews with players, Atkinson
and Willis conclude that “[i]n this modulating set of connections within a ludodrome
space, the sense of what is real or stable in either the concrete urban or virtual city has
further shifted, blurred and subtly been inflected with certain strands of this kind of
gameplay” (842). The obviously consequence-free activities players can engage in (death
and arrest merely take seconds out of the gameplay flow or necessitate a mission restart,
34

This term is often used rather casually in gaming hobbyist media; what precisely it indicates is hardly
ever clearly defined, but it appears gamers knows it when they see it. Since it is typically used in reference
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for these games to have incredibly detailed assets covering asset-rich worlds to “immerse” players,
hundreds of people around the globe spend considerable hours of labour crafting every visual element with
myriad tiny details—some of which will never be seen and many more never noted even by the players that
complete the games. As such, “production value” is at times little more than shorthand for the incredible
expenditure needed to pay armies of people to create the visuals of the game—an expenditure that these
companies control for by outsourcing the labour to the so-called asset farms.
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for example) are parts of this Rockstar magic circle that allow an empowered and
dominant relationship to the game world into which it wants greater and greater
immersion and investment. What Atkinson and Willis’s study appears to show, then, is
that while some elements of gameplay are not taken literally by players as to their
viability in the “real world,” some of those gameplay elements, and certainly the
representation of the world itself, do alter perceptions of the world outside the magic
circle. Another important conclusion we may take from Atkinson and Willis’s study of
the “ludodrome” is that ideology is what is most conversant in this meeting of the real
and the digital. The subtle ideological implications of the game world, explored and
interacted with through gameplay mechanics made to be fun and fulfilling, can have very
real impacts on the perception of the real world. It is perhaps almost banal to point out,
but this essentially says that fictional representations can transmit and reinforce ideology
and subtly alter worldviews. What the concept of the ludodrome adds is that gamified
fictional representations are perhaps even more effective and subtle in this relationship
than other media. This is especially true for open world games like Rockstar’s, where the
porous inside/outside frontier, a magic circle whose primary design is in its immersive
invitation to access, incentivizes particular played epistemologies, rehearses and replays
particular ideological formulas.
For an example, I turn to the ludodrome of GTAIII and IV, “Liberty City,” an
obvious New York City stand-in. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter’s analysis of
GTAIV’s depiction of NYC (as “Liberty City”) emphasizes exactly the
“contradictory blend of insight into, and complicity with, urban corruption” (34)
that is Rockstar’s hallmark. The New York City Rockstar branch that the glowing
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Vulture profile details as a “highly secure enclave” (Goldberg) is itself deeply
invested in exactly the neoliberal ideology and urban space it satirizes, valorizes,
and rehearses. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter point to the extreme irony of a
Rockstar representative’s statement around the game’s release that describes
GTAIV’s Liberty City as a “gritty urban environment . . . that hasn’t benefited
from economic boom and it hasn’t got Mayor Guiliani” (174). Games of Empire
explains how this pre-2008 crash “boom” and Rudy Guiliani’s neoliberal policies
are in fact representative of GTAIV’s depiction of ugly corruption, rife
criminality, and exploitation. The book cites David Harvey’s detailed historical
record of neoliberal policies of “corporate welfare” broadly and “an
entrepreneurial turn in city governance” in New York City particularly. Harvey
found the resulting widened rich-poor gap and gutting of social services and
protections actually led to an increase in crime, which consequently led to figures
like Guiliani investing more heavily in an increasingly militarized police to
criminalize entire impoverished and marginalized communities (172). Rockstar
and its parent company, Take-Two Interactive Software Inc., moved into NYC as
beneficiaries of the “new frontier of real estate development” (173) in the city’s
aggressive neoliberal policies that saw many parts of NYC undergo hypergentrification. The building Rockstar would eventually inhabit saw studio rents
explode to over 10,000 USD a month (173); aggressive policing urged by
Guliani’s focus on reducing crime to attract corporate high-tech businesses went
into effect alongside “Business Improvement Districts (BIDs)—in essence,
corporate-controlled mini-municipal governments” which transformed entire
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neighbourhoods. In this time, crackdowns on “the homeless . . . licensing
sidewalk artists, attacking street musicians, harassing news vendors, and silencing
street protests” became a combined effort by the NYPD and high-techcorporation-controlled BIDs (173). In the context of municipal, state, and federal
legislation that increasingly favored privatization and was anti-welfare (aside
from the corporate variety), New York City’s violent corruption and exploitation
is in fact typified by the “boom” and the policies of Guiliani and his ilk. As DyerWitheford and de Peuter strongly articulate it:
Rockstar . . . was the beneficiary of an urban class war that erased, marginalized,
and moved on those very aspects of metropolitan life the developer would
fictionalize and celebrate in its games . . . Rockstar could only capitalize on that
grit [of its fictionalized city] because of the boom, the gentrification, and Mayor
Giuliani’s draconian law-and-order regime. The grittiness of Liberty City is, then,
the digitized capture of class inequalities (173-174).
Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter go on to describe the great number of financial
malfeasances for which Take-Two faced multiple investigations and legal ramifications:
insider stock trading, falsified revenues, and top level executives receiving millions more
than their already massive taxable incomes are just a few of the offences they detail.
Games of Empire includes a telling quote from Dan Houser in 2008 when many of these
cases were leading to charges: “It’s what I associate with being in America: corporate
drama” (175). Houser’s dismissive attitude towards legitimate concerns with malfeasance
and mistreatment has likely remained in Rockstar’s continuing legal troubles after Games
of Empire was published. Leslie Benzies, lead developer of every GTA game from
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GTAIII to GTAV, launched a lawsuit in 2016 against Rockstar, Take-Two, and both
Housers, claiming (among other things) a fractious atmosphere of the Housers’ egos and
demanding $150 million USD in unpaid royalties. This particular corporate drama came
to an end in a “confidential settlement” (Supreme Court of the State of New York), likely
of untold millions, to get the three-year suit out of public rotation in a year where articles
on Rockstar’s exploitative labour culture were circulating once again. Dyer-Witheford
and de Peuter persuasively connect this dismissive attitude regarding “corporate drama”
to the ethos of the GTA series’ worldview; they argue that the franchise’s sense of
humour and narrative arcs manifest a “generalized indifference” for the neoliberal forces
the games depict, and for the neoliberal ideology whose very practices are foundational
and endemic to Rockstar’s production (178). GTA:VC’s inclusion of passive-income
properties is a trend that is expanded in the series’ most recent entry, GTAV, and in a way
that yet again rehearses Rockstar’s real-world ideological investments. In order to make
enough money to buy all the many passive-income properties and experience the totality
of GTAV’s content, players must invest in (and manipulate) a detailed stock market
system. This marries GTA’s narrative ideological investments with Rockstar’s history of
capitalist malfeasance: the invitation of access of the artificial frontier is here rendered as
the ability to access the same labour-obscuring, stock-manipulating modus operandi of
Rockstar.
It is important to note that GTA, like many games of its size, features entire teams
of writers—some of whom will or will not be involved with every element of the project,
let alone be there for substantial parts of the project’s development or be in the position to
make substantial creative decisions. Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter point out that “many
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politically left gamers like GTA,” recognizing that its caricatural style both intentionally
and inadvertently makes the games “by [their] very extremity a comedic exposé of U.S.
politics” while featuring comedy that is “a scathing parody of neoliberal sensibilities”
(179). Given Rockstar’s secretive practices, it is difficult to estimate whether or not some
of the games’ more incisive writing is done by Houser or by other members of the team.
Determining this is likely impossible, but more importantly it is immaterial: in the end,
we are left with a system designed to most acutely enrich its auteur and the boards of his
parent companies. Dan Houser is an engine of the games’ ideology; he can shrug off the
millions of dollars changing hands for his own personal and employer-involved
“corporate dramas.” It is this comedic dismissiveness that Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter
demonstrate as deeply symbolic for a game series that represents neoliberal ideology;
while only occasionally making fun of it, the games always make it fun.
Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter argue that the digital urban space of the GTA series
“performs a normalization of corporate criminality. Its game world asserts that crime is
the way the universe is—the way money changes hands, business is done, society
organized; it is the nature of reality” (178). For all of its vaunted freedom of player
agency, the core principles of its design and writing are cynical:
What is excluded from its virtuality is any alternative to the rottenness . . . The
game presents a no-exit situation. GTA contains occasional allusions to the fierce
genealogy of radical politics in North American communities of blacks, Latinos,
Asians, and other immigrant and minority communities—but only to negate their
potential . . . the ideological consistency of the games’ demonic satire [is] that
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brutalization, racism, and greed be ubiquitous . . . There may be other options; but
you can’t play them. (180)
This no-exit cynicism is in fact part-and-parcel of this tapestry of neoliberal ideology.
There is a line that can be drawn from this no-hope, no-alternative framing of the human
condition in a game functionally structured on criminal violence, to the justifications of
crunch culture as individual employee choice, to the conservative policies of policing as a
response to “the systemic patterns of inequality and marginalization inherent to global
capital, of which violence and crime are often only symptomatic” (156). Neoliberalism’s
obsession with the individual over the systemic (which ironically serves to maintain a
systemic order of “global capital”) translates well to the power fantasies of open world
video games. As Cameron Kunzelman asserts in his article on crunch culture: “Reducing
a systemic issue into an individual one masks the exploitation at work, though, in the
same way that talking about local weather doesn't give you a diagnosis of global
warming.” Flattening broad issues into matters of individual choice, heroism, and villainy
is a simplistic framework for consequence-free gameplay with the illusion of agency and
freedom. The Rockstar “punch line” is not simply the brutality of the human experience,
the comedic cynicism for the inevitability of neoliberal ideology; it is also how much
money is made by exploiting labour and providing consumers an empowered fantasy
within a digitized hellscape of neoliberalism. These games operate as salve for the
anxiety of crumbling social order with the advancement of neoliberalism—and Rockstar
sells that salve at a premium. The “joke,” then, is the normalization of the ideology in an
empowering fantasy, in a game genre of barely restricted movement, of repeatable
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activities designed to inspire feelings of satisfaction and excitement. As Dyer-Witheford
and de Peuter sum it up:
GTA is a cynical game that simultaneously satirizes, indulges, and normalizes
individual hyperpossessiveness, racialized stereotypes, and neoliberal violence in
a self-cancellation that allows these elements to remain intact, a structure that is,
in a very precise way, conservative . . . At one level GTA exposes some basic
operations of, and hypocrisies about, imperial economics, politics, and culture.
Yet at the same time the rendering of these truths in the form of excess, mockery,
equivocation, and ridicule functions to keep those same truths at safe distance—
the distance necessary for their endless repetition in a world where all streets
leading to an alternative have been blocked. (181)
As the following section will argue, this neoliberal cynicism of the GTA franchise has
reached an even more cultivated and revealing form since Games of Empire’s
publication.
GTAV’s Asshole Theory of Capitalism and the Neoliberal Treatment of Race
GTAV’s neoliberal bent can be analyzed (and operationalized in this chapter’s
forthcoming expanded theoretical framework) for its attempt to pose the anti-heroism of
greedy violence—the rewarding activities of its video game capitalism par excellence—
as capable of being earnestly racially egalitarian. This attempt is unsurprising, as modern
neoliberalism has fashioned its own particular brand of nominal post-racialism in the
West to facilitate its continued exploitation. Rockstar’s games indulge racist stereotypes
at the same time as it lampoons racism itself, just as they satirize capitalism while
valorizing its central compunctions in gameplay, narrative, and, most importantly, the
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exploitative labour contexts in which they are produced. As Dyer-Witheford and de
Peuter have pointed out, though the comedy may occasionally strike true, the
characteristic veneer of self-aware irony is merely equivocation that serves to distance the
work from the implications of its own punch lines. Games of Empire’s summary of San
Andreas’ ending as a “semiutopian moment” brought by the player’s “hybridized free
enterprise” alongside a cast of “cross-ethnic and mixed-gender coalition of criminal
capitalists” (169) is emblematic of this modern sensibility. GTA’s worlds, and neoliberal
ideology, tells us that if you wish to succeed, you simply need capital by any means—and
capital no longer has a “whites only” sign attached.
The reality is that neoliberalism and the free-market, privatizing, and
entrepreneurial policies it engenders are verifiably and progressively disastrous for most
non-white people in the West.35 These neoliberal policies are also deeply invested in the
global supply chains that exploit the labour and conditions of non-Western peoples. As
such, neoliberal ideological expressions perpetuate structural racism while professing the
egalitarianism of their approach. Neoliberal global capital’s supposed multicultural postracialism, then, merely validates treating the world’s different peoples as open to its
access—the psychology of the frontier. As David Lloyd and Patrick Wolfe put it, though
neoliberalism advanced its strategies of public relations, it maintains the structural
inequities of previous forms:
the fundamental act of demarcation, the distributions of legality and ruthless force
. . . continues in new forms, constituting new frontiers appropriate to the emergent

For a few starting points on this reality of neoliberalism’s continued racist outcomes, see J. N. Robinson
on poverty; Lipman and Giroux for education; Nkansah-Amankra, Agbanu, and Miller for incarceration
and public health; and Duggan for a broad look at the culture and outcomes of neoliberalism in the 1990s to
early 2000s.
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mode of accumulation on a global scale . . . Now, at a moment when the globe
has been appropriated ‘as a unity’, the current crisis of capital may find no
geographical ‘outside’ any more, but is no less productive of forms of
racialization. (114)
So the forays into race that GTAV engages, even more than San Andreas, thus makes
GTAV’s singleplayer story a distantiating cynical satire. GTAV explicitly names and
shames capitalism more than any game in the series previous, so its attempts to decouple
racism from the relation of capital with which the game and Rockstar are so thoroughly
enmeshed actually rehearses the very obfuscation of neoliberal ideology itself. GTAV’s
treatment of race in particular belies the series’ continuing no-escape neoliberal cynicism,
and anecdotally reveals precisely how neoliberalism’s supposed post-racialism is
essentially a dismissal of the continuing racist status-quo that neoliberalism is itself;
naturally, it also allows the games to be more palatably marketed to the massive
demographics of non-white, non-Western gamers.
GTAV features three playable protagonists: two white men, Michael and Trevor,
and one Black man, Franklin. The game, after a certain point, allows players to switch
between these characters at will, but missions are often tied to particular characters.
Michael is a former bank robber who made a deal with the FBI for a clean slate and a
high life in the GTA-equivalent of Hollywood Hills. Michael, a depressed family man,
explicitly says that he is trapped by his own 80s nostalgia. Trevor is one of Michael’s
former criminal buddies. When we first see (and play) Trevor, he is a rural-living meth
dealer often described by other characters (and himself) as “creepy” and “crazy.” Still
living a chaotic, violent, and criminal lifestyle, Trevor says he has dreamed of being an
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international drug and arms dealer since childhood. He is unpredictable, intelligent,
vulnerable, scary, and sad. Many critics and reviewers have latched on to Trevor as the
most interesting character, and indeed, many have pointed out that Trevor is himself a
kind of embodiment of the GTA series. As Tom Bissell puts it, “Trevor—the funny but
ultimately terrifying lunatic—is the embodiment of what the game actually is: an
experience uncomfortably pinned between grand narrative ambition and open-world
incontinent madness” (n.p.). Franklin, on the other hand, is a young Black man from
South Central Los Santos (GTA’s Los Angeles equivalent first represented in GTA: San
Andreas), a former gangbanger who links up with Michael and Trevor to learn the tricks
of their high-stakes-heist criminal trade when the storyline begins in earnest. He is often
represented as a kind of moderate centre between the chaotic mayhem but fundamentally
only-wants-to-be-loved nature of Trevor, and the selfish, nostalgic, but comparatively
rational nature of Michael. Trevor and Michael, through most of the game’s story, have
an uneasy alliance where neither man is capable of trusting the other, and Franklin must
frequently mediate—until the final choice of the game’s main story, where the player
must decide for Franklin whether he will kill Michael, Trevor, or neither, and instead
reconcile them.
A word that comes up again and again in the game itself and criticism thereof is
“asshole.” The game is about assholes as much as it is about capitalism, and assholes are,
first and foremost, self-interested individuals. Bissell calls GTAV “basically the most
elaborate asshole simulation system ever devised,” perhaps a reference to disgraced
lawyer and activist Jack Thompson’s attempts to ban an earlier GTA game by calling it a
“murder simulator.” Cameron Kunzelman, one of many critics who say GTAV positions
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itself as “above any real commitment to an ideology,” (“Why is GTAV So
Conservative”) highlights an example of in-game advertisements for a Republican
running for governor with the slogan “I may be an asshole, but I’m your asshole.” The
word “asshole” is tightly coded in GTAV. It is a specific epithet that turns up frequently,
but usually only once in a particular scene or dialogue (not counting the ambient
pedestrian dialogue in the open world). Trevor tells Michael’s white, disaffected, lazy,
and Black-culture-appropriating son that Michael’s life is “just one long manifestation of
asshole-ness.” Michael’s reconciliation with his wife near the end of the story is based
upon his acknowledgment that she deserved a better husband, because he is “an asshole.”
After Trevor calls Michael a “shell” of a human for his selfishness, self-loathing, and
aspirations to upper-class leisure, Michael asks “Are you some kind of pure, morally
justifiable asshole? What, because you’re totally psychotic, somehow it’s okay?” Trevor
returns with “I’m honest, alright? You’re the hypocrite.” Michael then sarcastically calls
Trevor a “hero” that’s “so far above it all.”36 Kunzelman’s claim that GTA positions
itself “above any real commitment to an ideology” is here validated, precisely through the
self-aware comedic distance that Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter emphasize. Trevor’s
comedic absurdity most embodies GTA’s at times incoherent mix of invested narrative
and power-fantasy play. Michael is a hypocrite, and in the game’s logic Trevor is, in a
sense, justifiable, insofar as this “hero” is the one through which the narrative tensions
and open-world mayhem gameplay make sense. The game itself highlights its violence,
its cruelty, and its cynicism as points of contention, even through the personal character
traits of the protagonists players inhabit. If this is an asshole simulator, the game
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repeatedly reminds the player that you, too, are an asshole—despite the fact that the
game, like the GTAs Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter studied, provides no alternative in
procedural play or narrative vision.
Importantly, however, the two main assholes—Michael and Trevor—fit into a
larger framework of assholes: cultural capitalism. “Capitalism” comes up in an
uncountable number of scenarios: Trevor’s arms-dealing associate says capitalism is “ten
percent business, ninety percent putting other people out of business,” and the game’s
social and political critiques are most blatant when capitalism is directly named. 37 When
Lester, the virulently anti-government and anti-corporation brains behind Michael’s
heists calls “government contracts” a “license to steal,” Michael notes that he and his
bank-robbing associates “are in the wrong business.” Lester responds that they’ve just
“taken the wrong contracts,”38 explicitly connecting the criminality of armed robbery to
the practices and inequities of government and corporate conduct. This comparison is
made many more times. Even honest Trevor decries his lack of funds by alluding to
dreams of a rich future in the following terms: “Where’s my consultant’s fee and my big
fat dividend? I want a franchise network. I want reward cards, merchandise. I wanna
make gun violence and drug dependency accessible to every man and beast.”39 Thus the
criminality of Michael, Trevor, and Franklin is put on the same scale as the selfish
assholes running corporations and governments—the characters are simply less
successful. Whiteness is never given an acknowledged role in determining the capitalist
scale of assholes, here—in GTAV, anyone can learn to be a rich white asshole. One of the
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game’s primary antagonists is Devin Westin, a multi-company-owning billionaire who is
shown to have influence over government agents, agencies, and politicians. In what could
be called the game’s “happy” ending of three possible endings, Devin Westin is the final
death that brings Michael, Trevor, and Franklin together—an act that answers a much
earlier scene with Trevor, where he says he wants Devin to understand “that all the
money in the world can’t save him from a nasty guy who thinks he’s an asshole.”40 The
player is given the power to decide the ending as Franklin, the moral center of GTAV’s
competing impulses, now that he has learned from his white mentors.
In GTAV’s depiction of capitalism, everyone is stuck in a system of assholes, and
racism is simply one more tool, like government contracts, for assholes to control and
exploit. Even Franklin criticizes the gangs of South Central Los Santos by saying “kids
do all the work to pay for some old bastards to live like kings . . . it’s like the
government.” Racism is mentioned, but it is fundamentally separable from the primary
exploitation that is, as Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter say, the “nature of reality” in
Rockstar’s ideology. Gangs—like the one Franklin leaves to join the apparently smarter
assholes that are Michael and Trevor—are here not social responses to, or even
symptoms of, societal positioning or the racially categorical poverty that neoliberalism
has deepened. Instead, gangs are cast as simply another order of assholes trying and
failing to reach the upper-class leisure Michael has achieved and seeks to secure, which is
itself orders below assholes like the government and Devin Westin. Trevor is a Canadian
posing as American “trailer trash,” a term that Michael uses to describe his own early life
as well. Michael, on more than one occasion, mentions his lack of “opportunity” as
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young “trailer trash,” and that robbery was his way of making opportunity. Trailer trash
whiteness is here made an equally embattled position, one that can be surpassed through
the correct performance of individualized, property-rich assholeness. The only thing
keeping Franklin from a mansion like Michael’s is not his race, but his deficiencies as an
asshole, still tied to a community that is narrativized as little more than exploitation.
When Franklin learns to be an asshole from his white mentors, he gains his mansion
through independent contract killing with Lester; it is his individuality and new whitetaught abilities that advance his prosperity, get him his mansion, and places the player’s
agency for the ending in his hands. Thus in the asshole capitalism of GTAV, racism is just
one more obstacle for individual assholes to overcome for greater personal prosperity. It
pre-emptively inoculates race and racism from being constitutively generated by modern
American cultural capitalism, class, and opportunity in the game’s grand, totalizing
outlook. Racism in GTAV is not an inherent product of the very economics of American
history and present, but merely another cynical entry in a terrain of exploitation. There
are no races, only assholes, GTAV says, and people of every colour can learn to be better,
self-interested assholes against the world of assholes.
Thus GTAV encounters racism, but elides it for its toothless central cultural
capitalist critique. Devin Weston, his billionaire ilk, and the federal government are the
true targets of the game’s critique. GTAV’s asshole theory of capitalism is indebted to
neoliberal ideology: individuals and individual action, rather than systemic norms and
structures, decide the social realities that shape individual action and possibility. While
this is theoretically ironic for an open world video game, where the very structure of
available actions overdetermine players’ immersion and sense of freedom in what is
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actually a rather limited agency, it is not ironic in light of Rockstar’s deep commitment to
neoliberal ideology. Just as Rockstar’s world of assholes is a world where the systemic is
made individual (which, we may recall, was the company’s early defense against
criticism of its crunch culture), neoliberalism divides and exploits its surplus populations
along these very lines. This individuation is the cultural validation for how neoliberalism
is still “productive of forms of racialization” (Lloyd and Wolfe 114). As Dána-Ain Davis
writes,
Neoliberal practices pull into its orbit a market of ideas about a lot of things
including the family, gender, and racial ideology. It is, as Lisa Duggan (2003)
notes, “saturated with race,” (xvi) using capitalism to hide racial (and other)
inequalities by relocating racially coded economic disadvantage and reassigning
identity-based biases to the private and personal spheres. (349)
GTAV’s asshole capitalism essentially captures this division, but naturalizes it the same
way it makes capitalism itself the inescapable “nature of reality.” In this way, racism is
figured fundamentally as a particular, separable kind of exploitation from inescapable
capitalist reality; it is an activity that is a “personal,” “identity-based” expression, and
thus not an integral part of GTA’s systemic theory of reality. GTA’s ethos is, at its most
positive, that the world is full of assholes, but there is good to be had and loyalties and
families worth holding onto in a world defined by exploitation; these positive aspects are
the product of personal choices, of individual morality in the exploitative context to
which all life is subject. Racism is bad, says GTAV, but it is not an integral part of how
the “nature of reality” is organized by capital. In other words, we can choose not to be
racist, but we cannot choose not to be capitalist.
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Nowhere is this individuation clearer in GTAV’s ethos than in the representation
of Franklin and his friendship with Lamar, a still committed member of the gang Franklin
leaves behind. GTAV has a number of “doubled” characters: Lester, Michael’s cane-using
anti-government anti-corporate intel-gatherer is doubled by Ron, Trevor’s perpetually
limping, knee-brace wearing intel-gatherer, obsessed with government conspiracies of the
“trackers implanted in our teeth by dentists” variety. Trevor’s double is Lamar—also
consistently referred to as “crazy,”—the irrational but passionate friend of the more calm,
selfish Franklin, who is the Michael of the relationship. Franklin’s story takes him further
and further from his South Central Los Santos neighbourhood. As this unfolds, Lamar
consistently questions Franklin’s dissociation from his community, but the game presents
Lamar’s criticism as narrow-minded and foolish. Franklin, after all, is learning how to be
a smarter asshole, how to not do all the work while older heads of the gang “live like
kings.” Because GTAV decouples race from its capitalist critique, Lamar’s insistence on
remaining in the gang lifestyle and his community is, essentially, cast as evidence of his
own stupidity. As the player-controlled white version of Lamar, Trevor’s contradictions
and gestures to self-awareness and self-loathing are fundamentally more correct—and
certainly more intelligent—than Lamar’s are in the game’s logic. Trevor’s successes and
failures apparently have little to do with his race, and everything to do with his mindset
as a character; as a player character, this matches the game’s structure and narrative,
where Trevor’s aforementioned “madness” is both his strength, weakness, and what made
reviewers latch onto him as most consistent with GTA’s mechanical frictions with
narrative ambitions. The difference between Lamar and Trevor, in GTAV’s world of
caricature, is not whiteness. Rather, the difference is that one has the self-awareness to
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know he is a posturing contradiction; Trevor knows he is an asshole and is content with
that fact. Lamar, the Black man who stays in his community and fights for his beliefs,
flawed though they may be, is presented as the stupid version of Trevor, just as Ron is
presented as the stupid version of Lester. That Lamar is a humourous side character, and
Trevor is playable alone makes this distinction clear: Trevor is an independent asshole
with agency, while Lamar is an asshole too caught up in that which ties him down: his
Black community.
GTAV critiques capitalism, but, in so doing, centers the ability and knowledge of
white characters as the signifier for that critique; these characters are the lens through
which critique is possible. Blackness and Black life are never serious touchstones for
examining capitalism and identity in a game that repeatedly deals with capitalism and
identity, and features a Black protagonist; Lamar’s critiques of America are toothless
because Lamar is, largely, rendered a blinders-wearing fool circling the loop of his own
beliefs, much like he circles the South Central Los Santos neighbourhood from which
Franklin drifts. This refusal to engage Blackness and Black life as central to the workings
of capital is again understandable as a neoliberal set of emphases; as Davis argues,
Under neoliberal racism the relevance of the raced subject, racial identity
and racism is subsumed under the auspices of meritocracy. For in a
neoliberal society, individuals are supposedly freed from identity and
operate under the limiting assumptions that hard work will be rewarded if
the game is played according to the rules. Consequently, any impediments
to success are attributed to personal flaws. This attribution affirms notions
of neutrality and silences claims of racializing and racism. (350)
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GTAV’s depiction of alternatives (like Lamar’s insistence on staying and working in his
community contrasted with Franklin’s individualized success) are not only blocked off,
they are mentioned precisely to be belittled as the personal choices of the misguided, of
those too stupid to be more active assholes and thus able to resist the systemic symptoms
of neoliberalism and its structural racism. The player power fantasy of GTAV, and open
world games broadly, is a fantasy rewarding individual autonomy—like neoliberal
societies, the undergirding irony is that these individual choices of players take place
within a deceptively restricted system.
This extrication of race from capital through individualization, and the
normalization of neoliberal ideology, makes up subtext that inflects the ways players
interact with these open worlds and their real worlds, as with Atkinson and Willis’s
ludodrome. To be fair, the power-fantasy activities that feature no long-term
consequences in the game are not instructive or imitable in the real world. Yet the
ideological sanitation is at least as effective as any cultural production, particularly when
Rockstar’s games, starting with GTAIV, are widely praised as examples of potent, bigbudget storytelling and player freedom in the medium. Surely, GTAV does not expect the
depicted activities of its anti-heroes to be encouraged, but in the context of a game genre
where players’ primary interaction is ubiquitous violence, these attempts to depict levels
of moral scale in its worldview are revealing. Casual homicide and driving at ludicrous
speeds, and so forth, where the consequences are little more than sixty seconds of delay
for another attempt after death, clearly exist inside the magic circle. What slips through
the porous boundary of the circle, of the ludodrome, are the narrative structures that
house those inside activities as enjoyable, rewarding interactions that incentivize living in
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accordance with the structure’s ideological implications. When these narrative structures
are heavy with neoliberal ideology, it can normalize simply by entertaining. GTAV’s
effective and direct approach of neoliberal obfuscation comes in the same package that
most obviously represents Rockstar’s enrichment on exactly the principles of capitalist
corporate greed it mocks and equivocates—though has absolved of its constitutive
racism.
GTAV’s asshole simulation equivocates the relation of capital to matters of scale,
rather than kind; systemic and historic reality falls away for the primacy of individual
choice, naturalizing both capital as the law of human existence, and shielding capitalism
itself from being an inherently racist mode. Rockstar’s flattening individuation implicates
players’ played asshole power fantasies into the spectrum of ideology represented by the
capitalist modes its games critique and its business operates upon. In the aforementioned
happy ending, Michael talks to billionaire Devin Westin before killing him alongside
Franklin and Trevor. He tells him that “there’s two great evils that bedevil American
capitalism of the type you practice,” the first being “outsourcing”—which he uses as
metaphor for private mercenaries he “underpaid” to kill the three protagonists—and
“offshoring your profits”—which he uses as metaphor for the cliffside ocean view at
which the protagonists drown Westin in the trunk of a car. As shown, Rockstar’s open
worlds simply cannot be produced as they do without substantial outsourced global
supply chains, and Rockstar is infamous for offshoring its profits to escape national
taxations.41 This asshole simulation, where assholes triumphantly kill a bigger asshole,

A report by Tax Watch UK called “Gaming the System” details this offshoring, and even points out that
Rockstar lists its games, including GTAV, as “culturally British” to gain millions in tax credits provided by
the UK government for independent game development.
41
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provides a presumable sense of liberation for gamers. Westin, the stand-in for “the kind
of capitalism” that is bad, is one person whose choices stand in for systematic activities
that Rockstar has engaged for years. Players get to kill Westin and they pay Rockstar for
the privilege. The particular individuating narrative ideological expressions, which make
racism more a personal choice than a concealed component of that very ideology, also
serve to normalize player- and Rockstar-as-asshole. As the next section will further
detail, Rockstar sells the artificial frontier’s invitation of access, all the while epitomizing
the exploitation of the global neoliberal frontier upon which its business model functions.
The Non-Physical Casino Games of High Finance and GTA Online
GTAV features an online component called GTA Online. In GTA Online, the
game’s more absurd elements of player empowerment and mastery of space take center
stage, with the stories and characters taking a more secondary role in the multiplayer
section. The central gameplay loops are primarily invested in (1) making in-game money
and (2) all of the expensive digital items and property this money can purchase. Some of
these items, like clothing, are purely cosmetic. Others provide benefits; mansions and
apartments can store more vehicles or function as a social space to host other online
players, and illicit businesses provide even more opportunities for making money. Then
there is, of course, an incredibly large assortment of vehicles (from humble sedans to
flying motorcycles equipped with rocket launchers) and weaponry (from baseball bats to
death ray laser guns) available for purchase. Completely eschewing even the veneer of
gritty realism that restrains the player’s dominance of the game’s map, which GTAIV
began and carried to a less-invested extent in the singleplayer portion of GTAV, GTA
Online is pure fantasy for those with enough money to purchase it. Servers of GTA
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Online can become warzones of jets and tanks of competing in-game millionaires and
their hired player associates in the streets of a fictionalized Los Angeles and its
surrounding southern California countryside.
Many Western big budget open world games, including GTA Online, share and
cross-innovate design principles with Massively Multiplayer Online (MMO) games.42
Most of these innovations are, naturally, aimed at extending the profitable life of a
particular game. For some MMOs this leads to a subscription model, whereby players
typically pay a monthly fee to play the game, which features periodic content updates and
thus new reasons to engage the core gameplay loops of the base game. Another
increasingly common phenomenon is a special in-game currency that can be purchased
with real cash—a so-called “microtransaction”; usually, this special currency is limited
only to purchasable cosmetic items for players. In a study on “Virtual Consumerism,”
Vili Lehdonvirta et al. argue that the “microtransactions” of real-world currency for
digital items or in-game currency have made “simulated shopping and commodity
consumption” (1059) a centrally important factor in MMO design principles. As Hamari
and Lehdonvirta point out, this virtual consumerism has become almost inextricable from
multiplayer design because these microtransactions have become the main source of
revenue for many game companies (15), another trend that has intensified in the years
since their 2010 article “Game Design as Marketing: How Game Mechanics Create
Demand for Virtual Goods.” That article sought to delineate and advise how the
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Most MMO games are now, by and large, open world games with worlds that are shared among multiple
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they are similarly confined in progression until so-called “endgame,” where high-level players run
gameplay loops that are often more self-contained: “dungeons,” and player-versus-player arena-style
match-ups.
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“persuasive technology” of games could be used for “linking game design . . . and
marketing” for the purpose of “selling products or services” (27). Drawing from literature
that connects “games as domains of artificial outcomes” to life in the real-world society,
which is “full of games” of this nature, the proposed marketing strategy hinges on the
similar observations of Atkinson and Willis’s “ludodrome.” As “the distinction between
computer games and these other ‘games’ in the society is blurring” (27), Western open
world games that do not even have multiplayer components have become marketplaces
for digital items.43 Though the subscription model is still in use, some of the most
profitable games today (such as Fortnite) gain their entire revenue from
microtransactions, forgoing even an initial purchasing fee for the game itself.
GTA Online is updated periodically to add new vehicles, weapons, new modes for
player-versus-player violence, as well as missions with self-contained versions of the
characteristically absurd and cynical Rockstar stories. However, as GTA Online is
packaged as part of a game ostensibly billed as heavily focused on its single-player
content, it does not have a subscription fee. Instead, the revenue necessary for Rockstar to
both maintain the servers that host online play and produce new content to attract new
consumers comes from the ability to purchase in-game multiplayer funds with real cash.
For those players who wish to access the expensive items without labouring in the game’s
mechanics, Rockstar offers “Shark Cards,” which are simply pre-determined amounts of
in-game cash purchased for real dollars. The in-game cash can be used for anything in the

Many games from Ubisoft’s catalogue (which I will focus on in the following chapter) are single-player
only but still feature an extra marketplace for buying in-game items like clothing or weapons. Some of
these purchasable packages are literally titled “Time Savers” and provide resources that let players spend
real money to reduce the time spent on in-game labour collecting resources in the massive, checklist-style
activity-heavy open worlds.
43
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game, including the armaments that give the digitally wealthy players dominance over
other players. This structure is often colloquially referred to as “pay-to-win” in gaming
media, as those with the real money to spend on the game can gain an immediate tactical
advantage over other players who do not put in real money. GTAV (and the later free
addition of GTA Online) was released before some of the more heavily publicized
Western consumer rejections of the practice. For example, two big-budget games (one an
open world) released in 2017 drew so much ire from gaming communities and media that
Electronic Arts and Warner Bros. Interactive Entertainment suffered headline-garnering
temporary losses to their stock prices (Huang).44 GTA Online’s pay-to-win structure
cultivates GTAV’s asshole capitalist ideology not just through the immersion of its world
and narrative, but by emphasizing individual players’ prerogative to literally game the
system with capital, which translates to the equivalent of otherwise hard-won assets that
provide player advantage.
Eustance Huang argued in 2018 that players in the Western game market are less
amenable to the pay-to-win structure than players in the Chinese market, primarily
because of their respective histories with video games as a medium. Until recently, a
significant proportion of gaming in China was done in internet cafes and other venues
that required “paying recurring costs to game” (Huang, n.p.). Huang draws the
perspectives of multiple games market analysts who agreed that the differences between
these markets would likely fade over time, and the likelihood is that Western markets
would come to accept the microtransaction-based models that are overwhelmingly
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Perhaps ironically, the Warner Bros. game, Middle-earth: Shadow of War, is a single-player-only open
world game, and still fell under the scrutiny of microtransaction antipathy for its pay-to-win structure. This
despite the fact that Ubisoft has run a similar model without economic repercussions of any kind: see
previous footnote.
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popular in the Chinese market. The incredible financial success of Fortnite in Western
markets, which uses a microtransaction model for cosmetic enhancements (including
appropriated dance moves for a player’s avatar45), appears to validate those predictions.
After all, globalized neoliberal supply chains and markets46 are demonstrably effective at
creating market parameters and then funneling consumption and labour into them. Those
parameters are, by and large, the logics of capitalism as expressed by the de-regulated,
hyper-individualized domain of international corporations: whatever extracts more
surplus value from labour and raises consumption (and the price thereof) is ideal.
Temporary stock dips brought on by a displeased consumer base is a brief temporal
hiccup. If microtransactions are better for the bottom line of big budget game
development, then heavy investment will ensure they become popular. The brazenly payto-win structure of GTA Online’s microtransactions came before the sound-and-fury of
2017, but the game continued with resounding success in that same year. One analyst
firm suggested that, from GTAV’s release in 2013 to 2017, more than a billion USD
revenue came from GTA Online microtransactions (Strickland).
This extremely profitable revenue stream meets Rockstar’s characteristic
cynicism and normalization of the neoliberal ideology (which its cynicism and revenue
are predicated upon), and results in its clearest expression in GTA Online’s latest major
update. In July 2019, GTA Online added a fully functional in-game casino. This update is
emblematic of the utter weightlessness of Rockstar’s satire, revealing it is, at its core, no
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See Cole (2019).

The Chinese market is, of course, included in these globalized neoliberal supply chains, despite specific
characteristics of its centrally planned economic structure. From game production with firms like Virtuos to
game consumption with the lifting of the ban on game consoles in 2015, Chinese labour and consumption
are part and parcel of the metrics shaped by the neoliberal ideology that currently dominates world market
logics. How precisely these ideological and material contexts differ is a different study entirely.
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more than self-interested normalization. Indeed, Rockstar’s satire of capital is a perverse
scheme whereby a corporate entity provides artificial freedom and power fantasies, where
the apparent targets of ridicule and antagonism are functionally indistinguishable from
the very entity that develops and delivers them. With GTA Online’s casino update,
players can buy and decorate a penthouse in the Diamond Casino and Resort. Months
after the update launched, a further update in December 2019 included a connected short
storyline in which players are pitted against rapaciously greedy oil barons who have
engaged a hostile takeover of the casino; like much of GTA Online’s stories, it is
connected to Lester, GTAV’s socially awkward hacker who hates corporate greed. To
disrupt the casino’s corporatization by representatives of an industry more easily
villainized in the era of climate collapse, players are tasked with robbing the casino’s
vault. Here too, then, the plot provides a very particular flavour of liberation: an
individual prerogative for lawlessness prevailing in the face of a thinly veiled allegory of
corporate exploitation. This is the narrative mechanism by which Rockstar disguises its
own corporate greed, selling a power fantasy of individual greed out-playing corporate
greed.
The storyline of working alongside Lester is the narrative dressing on a new
gameplay loop for repeatedly planning and executing the heist on the casino’s vault. All
of that merely provides the possible in-game labour to make the usual in-game currency
that can then be turned into casino chips, another in-game currency that can be gambled
on functional slot machines, horse races, and games of poker, blackjack, and roulette.
Chips can also be spent on cosmetic items for the player’s avatar or penthouse, or they
can simply be turned back into in-game dollars. Of course, since those chips are
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purchased with in-game cash, and in-game cash can be purchased with real-world
currency, GTA Online is essentially a fully functional online casino. The ability to
purchase casino chips—and thus gamble with a currency two clicks away from real
money—is removed from GTA Online in over 50 countries, including China, because the
activity is recognized as legally indistinct from real gambling (Thier). Players in these
countries can enter the casino and play the heist (multiple times over), but they cannot
gamble. This setback was apparently not significant, however, even with China as the
leading consumer of microtransactions in games. Strauss Zelnick, CEO of Rockstar’s
publisher Take-Two, noted the financial impact of this update on a 2019 earnings call:
“Recurrent consumer spending on Grand Theft Auto Online grew 23% to a new record,
driven by the July release of the Diamond Casino & Resort update, delivering record
player engagement across daily, weekly, and monthly active users in July, and then again
in August” (qtd. in Brightman).
When I first took a virtual walk through the Diamond Casino in GTA Online, I
was unsurprised by the update’s ever-present cynical style: NPCs47 have various on-thenose comedic conversations about the casino’s status as a heartless money-sink. I admit I
was mildly surprised, however, by the nameless, mute NPC seated on the floor by the
casino’s exit. Head in hands, this figure had the obviously dejected posture of a customer
who has just lost a significant amount of money. I would later see this position reused
elsewhere in the casino with a slightly different character model. Though it is only one
small detail in a lavishly over-detailed space, I often consider the numerous processes

47

Non-player characters (NPCs), as the name suggests, are any game characters that are not controlled by a
player, whose scripted actions and situational responses are prescribed by the game’s programming.
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involving countless people that were necessary to add it: to model the various versions of
the NPC and his clothing, to animate his pathetic position, to select and authorize his
possible locations, to program the random chance he would or would not appear at any
given time. All of that productive labour to put a tiny reminder of the artificial human
cost of a digital casino in this power-fantasy frontier grotesquely depicting modern
capitalism. Here, it fleshes out a very real casino operation that exploits and profits off of
the real human cost of gambling. It is, in effect, a microcosm for the GTA series’
increasingly labour-intensive visual verisimilitude, a small part of a set-piece to depict a
world worthy of hostility for the intentions of the greedy on the one hand, and, on the
other hand, a set-piece to run a literal casino with the same intentions. Put in the context
of Rockstar’s excessive style generally and in the casino particularly, it is likely the
figure is actually meant to be a target for ridicule; a fool you see on your exit, a fool that
cannot play the game as the player can. This is the same ridicule which “functions to
keep . . . truths at safe distance,” the truths of neoliberal ideology, and that distance is
“necessary” for the “endless repetition” of the activities that incentivize the played
expression of that ideology with no alternative (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 181).48
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Another personal anecdote worth sharing: my time with GTA Online would have been extremely limited
were it not for the game’s structure being broken for me early on. The “grind” to get enough money and
levels to actually do much in the game world is significant (as it always is in Western big budget open
world games), and I was unwilling to engage these systems for long when I first tried them. This was
shortly after GTA Online’s release, where many features were yet to be added—or removed. One feature
that was removed was the ability for players to share their in-game currency with one another. However,
before that removal, another player wordlessly gifted me several million in-game dollars. This player was
likely one of the many “hackers” that broke the game’s programming in the early days of GTA Online.
Naturally, I immediately spent these ill-gotten gains on the armaments and property I would need to
actually start engaging the money-making schemes wealthier players have access to without labouring in its
“grind” for countless hours. So not only does GTA Online broadly represent the “comedic exposé” (DyerWitheford and de Peuter 179) of American capitalism, it also provided me a comedic parable for the
practical necessity to break the supposed rules of a supposedly non-exploitative system to succeed, or how
one must begin with capital to make capital. That Rockstar removed the ability to share money to make this
kind of hacked community-enrichment impossible and to make GTA Online a more distinctly neoliberal
and individuated competitive economy (where the rich can purchase victory) is itself a telling move.
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Rockstar as a clear expression of neoliberal production, design, and ideological
verve through a literal casino is a natural development. Susan Strange famously
expounded upon the intense de-regulation of Western democracies’ financial systems in
her 1986 book Casino Capitalism. Though Strange did not use the word “neoliberal” in
her work, the economic realities she analyzed and presciently predicted are the same
developments Harvey and others identify with the neoliberal turn in Western policy that
started in the 1970s. Importantly, the ethos that undergirded this turn, as mentioned
earlier in the chapter, is closely connected to the ideological developments that were a
symptom and origin of colonial relations. Strange’s purview was far less historical than it
was contemporaneously statistically analytical and predictive, but she nevertheless
delineated the outcomes of the neoliberal economic order in ways that dovetail neatly
with the work of Harvey and others. Strange chose the analogy of a casino for the
unregulated financial markets because of the increasing volatility and speculation-driven
nature of capitalist markets in advancing neoliberal policy, where “games are played . . .
that involve sums of money so large that they cannot be imagined” (1). For Strange, the
most important difference between casinos and casino capitalism is that “in the latter all
of us are involuntarily engaged in the day’s play. A currency change can halve the value
of a farmer’s crop before he harvests it . . . A takeover dictated by financial
considerations can rob the factory worker of his job. From school-leavers to pensioners,
what goes on in the casino in the office blocks of the big financial centres is apt to have
sudden, unpredictable, and unavoidable consequences for individual lives,” and fortune
and misfortune for those not playing the game with on-paper liquid assets “is a matter of
luck” (2). If GTAV’s story thematically critiques corporate greed as a rigged casino game
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where the house always wins, the satire is inevitably the distance from which Rockstar
and Take-Two can make itself the house and ensure every game is played in its favour.
Strange’s identification of casino capitalism is the ballooning de-regulated finance
industry and the policies influenced by a fortifying corporate power. As Lloyd and Wolfe
put it, the “crisis of profitability that confronted capitalism in the early 1970s led to
economic restructuring on a vast scale, from the off-shoring of manufacture, enabled by
post-Fordist modes of ‘flexible’ production and by containerization, to the sustained
assault on the welfare state” (109-110). With corporations turning to globalized
neoliberal supply chains to exploit cheaper labour elsewhere, Western wealth became
progressively located in the finance industry. Greta R. Krippner and others have termed
this particular shift in corporate capital “financialization.” Krippner’s exhaustively
empirical study of American financialization refers to “finance” as “activities relating to
the provision (or transfer) of liquid capital in expectation of future interest, dividends, or
capital gains,” and financialization itself as “a pattern of accumulation in which profits
accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity
production” (174-5). Krippner’s study also points out that with overlap in boards, major
shareholders, channels for capital exchange, and so on, “the distinction between forces
operating ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ non-financial corporations is becoming increasingly
arbitrary. Non-financial corporations are beginning to resemble financial corporations—
in some cases, closely” (202).
Take-Two and Rockstar, with all their “corporate drama” that Houser can dismiss
alongside his own undisclosed settlements over millions, are profiteers in an industry that
is benefitting from neoliberal policy and quickly moving away from physical products. In
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short, they are corporations whose capital and production chains cannot be distinguished
as “outside” financialization. This is how Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter can call video
games “exemplary media of Empire . . . games are media constitutive of twenty-firstcentury global hypercapitalism” (xxix). The ironic genius of Rockstar’s oeuvre
specifically, it seems, is in providing hypercapitalist frontiers, ludodromes of their own
ideological inside/outside indistinguishability, where the disaffected and the fortunate
alike can be comforted by a fantasy in which the individual prevails and gains a piece of
that dominance for themselves. The roll of the die may decide the fortunes of people
more and more marginalized by global capital outside the circle, but Rockstar provides a
playground inside of it where the dice (outside of its literal casino games) are loaded for
the player. The porous magic circles of GTA are not so much ambivalent as much as they
are totalizing. They provide, for corporate profit, the comforting play and the endless
repetition of fantasies of dominance that rehearse the very principles of neoliberal global
capitalist exploitation that these companies engage to produce the works themselves.
Within the digital frontier, the player is invited to access everything; the inside of the
game is a reward system. On the outside, Rockstar is always the house, and its dice are
always loaded—its consumers are inside of the house only as part of fantasies that
normalize the exploitation.
Indeed, the psychology of the frontier—the dangerous, anxiety-producing but
profit-rich invitation to access, the indistinguishability of the “inside” and “outside” of
sovereign domain—is broadly comparable to accumulation of capital in the era of
neoliberalism. Consequently, just as Turner must make the frontier abstract and universal
to see a positive arc to his American teleology, where the economic, social, and political

93
enrichment of the frontier merely changes form, capitalism’s basic structure transitions to
the abstract and universal to maintain its required infinite growth. Capitalist accumulation
by its very nature requires the constant accumulation of more capital in order to sustain
itself (even if that sustainability is in the casino-style peaks and valleys associated with
market volatility). Governments and corporations alike proceed on the conventional
wisdom that growth of capital is an absolute good to be maintained at any cost; this is
especially a necessity currently to maintain financialization’s reliance upon the
speculation and confidences of the gamblers of capitalism’s casino. A recent trend for
corporations has been rebranding Chief Marketing Officers as Chief Growth Officers, or
indeed, making the latter an entirely new role—naturally for considerable pay
(Sternberg). Even traditional capitalist economists have recently been attempting to pivot
the notions of capitalist growth away from “increasing use of the Earth’s natural
resources” and “separating economic growth from physical growth” (Johnston) due to the
increasing awareness of current and impending ecological collapses. Of course, this
attempted domestication of capital’s accumulative logics does not attend to the actual
issues that Strange and others have identified: Capitalist growth has already been, for
several decades now, increasingly focused on non-physical growth, on the great sums of
financial transfer for shifting the venues and styles of labour exploitation around the
globe. Importantly, this occurs more and more through digital networks for digital
production and digital commodities. This does not mean corporate entities have suddenly
gained a conscience that is wholly alien to the logics of capital accumulation in and of
itself. Indeed, this shift to non-physical growth cannot even be argued to have
fundamentally changed the relationship global capital has to resource extraction, physical
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growth, or the exploitation of labour; at most, it means these aspects have to be more
carefully managed and redistributed for maintaining or expanding revenue streams.
Globalized capital is able, as Strange highlighted, to re-prioritize growth in a world less
and less ecologically able to sustain traditional modes of growth heretofore; thus,
corporations entrench themselves in the numbers games of the high-finance casino,
orienting that venue as more centrally important to maintain growth, investor confidence,
and so forth.
The shift of emphasis for capital accumulation from the physical to the abstract
may have merely accelerated the volatility and unsustainability of the enterprise as a
mode of social organization. This volatility of non-physical origin is not without its
benefits, of course. Surplus populations must be maintained at a level of precarity that
makes capitalist exploitation function. Harvey clearly identified the animus of nonphysical growth of financialized neoliberalism and its obsession with digital
technologies—of which modern big budget game production (with microtransactions and
their constant collection of analytics on player behaviour49) are a part:
[Neoliberalism] holds that the social good will be maximized by maximizing the
reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring all human action
into the domain of the market. This requires technologies of information creation
and capacities to accumulate, store, transfer, analyse, and use massive databases
to guide decisions in the global marketplace. Hence neoliberalism’s intense
interest in and pursuit of information technologies . . . These technologies have

See Weber (2018) and Emily Greer’s 2018 session at the Game Developer’s Conference for
introductions into the kinds of game analytics, as well as their uses and abuses.
49
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compressed the rising density of market transactions in both space and time.
(Brief History of Neoliberalism 3-4)
Certainly, the effects of this shift are recognizably detrimental even to the heretofore
privileged populations of settler nation states, once the primary beneficiaries of capital’s
dominance. Strange saw the casino and was prescient of finance’s gambling’s fallouts,
and her work is just one small piece that can be added to entire bodies of literature
studying these effects, particularly how this move from physical to abstract reveals key
elements of capital’s relation to people, land, and place. Saskia Sassen’s work in
sociology and economics has summarized just some of these effects on different
populations:
the growing numbers of the abjectly poor, of the displaced in poor countries who
are warehoused in formal and informal refugee camps, of the minoritized and
persecuted in rich countries who are warehoused in prisons, of workers whose
bodies are destroyed on the job and rendered useless at far too young an age, of
able-bodied “surplus populations” warehoused in ghettoes and slums . . . [these
phenomena are] signaling a deeper systemic transformation, one documented in
bits and pieces in multiple specialized studies but not quite narrated as an
overarching dynamic that is taking us into a new phase of global capitalism.
(“Expelled” 198)
Sassen and others50 have studied corporate real estate practices, including how even (or
perhaps, especially) in the era of ever-increasing precarity and housing crises, the forces
of speculation-driven accumulation of capital evicts tenants in swiftly gentrifying
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96
neighbourhoods and sits on empty housing for indefinite periods, waiting for greater
return. As Veracini says, “Capital is thus literally settling on space that is made empty
through financialization” (“Containment” 119).
This settled empty land is poetically analogous to the process and psychology that
makes big-budget open world video games such an appetizing corporate investment for
return as well as an attractive fantasy for gamers: the digital frontier is always already
empty, primed for settlement by a player unalienated from their played labour and
reward. In the real world, people can be removed from land and buildings upon it in order
to extract greater value; space can be emptied literally and conceptually. In digital
worlds, developers start with an empty world and fill it with invitations for the player. In
this vein, it makes sense that Rockstar would lean further into a microtransaction business
model as it encourages its players to settle in their digital worlds. This is again the
promise of the frontier myth: “free land” for “fit people,” a universal invitation for capital
to access. Gamers simply get to play the fantasy of being invited. Who or what entities
receive the invitation in the material world of global capital, however, is not universal; it
is the fact that those who receive the invitation are given access that is universal that
shapes Empire’s sovereignty. The frontiers of corporate capitalism in the era of the
neoliberal casino reveal that even the sovereignty of the states that settled the so-called
New World are only secondary to the very processes and logics of capital accumulation.
Coulthard asserts that “[l]ike capital, colonialism, as a structure of domination predicated
on dispossession, is not ‘a thing,’ but rather the sum effect of the diversity of interlocking
oppressive social relations that constitute it” (15). The co-development of capitalism and
colonialism, then, and their attendant symptomatic social relations, are deeply important
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to identify for my analysis moving forward. Though Sassen calls the current crises a
“new phase,” it is a phase nevertheless reminiscent of and understandable as a
consequential development from the colonial origins of capital.
Sovereignty, Racial Capitalism, and GTAV’s Brush with Indigeneity
Strange’s later work would advance her theories surrounding the growing
internationalized, financialized corporate influence in the world in just such a gesture to
its historical bases. In an article published posthumously in 1999, she specifically stresses
the changing nature of political sovereignty for Western nations. Recall my introduction’s
quick summation of Western sovereignty in international politics as historically indebted
to precepts laid down in the Westphalian treaties of 1648; in this conception, sovereignty
is located in the nation state’s controls of domestic affairs within its borders. Strange’s
article coins a cheeky portmanteau to illustrate how corporate power and international
financialized markets (or the forces of “global capital,” as per Dyer-Witheford, de Peuter,
and others) have superseded this apparent arrangement of sovereignty: the article is titled
“The Westfailure System.” Strange identifies the Westphalian model of sovereignty as
buckling under the weight of international corporations that wield ever more power and
influence over labour and production in national and international contexts. Strange
groups the model’s failures into three categories: financial, environmental, and social.
Her conclusion is that these failures are a symptom of the fact that it “cannot be
realistically isolated from—indeed is inseparable from—the market economy which the
states of Europe, from the mid-17th century onwards, both nurtured and promoted” (345).
Essentially, Strange suggests that the Westphalian model is failing because it no longer
has the ability (that she is doubtful it will ever regain) to de-fang the consequences of the
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capitalist system’s logics that are inherent in the Westphalian historical and continuing
sovereignties.51 This is the understandable latest development, then, of what DyerWitheford and de Peuter call Empire; the forces that most purely express empire’s
exploitation have gained the sovereignty that was once wielded by imperial powers, then
by settler and colonizing nation states. Corporate power has surpassed national power,
but not in a fashion utterly distinct from the mixed private-and-state enterprise that
European imperialism and settler colonialism has always been, and to which those mid17th century Westphalian market economies are indebted. The current form of
unrestrained pursuit of capital accumulation has merely shifted the balance of multiple
united state and non-state actors. Corporations and interrelated state apparatuses hold the
power to shift state policy in the ways Harvey, Dyer-Witheford, and de Peuter note took
place in New York specifically. Veracini calls this “the ‘sovereign effects’ of financial
capital, which has now acquired an unprecedented capacity to dictate policies ‘from
above’” (“Containment” 123). Sovereignty for modern neoliberal capitalism is now less
about national domains of domestic power and the monopoly on state violence; it now
rests in the hands of global capital.
Strange’s conclusion is in line with what many Indigenous scholars, and scholars
of (settler) colonialism and Marxism (like Veracini above) have argued for some time.
The casino of financialization becomes even more relevant to this chapter’s study of
Rockstar when we look at precisely how those scholars direct their analyses of the same
forces Strange and Krippner identify. Strange’s assertions are echoed in studies of settler
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It is worth pointing out that Strange did not consider herself a Marxist. A great deal of her work mostly
seemed interested in how market logics were not (and possibly could be) sufficiently regulated
internationally; this posthumous article, however, seems to indicate that her findings eventually drew her
much closer to contemporary Marxist analysis.
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colonialism, a project “predicated upon an objective to take possession of new territories
and to transport the sovereignty of empire to them” (Dwyer and Nettleback 4). The
development of Westphalian sovereignty into the imperial sovereignties of empires is
concurrent with, and in many ways indistinguishable from, the development of market
capitalism. Many scholars of settler colonialism and critical race theory suggest that this
is how the modern orders of racialization (and thus modern Western racist ideologies)
were formed and later codified. Strange saw capitalism’s ever-widening “socioeconomic
polarisation,” where the corporate forces benefitting the most from and directing this
polarisation are largely unrestrained by accountability in the Westphalian model of
international politics (“Westfailure” 352), a direct result of that model’s historical
indebtedness to capitalist logics. Other scholars can expand this analysis with insights
into the nature of those connections and their expressions.
Cedric Robinson famously coined the term “racial capitalism” in Black Marxism:
The Making of the Black Radical Tradition. Robinson argued the development of the
Western conception of “race” (which differed from previous historical conceptions of
ethnicity/peoplehood) was due to its requirement for fostering in-group and out-group
inequalities. This reading is in line with the concept of surplus populations: race is part of
capital’s necessity to manage its surplus populations with disposability and division.
Capitalist and proto-capitalist colonial management of surplus populations has used racial
division for precisely what that phrase denotes: division. W. E. B. Du Bois suggested that
the societal privileges whites have in the Western world (which included capital and the
access to it) over non-whites is little more than enough to ensure the failures of Western
economic enrichment can be politically operationalized against non-white out-groups,
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thus maintaining the structure (709). Indeed, these inequalities and their naturalized
codification in “race” are necessary to theoretically justify and practically enact the
dispossessions of capitalism’s first engine of European enrichment: colonialism, and its
violently extractive sovereignty exported abroad. While tracking the colonial causes of
the First World War, Du Bois noted that as the European imperial powers fought over
expanding their colonial holdings, they created the conditions for “precisely that state of
helplessness which invites aggression and exploitation,” which validates the developing
syntax of racist ideology (708). The very concept of race progressed as the stolen wealth
accrued, and as the peoples and cultures pillaged were forced into conditional practices
the pillaging created: “Thus the world began to invest in color prejudice. The ‘Color
Line’ began to pay dividends” (708). This arc is echoed by the settler frontier’s selfperpetuating conditions of savagery and civilization discussed in the introduction.
This inextricability of race hierarchy and colonial capitalism is precisely why the
supposed post-racial nature of neoliberalism is little more than cover for continuing
exploitation. This post-racial fantasy is part of how GTAV rehabilitates its own
exploitation. Without facing how the “relation” of capital is itself co-constructed with
colonial racism and the logics of surplus populations, the divisions they engender, and the
material disparities between groups they historically and continue to produce, the
validation of good intentions and the extrication of race from capital plays the part of
progress when the reality looks much worse. GTAV poses racism as only attendant to
capitalist exploitation (which is quite simply the way of the world) rather than
constitutive, and thus rehearses the central racism of that logic. True to the
weightlessness of its satire, by depicting racism as useful but dispensable to the economic

101
exploitation it both revels in and ridicules, is produced by and reproduces, GTA evades
historical reality and evinces its own ideological rehabilitation of that exploitation. Before
moving on to this chapter’s analysis of Rockstar’s Wild West fantasies of the Red Dead
Redemption series, however, it is important to paint a clearer picture of the colonial
relation in this matrix of racialization and capitalism.
Scores of scholars, theorists, and writers have pointed out that racial capitalism—
not always in name but in metrics and formal framework—continues unabated in modern
democratic neoliberal governance, culture, and economics, despite neoliberalism’s
professed post-racial multi-culturalism. Bonita Lawrence (Mi'kmaq) and Enakshi Dua’s
influential article “Decolonizing Antiracism” potently demonstrates that even anti-racist
activism and scholarship can validate colonialism by ignoring the historical bases of and
connections between racism and the economic modes of developing and developed settler
states. Beenash Jafri points out that Lawrence, Dua, Sherene Razack, and others situated
“settler states,” before Wolfe, as principally referencing “the patterns of capitalist
development that are particular to the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand: White
settlement of these lands required the erasure and displacement of Indigenous peoples
and claims to land, and the exploitation of labor of people of color to develop that land”
(Jafri). As such, the nominally meritocratic individualization of neoliberalism is the
torch-bearer of settler colonial economic structure and racist ideology along the histories
I have established. These scholars and Harvey all recognize privatization of land is a
central element of settler “progress,” and is the reason and metric by which Indigenous
peoples need be eliminated as the most troublesome sets of surplus population. We may
again recall that Turner’s thesis must make the frontier abstract once Indigenous lands
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have been stolen for private settler ownership; it is a sign of teleological process for
Turner that “the great spaces of fertile prairie land . . . have already passed into private
possession” (293) of a “fit people” (294). Precisely who counts as “fit people” in the
privatized land-grab of the frontier is racially explicit for Turner’s Indigenous exclusion,
and implicit in the neoliberal context that individualizes systemic problems for racialized
groups. This is why capitalism and overt and covert forms of racism are baked into the
settler colonial imaginary, of which Western big budget open world games broadly and
Rockstar’s games specifically are a part. Capitalism and racism are constitutive of both
the very sovereignty settlers brought with them, and the Empire that has overtaken
national settler state sovereignty.
Coulthard’s important clarification and realignment of Marxist analysis through
Indigenous political thought in Red Skin White Masks is again useful for summarizing the
relations tracked here. Coulthard writes about settlers’ dispossessions of Indigenous
peoples as such:
these formative acts of violent dispossession set the stage for the emergence of
capitalist accumulation and the reproduction of capitalist relations of production
by tearing Indigenous societies, peasants, and other small-scale, self-sufficient
agricultural producers from the source of their livelihood—the land. It was this
horrific process that established the two necessary preconditions underwriting the
capital relation itself: it forcefully opened up what were once collectively held
territories and resources to privatization (dispossession and enclosure), which,
over time, came to produce a “class” of workers compelled to enter the
exploitative realm of the labor market for their survival (7).
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Similarly, Harvey’s The New Imperialism argues that modern neoliberalism’s primary
mode of capital expansion is “accumulation by dispossession.” Harvey puts these modern
dispossessions into categories, including privatization and financialization. Lloyd and
Wolfe connect modern neoliberal dispossession and the settler colonial historical origins
as such:
the fundamental continuity between the historical development of European
settler colonialism and the present-day development of the neoliberal world order
resides in the exigencies of managing surplus populations. So far as settlers have
been concerned, the salient surplus has, of course, been the Native population,
whose refractory presence has prompted a range of techniques of elimination—
from outright homicide to various forms of removal and/or confinement, and,
once their numbers have been appropriately reduced in the post-frontier era, to
Natives’ assimilation into settler society—techniques that have met with mixed
success in the face of Native modes of resistance which have varied as creatively
as the settlers’ own repertoire of strategies. In this overall historical process, the
key shift is the ending of the frontier, which generally coincides with the
consolidation of the settler state, and which is typically marked by intensified
programs of Native assimilation, so many mopping-up exercises for civilization.
(111)
This is how the history of settlement and the contemporary continuance of neoliberalism
merge and develop what Coulthard calls the “settler colonial relationship,” which features
“interrelated discursive and nondiscursive facets of economic, gendered, racial, and state
power . . . structured into a relatively secure or sedimented set of hierarchical social
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relations that continue to facilitate the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of their lands
and self-determining authority” (6-7). This “colonial relation of dispossession” (14) has
figured and continues to figure Indigenous lives as outside of capital’s expansion; it is
only through the dispossession of Indigenous land and sovereignty thereof that capital
may expand, and only by assimilation into neoliberal practice can Indigenous life be
made inside that expansion. The frontier may have mostly closed physically, but it
continues conceptually.
It is important, however, to ensure this framework does not place Indigenous
peoples as only another racialization as invented by, or constitutively a response to, the
colonial relation of dispossession. As J. Kēhaulani Kauanui (Kānaka Maoli) puts it,
Indigeneity is “a category of analysis that is distinct from race, ethnicity, and
nationality—even as it entails elements of all three of these”( “A Structure, Not an
Event,” n.p.). It is crucial to note that not only did settlers bring and impose a sovereignty
on stolen lands, doing so displaced and destroyed countless pre-existing sovereignties
among the Indigenous peoples with relationships to the land that were wholly outside the
very conception of sovereignty that was transported across the Atlantic. Vine Deloria Jr.
(Standing Rock Sioux) tracks the concept of “sovereignty” through global historical
circumstances in “Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty.” From theological
origins to the “divinely ordained” Kings of Europe, Deloria suggests sovereignty, even
before the Westphalian codification and the attendant colonial adjustments and
validations, was about locating “immense absolute powers” in individuals. This explains
why early colonial Europeans assumed the “spokesmen of other nations” of varied
Indigenous peoples were thought “to represent the nationhood of the people they
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represented” (22). Deftly demonstrating how European treatments of “Indian”
sovereignty was amorphous enough to accommodate expansion and dispossession,
Deloria points out that “Indian communities were acknowledged to have a European
version of sovereignty as long as they held sufficient territory and military strength to be
an important factor in determining the outcome of the colonial conflicts,” and as soon as
“England became predominant on the continent the idea of Indian sovereignty became
less popular” (22). The American Revolution saw “Indian sovereignty” returned to
importance, yet again for the political and martial impact on colonial warfare; the nascent
American state respected sovereignties that would fight the English both out of necessity
and to demonstrate “their ability to act in traditional political terms” to “allay the fears of
other nations” and “legitimize their activities” (23). When the American Revolution
ended and American sovereignty consolidated, so too ended the apparent settler respect
for “Indian sovereignty” and the treaties made during and after the war. For Deloria, this
is merely a continuation for the fraught, conditional nature of European sovereignty itself,
even prior to colonial contact: “Few nations were powerful enough to insist upon total
independence from other nations and legal fictions replaced a frank discussion of the
actual state of affairs. Treaties between equal “sovereigns” often disguised the fact of
interdependence of European nations” (“Self-Determination” 22). The legal fictions of
this sovereignty take on new dangerous power with accumulation by dispossession.
Joanne Barker (Lenape) also tracks the development of “sovereignty” in the
European colonial context, and in noting its “historically contingent” status, tracks how
Indigenous groups have since used the word to translate, “defining their relationships
with one another, their political agendas, and their strategies for decolonization and social
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justice” across the varied “social conditions that produce its meanings” (26). It is in this
way I use the word “sovereignty” not only to describe the power relations imposed by
settlers, but also to describe the varied political and social beliefs of Indigenous groups,
and their relation, à la Barker, to “concepts of self-determination and self-government . . .
recognition of inherent rights to the respect for political affiliations that are historical and
located and for the unique cultural identities that continue to find meaning in those
histories and relations” (26). That these sovereignties are “located” is critical; that
Indigeneity is inherently related to place is why Coulthard refers to the “place-based
foundation of Indigenous decolonial thought and practice” as “grounded normativity,”
which is the “modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and longstanding
experiential knowledge that inform and structure [Indigenous] ethical engagements with
the world” (13). This is how the privatization of land once “collectively held” (7) is itself
an expression of capital’s sovereignty assaulting alternatives for its own survival and
expansion, and presages how settler nation states themselves would have their conditional
sovereignty so thoroughly outmatched by the relation of capital encoded into it.
The early history of settler colonialism in practice is a mixed private-state
enterprise, then, and the neoliberalism of today fits neatly together in frameworks that
reveal the lie of settler “legal fictions” of sovereignty. Settler sovereignty has always
been porous. The interdependence of nations and the necessity of constant expansion and
accumulation, both historically and contemporarily, makes the settler psyche inherently
anxious. Motivated by belief in absolute jurisdiction over and security of the inside, but
constantly reaching outside for extraction, advancement, and expansion, the settler
imaginary is beset by the desire for an interiority of unassailable integrity with an
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attendant and inextricable need for access to that which lay in exteriority. The frontier
remains an enduring concept (represented repeatedly in various guises) in the settler
imaginary precisely because it represents the hope, promise, danger, and validation of
Empire, from the exploitation of post-Republican Rome to settler nations built on
genocide and slavery. The frontier in fiction acts as a calming salve for the anxiety of the
inherent porousness of European, market-logic, colonial sovereignty itself: the inside and
the outside were always comingled. In the interactive fiction of videogames, this salve
takes on a procedural power lacking in other media. Many aspects of sovereignty
transported by settlers, now little more than the nominal interest for bordered states and
more realistically held by the borderless empire of global capital, are disintegrating.
Political norms and material prosperities largely decline across the board aside from an
increasingly small population with massive capital. In the withstanding reality of its
economic practices, neoliberal Empire’s frontier is the complete invalidation of borders
against itself. The calming, hypnotic power fantasies of Western open world games, then,
use the frontier as setting and psychology of design for players as subjects of Empire,
desperate to feel the access promised by the culture produced by neoliberal capitalism,
with all its strategic historical omissions, exploitations, and valorization of frontierism.
GTAV, I should note, does feature small references to Indigeneity—naturally
shorn of any alternative sovereignty—most of which are in missable optional activities.
Lamar, Franklin’s stupid Trevor to his Michael, at times claims he is part Apache. The
claim is presented along the lines of GTAV’s general use of race described above. Trevor
the Canadian pretends to be American to get rich; Lamar uses Indigeneity to pretend his
gangster activities are, as Franklin critiques it, the “protest . . . of some kind of noble
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anarchist.” Indigeneity, here, is thus merely another cynical equivocation: even were it
principled resistance, under the status quo of criminality that is the nature of GTA’s
reality, it is in effect self-deluded savagery. This kind of savagery makes good gameplay
(as Lamar’s violent tendencies actually instigate many of the game’s missions), but
means little else narratively. But this is not Rockstar’s only treatment of Indigeneity, nor
is the GTA series the most obvious representative of the frontierism of open world games
in its oeuvre. The Red Dead Redemption series not only lets players live out Wild West
fantasies, but also does so in a setting it repeatedly reminds players is just after the very
“ending of the frontier” Lloyd and Wolfe argue marks the primary transition of settler
colonialism’s mechanics to what would eventually become nominally post-racial
neoliberalism (111).
Red Dead Redemption, Open World Occlusion, and the Neoliberal Cowboy
Rockstar released Red Dead Redemption (RDR) in 2010, after GTAIV and before
GTAV. Thoroughly praised in mainstream outlets as a more mature approach to narrative
than the GTA series, RDR literalizes Rockstar’s open world frontier design into the
imagery most closely associated with the American frontier by decades of Wild West
fictionalization. The introduction of RDR, as Jodi Byrd points out, shows player-character
John Marston on a train where he overhears “[t]wo older white women . . . reflect on
how, although the Natives have lost their lands, they have gained heaven, that although
the Indians might live like animals, they are happy in that life” (“Red Dead
Conventions” 345). Thus the game begins with a self-aware presentation of a colonial
attitude, a mild critique that appears throughout the game. This critique only acts as setdressing for much of the game’s plot and gameplay, as the player re-enacts the tropes of
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the Western genre, from ranch-handing to capturing bandits, from hunting animals for
their sellable parts, to games of saloon poker, and so on. The introductory train sequence
is emblematic for how RDR features Indigenous peoples generally; they are mostly used
in absentia for commentary, a tragically near-extinct identity that is used only
secondarily to advance more central narrative concerns. Indigenous peoples only actually
appear in RDR in the last section of the game, where they are still secondary and then
made utterly extinct in the game’s framework with the player’s participation.
Byrd calls RDR “a study in contradictions” for its apparent “critique of the
Western genre” in a product that “fetishizes genre at the site of the Indian absent
presence” (344). The older white women’s sneering superiority is a classic example of
Rockstar’s caricature of odious American ideology as in the GTA series: critique your
cake, devour it, and bake anew too. Just as GTA uses “scathing critique of neoliberal
sensibilities” (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 179), cynicism, and equivocation to validate
a core neoliberal ideology, Byrd similarly suggests that RDR poses Indigeneity as thereand-not-there, an “absent presence” that exists both inside and outside its artificial
frontier in the service of fetishizing the very Wild West genre tropes that also validated
genocide and Indigenous dispossession in the first place. RDR’s title itself is a tellingly
vague encounter with this tension; Byrd notes the “genocidal racism of the conjoined first
two words is tempered by a lingering ambivalence of redemption that emerges from the
game’s tension with the generic conventions it charts” (“Red Dead” 345). Byrd probes
the game’s titular and contextual genric ambivalence, wondering “Is it Indians who must
be redeemed by dying and having their lands put to productive use within the US fee
simple empire, or is it the settlers themselves who must seek redemption for the genocide
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and colonization of Indigenous peoples, a redemption that is forever out of their grasp?”
(345) As this chapter’s discussion of RDR will assert, true to Rockstar’s open world
principles, it appears the answer is that the redemption in the game’s design and the
context of Rockstar’s production implies the redemption of Indigenous disappearance.
Narratively, the redemption is perhaps even less well-intentioned than redemption for
settlers: redemption for genocide is not only an impossibility; the impossibility of settler
masculinity’s survival is itself worthy of tragic elegy over the Indigenous genocide of its
historical foundation.
These questions over the direction of “redemption” and their relation to the
game’s phantasmic Indigeneity are all the more salient in the context of Red Dead
Redemption technically being a sequel to an earlier Rockstar game, Red Dead Revolver,
which features a half-Indigenous protagonist—and whose ludological genre is a much
more confined, linear shooter. The series abandoned the storylines and characters of
Revolver, but Redemption 1 and 2 share each other’s world and many of the same
characters. That the series abandoned Indigeneity as an aspect of the main character (the
titular “Red,” no less) is likely the result of the marketing logics that direct design for
costly open world games; these logics suggest that white males are the predominant
market for open world games, and that for the all-important “immersion” of open world
games to be most effective in that market, the protagonists should be white males. Using
a non-normative protagonist for a masculine frontier adventure in the open world genre
(far more expensive to create than more linear alternatives) is simply too risky a
proposition for a company certain that straight white male gamers would reject such a
choice—a logic with conflicting evidence on the one hand, and a self-perpetuating
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character on the other. 52 Abandoning a linear style of gameplay for open world
gameplay, in a sense, is the move that precipitates replacing an even part-Indigenous
protagonist with a white one. It seems even virtual settlement on artificial frontiers
requires a Turnerian “fit people.” The cost of creating the artificial frontiers of open
worlds has already been discussed, but Joshua Miner argues that the very algorithmic
structure of how these frontiers are displayed for players can be read as a distinct “settler
digitality.”
Miner’s delineation of settler digitality is tied to the “revival,” in the mid-2000s,
of “western games” which draw from the tropes of Wild West film and “incorporate
open-world environments and game structures in a setting tailor-made for them” (58).
Miner notes that Rockstar “rewrote the Rockstar Advanced Game Engine (also used for
the Grand Theft Auto series) for Red Dead Redemption (2010) during an industry-wide
proliferation of open-world video games thanks to major advancements in 3D rendering”
(58).53 Even without explicitly “western” settings, though, Miner asserts settler digitality
is encoded in open world games by how they render those worlds in the first place. The
relevant advances in rendering that led to heavy investment into big budget open world
games have to do with how these worlds are essentially made in the player’s view, and
unmade outside of it. These advances
had opened the possibility of highly complex, photorealistic geometries in openworld settings, and the established algorithmic shortcuts for efficiently generating

This point will be expanded upon in the following chapter and its discussion of Joshua Jackson’s
“capitalist socius” in game design.
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Rendering, in the parlance of digital production, is simply the process of generating digital images for
display.
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3D worlds shifted. An immersive POV54 further consolidated a set of rendering
techniques designed to divert computational resources toward the subjective
experience of the player, a framework that includes level of detail/draw distance,
mesh simplification (reducing the polygonal complexity of models drawn at
differing distance or conditions) and frustum and occlusion culling (not rendering
figures and objects that fall outside the player’s unobstructed field of view). The
expansive, untamed environments of the western genre dispose games to these
algorithms for handling geometry and improving the overall look (“Surveying the
Frontier” 118).
As these rendering techniques essentially “draw only those objects in the player’s view,
in discrete stages that draw, texture, and then light world geometry,” for the programming
of open world games, “relative to environments rendered in real time, vision is not
merely vision; vision is literal creation” (“Biased Render” 52). For Miner, these
techniques are not only clever ways to render artificial frontiers on limited hardware,
frontiers free for the exploration and domination by the fit people gamers may imagine
themselves to be. They also represent and encode settler relationships to land and the
bodies that populate them.
Connecting graphical occlusion and settler colonial occlusion of Indigenous
cultures and bodies, Miner suggests “such computational shortcuts reflect an ideological
orientation that privileges player subjectivity and visual fidelity over the Other, a distilled
object on surveyed land” (“Surveying the Frontier” 118). Settler digitality, then, “is
emergent in the algorithmic grammar of mainstream video games, where rendering (1)
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relies on a spatial-hierarchical system of visual definition; and (2) maps these to
particular digital bodies” (118). Part of “a range of algorithmic techniques, [which]
organizes gamic vision and therefore player subjectivity” (118), this algorithmic grammar
necessarily ties this subjectivity to particular points-of-view: “In non-Indigenous games
featuring Native characters, the subjective camera is a digital proxy for the settlercolonial gaze . . . Cultural shortcuts translated into digital technology contribute a degree
of design bias toward settler perspectives” (“Biased Render” 52). Miner suggests digital
Indigenous bodies are visually occluded with western games’ programmed grammar,
because their techniques of rendering assets prioritize certain kinds of fidelity for
subjective views of land. This, Miner argues, inherently relates to the ways Indigenous
cultures and cultural viewpoints are themselves narratively occluded in these digital
frontiers. When Rockstar’s design moves from the tight, linear mission stages with halfIndigenous Red of Red Dead Revolver to the open world frontiers with white John
Marston, the programming to make such a leap possible “operate[s] on a rendering
paradigm that tends to shift Indigenous figures and stories into occluded space” (126).
Red Dead Redemption’s opening train sequence is symbolic of exactly this occlusion.
Critique of moralistic colonial attitude comes from the “absent presence” of Indigenous
peoples; the dispossession is mentioned by white bodies, and this itself merely serves as
interstitial dressing to the sweeping, sumptuous shots of terrain, the train barreling
through a massive game world players will soon get to inhabit and dominate.
Similar to Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter’s analysis of GTA’s cynicism and
figuration of neoliberalism as inexorable, Sara Humphreys reads RDR’s critique of the
American colonial project as one of “eternal inequality,” where the “hierarchy of national
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identities . . . racial, gendered, and economic . . . remain entrenched” in the game’s
“frontier ideologies” (201) as they are played and narratively delivered. Similar to the
concept of the ludodrome, Humphreys argues that the “participatory nature of video
games offer[s] epistemic and ontological stability” (206). This is a similar understanding
of how the repeated actions of a player’s input in gameplay naturalizes the ideological
bases of the simulated activities rather than the represented activities as they are
simulated (209). In blunt terms, RDR is not likely to inspire a player to shoot people
outside the magic circle, but they certainly interact with a player’s understanding of when
shooting someone might be justifiable outside that circle. Humphreys’s argument is that
RDR’s bodily engagement is less in service to “a nostalgic dream of American identity
through the “was” of the West,” and more in service to the game’s nature as a
Foucauldian “cultural placeholder of ‘authenticity and attribution’” (206). That is to say,
the gameplay of cowboys from the Western genre’s formulas does not validate or
encourage cowboy activities as much as it validates the ideology these fictive cowboys
hold in common with the neoliberal ideology that dominates the cultural space of its
developers and players. Noting the game’s release during “pressures brought to bear on
US citizenry by the continued repercussions of the 2008 collapse” (206), Humphreys
calls the gameplay and its ideological validation a “safety valve” that “relieves the
pressure of a failed neoliberal economy,” as players guide Marston to “violently defend
the edicts of neoliberalism” with the “authority invested in him through his status as a
white, heteronormative, rugged individual: the cowboy” (206).
Among the first interactions the player has in the game is aiding patriarch Drew
and daughter Bonnie MacFarlane and their ranch. Drew and Bonnie offer missions where
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Marston protects their large homestead and herds cattle, missions that themselves
foreshadow Marston’s eventual return to his own ranching and cattle-herding at the end
of the game. The other set of early missions sees Marston help a local marshal kill cattle
rustlers. Both sets of story missions introduce the optional activities of bounty-hunting
and homestead law enforcement, activities that send the player out to far-flung locales
with the former, and simply around the increasingly familiar MacFarlane ranch for the
latter. Humphreys notes that Bonnie says “businessmen are the new cowboys”55 in
reference to the changing social texture of the American experience, where federal
government and the interests of big business are replacing mythical rugged individualist
cowboy masculinity. Humphreys points to an early compulsory mission introducing
Drew MacFarlane—a non-violent ride and horse-wrangling affair where the ranch-owner
commiserates with Marston about modernism’s evils surpassing outlawry. The
conversation is ended with Bonnie’s call to “enjoy the ride,” an example of what
Humphreys calls a “manifest domesticity, to use Amy Kaplan’s phrase” that
“depoliticizes the conversation, thereby subordinating dissention to propriety” (208).
I argue that what Humphreys calls depoliticization is another symptom of
Rockstar’s validation of the morality of the worldview it critiques—yet still nevertheless
embodies in production and play. RDR’s confused matrix of political reality and cowboy
masculine identity figured in its “eternal inequality” is similar to the GTA series’
depoliticization of its critiques of asshole capitalism. RDR’s tragic teleology of
modernism á la Turner’s “disintegrating civilization,” and GTAV’s asshole capitalism’s
individuation of systemic issues are the indelible superstructures to each respective
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game’s narrative events and play. The depoliticization, then, is more accurately another
individuation of systemic context and constraints. In this way, capitalism and colonialism
are themselves subordinated for RDR’s elegiac treatment of cowboy masculinity, framed
by settler digitality. This nostalgic representation of vanishing cowboy individualism thus
de-couples the cowboy activities the player engages from the very forces RDR poses as
responsible for that cowboy individualism’s disappearance. Like GTA, RDR’s narrative
focuses on the individuals struggling within an underdeveloped context in an
overdeveloped open world—systemic realities are replaced by detailed assets. This
allows players to feel powerful in a game world that tells players the powerlessness
experienced outside the magic circle in the real neoliberal world is an inescapable natural
consequence of history. The “release valve” for “neoliberal pressure” is revealed in
precisely the gameplay that rehearses the activities of the Western genre.
RDR, like GTA, is always just aware enough of the ideology it indulges and
critiques to intentionally and inadvertently gesture to the fissures of its own
representation, but ultimately always rests upon the decoupling of its central principles
from the aspects of American culture and history it represents as beyond the titular
redemption. To do otherwise would be to cast its central gameplay behaviours as equally
problematic as the villains it does not even bother to give nuance or complexity. The
second appearance of Marshal Johnson (who Marston helps kill cattle rustlers and bandits
in the desert) sees him struggling to contact the railway company that employs him.
“Suddenly, the world is full of ‘theys,’” the marshal opines regarding the federal and big
business interests that are apparently the root cause of the region’s issues. These are the
very same forces that are coercing Marston into the game’s plot in the first place: it is
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eventually revealed that federal agents have kidnapped Marston’s family from his ranch
and forced him to hunt, kill, or capture the surviving members of his former gang for his
family’s return. The marshal makes passing reference to his salary-paying railway
company and their demands that he “turn a blind eye to them burning settlements,” which
as Humphreys points out, is another reference to the political and monied forces
“responsible for the economic turmoil and physical violence in” the region (211). But the
mission that follows, and indeed the player’s activities necessary to complete the story,
are focused on a displacement of those concerns “by Marston’s role as a bounty hunter
and lawman. That is, property crimes are enacted by rustlers and outlaws who must come
to justice” (211); Marston’s violence to protect property is cast as his helpful, heroic role
as a cowboy. A reward system that incentivizes precisely these kinds of activities with
bonuses and freer exploration of the open world makes this apparent if the depiction of
Marston’s personality in cutscenes and missions do not. Humphreys suggests the game
thus emphasizes the bandits, “upon whose shoulders the fault for ruptures in ownership
and property rest,” which renders “the ‘interference’ by government and corporate
interests . . . part of the discursive landscape, along with the cacti, and does not produce
political resistance and action. The status quo—no matter how reviled—remains” (212).
This is the Wild West flavour of GTA’s no-escape neoliberalism á la Dyer-Witheford and
de Peuter. As Humphreys points out, Marston’s first missions “are designed to repair the
fractures to private property” (211). Indeed, players will likely purchase multiple
properties through the game that allow them to save their progress or change Marston’s
outfit, providing particular bonuses. Purchasing these properties, that is, provides the
ability to make progression possible, giving players access to literal gameplay cohesion
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for a game that takes, at least, tens of hours to complete. More importantly, as
Humphreys highlights, Marston’s true goal is to get his family back and return to his own
ranch and replicate the life he sees on MacFarlane’s ranch; this is the happy ending held
at arm’s length from gamers playing through the story, and it is one obviously associated
with the propertied productivity in line with neoliberal ideology.
It is important to note that the Red Dead Redemption series has a much more
generally serious and dramatic tone than the GTA series. Both series include attempts at
earnest drama performed by talented actors and lengthy treatments of character
motivations, and both include absurd and crude humour and characterizations. However,
the RDR series much more heavily emphasizes the former where GTA has a ratio that
more heavily favours the latter. The reward system mentioned above, which incentivizes
classic heroic Western genre actions, is called the “Honor”56 system and is completely
absent from GTA’s mechanics. This systematic difference alone suggests that RDR has
aspirations to moralizing thematic content that GTA eschews. In RDR, positive Honor is
doled out primarily for catching bounties and wiping out bandit strongholds, gameplay
that typifies the game’s simplistic Western genre motifs. Humphreys claims RDR’s
played ideologies “require the correct performance of rugged individuality” in gameplay
heavy on Wild West tropes, and asserts that “neoliberalism and the frontier mythos
cannot be separated,” and “the power of the frontier” is here used as “means to
narrativize the discourse of neoliberalism” (210).57 Even to generously read RDR’s

I use the American spelling of “honor” and “honorable” throughout this dissertation to cohere with this
system’s spelling.
57
RDR and RDR2, unlike GTAV, is more like GTAIII, in that it locks access to regions of its massive open
world until players progress the main storyline. As such, these systems do require the correct
“performance” to allow complete access, even for players who are uninterested in that story.
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critique of federal and corporate encroachment as sustained and nuanced would highlight
where it fundamentally disavows how genocide and Indigenous dispossession is
inextricable from the modern-neoliberal-acceptable mythic figure of the Western-motif
cowboy individualist that players inhabit. RDR’s primary ideological disavowal is similar
to GTA’s decoupling of race and capitalism. RDR’s equivalent is how it decouples settlers
from the violence necessary for settlement, instead blaming the “theys” the marshal
mentions, absolving the cowboy masculinity that is acceptable to the contemporary
mythology of individualistic neoliberal spirit.
In the mission58 introduced by the cutscene in which the marshal mentions the
“they” of federal and corporate encroachment, this neoliberal logic qua cowboy
masculinity comes alongside the occlusion of Indigeneity, an occlusion necessary for its
very coherence. The marshal complains about city businessmen and “government men”
that traffic in “this Manifest Destiny hogwash. Tamin’ a wild land; bringin’
modernization and betterments to the West. It’s only made the rich richer and the poor
poorer, and it’s killed a way of life.” Marston agrees, responding “Just look at what they
did to the Natives for God knows how many years.” Marston’s line about the
mistreatment of “the Natives” by the ambiguous “they” of federal and corporate interest
is part of dialogue that takes place in transit from a mission’s beginning to the site of its
inevitable gunfight. It is telling that this dialogue can be easily missed: this mission is so
early in the game that the ride acts as a tutorial for how to easily ride a horse alongside a
group of other friendly riders—and thus simplifies horse-riding game mechanics for
players to more comfortably listen to dialogue while making it to where combat likely
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takes place. The player is provided with a tooltip59 to hold a button to merely follow the
marshal’s speed. Only by not doing this and choosing to ride at a slower speed will
players ever get a chance to hear Marston utter the line. Though more serious than GTA,
the RDR series is still designed to be entertaining experiences for a range of players, from
those that take their time, completing optional activities and experiencing every
conversation, to those that wish to rush through the plot and get to the killing. This
missable dialogue about these spectral Natives is emblematic of the occlusion of
Indigenous lives RDR maintains.
Red Dead Redemption, Where Cowboys are Indians, But Still Settlers
Another early but unmissable example of RDR’s ideological tension with
Indigenous peoples is featured as part of the early missions with the MacFarlanes—
missions that hint at the propertied man-of-the-family life Marston has lost and wishes to
regain by story’s end. Drew MacFarlane is said to have brought in European tutors to
ensure his children did not become “savages”60 in the wild land he personally dominated.
Marston also agrees with MacFarlane, as he does with the marshal, about his feelings of
being outpaced in a developing America. These three grizzled white men are presented as
victims of distant federalist corporatism (the ambiguous “they”) as the heretofore spectral
Indigenous people in all their absent presence. In an early cutscene, Marston listens
reverently as Drew MacFarlane waxes on his 30-year-long list of difficulties being a
ranch-owning settler. MacFarlane says that when he arrived the “land had never been
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settled.” He immediately follows this statement with “for 10 years we fought the Indians.
Tough men.”61 For MacFarlane, the Indians he fought for 10 years were not “settled” in
the area for which they fought. This is perhaps a representation of the doctrine of
discovery, and the John Lockian fallacy that supposes Indigenous peoples have no claim
to land on which their living did not count as proper civilizational modes.62 Certainly
their lives and cultures were not settlement, for Indigenous peoples are not settlers, at
least not like the white masculine productive figures represented by Marston, the marshal,
and MacFarlane. The cutscene dialogue of MacFarlane talking about those 20-years-gone
“tough men” is given a pregnant pause and close-up of his aged, rugged appearance,
reflecting on a fight worthy of bygone masculinities in contest.
This moment is perfectly aligned with Turner’s frontier thesis, where combat with
“Indians” forges the positive, typically masculine aspects of American culture. The only
adjustment for RDR is that the federal government and corporations have interfered with
the development of the individuals who apparently fought and won that contest. It is
aligned because this martial contest uses Indigenous life as a resource to be exhausted in
the service of constructing settler identity. This is why settler literature retrospecting on
this frontier contest is almost always deeply interested in limited forms of Indian
masculinity. As Brian Klopotek (Choctaw) argues,
For at least the last century, hypermasculinity has been one of the foremost
attributes of the Indian world that whites have imagined. With [Indigenous
women] . . . usually playing secondary roles, Indian tribes are populated
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predominantly by noble or ignoble savages, wise old chiefs, and cunning warriors.
These imagined Indian nations comprise an impossibly masculine race. (251)
Indeed, there is not a single Indigenous woman in the first RDR, even as a nameless NPC,
and what few Indigenous men are represented all fall cleanly into these hypermasculine
warrior categories. In this way, RDR merely makes itself a cynical version of Turner’s
frontier thesis, where the teleology of manifest destiny is seemingly overwritten by the
absolutely exploitative nature of human experience and development. The “tough men”
that are the Indians are gone, replaced by the “tough men” that are cowboys and ranchers
like MacFarlane, who are themselves being replaced by the “tough men” that are the
federal agents and railway company owners that overtake their way of life. Apparently,
cowboys are the new Indians, and just as Bonnie MacFarlane says, “businessmen are the
new cowboys.” The game certainly sustains “hierarchies of identity that privilege rugged
and white masculinity” (Humphreys 211), but does so in terms that here cannibalize an
Indigenous absent presence. It is a gesture that equivocates the tragic disappearance of
white cowboy masculinity with the genocide of Natives who are repeatedly said to be
victims of the ambiguous “they” that also kill the cowboy “way of life” the marshal
mourns.
This equivocation is emblematic of the “contradictory reappropriation of a
foundationally disavowed Aboriginality” (Wolfe 389) that settler states inevitably come
to in the assimilative turn of settler colonialism after the “ending of the frontier” (Lloyd
and Wolfe 111): the Indians were not settled on the land where they lived, but the settlers
who stole it are imbued with their masculinity and apparently moral claim to the land.
This fraught equivocation of masculinities is itself a well-worn trope for white settlers.
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Philip J. Deloria’s (Standing Rock Sioux) Playing Indian provides detailed accounts of
how settler organizations through history, from Tammany Hall to the Boy Scouts of
America, draw from a jumble of real, literary, and apocryphal Indigenous cultural
expressions to fashion new masculine self-empowerment. By appropriating aspects of
Indigenous cultures and histories that are outside of the American bordered sovereignty
of inside, settlers simultaneously validate themselves through Indigeneity while
disavowing the Indigenous sovereignties the American project still works to eliminate.
As Deloria says, “By the early twentieth century . . . many Americans had become
fascinated with a positive exterior Indian Other, one who represented authentic reality in
the face of urban disorder and alienating mass society” (74). For gamers of the Western
world under neoliberalism, where the “increasing reliance on automation in production as
well as the extortion of higher rates of productivity from workers faced with precarious
employment in deindustrializing economies,” RDR serves as elegy for masculinities of
populations made “redundant” (Lloyd and Wolfe 110). RDR’s power trip under an
ostensible umbrella of cynical themes may be especially enticing to settlers now
experiencing increasing dispossession in the face of escalating financialization. The play
of cowboy masculinity and its associations with mythic Indian masculinity may be added
to Humphreys’s view of the game as a “safety valve” meant to relieve the pressures of
increasingly alienating settler society.63
It is important to note, as Lloyd and Wolfe do, that neoliberalism’s management of surplus populations
does not mean that all surplus populations are treated equally, nor are the situations the same even when the
treatments are cosmetically identical. Even when corporations and neoliberal state governments use the
same techniques against resistant surplus populations, surplus populations under the settler umbrella (a
category that shifts in ways similar to how assimilation into “whiteness” varies for different ethnicities in
time and place) are never positioned the same as Indigenous peoples. Indigenous populations are by
definition outside the settler inside; Indigeneity necessarily carries with it the sovereignties of respective
nations, tribes, etc. Thus the encroachment of empire into Indigenous land and rights infringes upon
external sovereignties.
63
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This equivocation of masculinities is partially how RDR rehearses the core
Indigenous disavowal upon which Turner’s thesis is predicated. However, rather than
settling for the obviously genocidal notion that settler character is fashioned by total war
against Indigenous peoples, RDR uses the common maneuver of neoliberal settler culture:
appropriating Indigeneity for its settlers—itself a disavowal of what Indigeneity and its
alternate sovereignties would otherwise represent. This becomes most apparent when
RDR actually brings Indigenous people into its world as present rather than absent. The
concluding section of Marston’s coerced goal (though not the end of the game itself) has
players hunting and killing his former gang leader Dutch van der Linde. Marston
describes Dutch as a keen manipulator, able to bring outcasts and the marginalized under
his thrall—as such, he has apparently rallied the local Indigenous peoples into a gang of
resistance against the encroachment of corporate and federal power. It is as a violent gang
led by Dutch that Indigenous figures finally half-emerge in RDR from occlusion into
digital corporeality.
The only Indigenous character that appears in the story not working for Dutch is
Nastas. Byrd notes that Nastas, “the American Indian supporting character with the most
lines,” helps Marston track Dutch, and “is resigned but suitably disdainful about how the
land is being mistreated . . . and is finally shot in the face by another Indian gang member
who declares him a traitor” (346). Nastas narratively operates much like the marshal and
Drew MacFarlane do; they are all masculine characters, proven in combat, who are
partnered with Marston for a few missions that introduce players to a particular region of
the open world; these characters themselves embody their respective area’s relevant
narrative beats in the storyline. MacFarlane’s missions introduce the plains of
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“Hennigan’s Stead,” and MacFarlane embodies the difficult position of settler ranching
that has transitioned from stealing land from Indigenous people to the unwinnable battle
against the onslaught of modernity. The marshal’s missions introduce the deserts of
“New Austin” and the Wild West saloon-centric town of Armadillo. He embodies the
settler battle to maintain settler property rights in a West yet to be fully transitioned from
“Wild,” as well as how those battling settlers are pawns on the chessboard of the federal
and corporate power that is modernity’s onslaught itself. Nastas’s missions introduce the
plains and forests of “West Elizabeth,” and Nastas embodies the vanishing Indigenous
people and the oppression they face that would drive them to desperate, violent
insurrection under Dutch’s direction. Like the marshal and MacFarlane, Nastas is one of
the few characters that Marston appears to earnestly respect and with whose principles he
explicitly agrees. Unlike the marshal and MacFarlane, Nastas’s thematic anxiety over
being a figure quickly occluded by teleological modernity is the only one given the
narrative finality of being murdered. Pointedly, the “West Elizabeth” area that Nastas’s
missions introduce is where Marston’s ranch is located; thus Nastas acts as an important
guide for players learning about the region that is locked until this penultimate section of
the game, and consequently provides a sense of Indigenous authenticity to the region that
turns out to be Marston’s home. Nastas’s Indigeneity is mobilized as another masculine
identity, weathered and vanishing, that gives Marston an air of that authenticity and
locational warrant. Marston agrees with Nastas while they ride through its dense forests
and quite literally past the ranch to which Marston will return. After Nastas is dead, the
Indigenous peoples return to occlusion, emerging only during missions to be shot to death
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by the player as Marston, accompanied by US Army troops and the federal agents that
coerced him into the hunt for Dutch.
Dutch, as Marston’s former gang leader and now white leader to a gang of
Indigenous people, clearly represents and explicitly articulates the Western-flavoured
Rockstar thematic cynicism, and how Indigeneity is used as an occluded, atavistic form
of the masculinities soon to vanish. In the mission64 that sees Dutch dead and the Native
resistance/gang crushed (and never mentioned again), Dutch articulates several things
borne out by the game’s narrative. Cornered at gunpoint, Dutch tells Marston that “We
can’t always fight nature . . . We can’t fight change. We can’t fight gravity. We can’t
fight nothing. My whole life all I ever did was fight . . . But I can’t give up, neither. I
can’t fight my own nature. That’s the paradox.” Marston, a former outlaw attempting to
go straight as a rancher, rejects this fatalism. But Dutch’s fatalism is proven correct; it is
the very “eternal inequality” that Humphreys highlights as the game’s ethos, the Rockstar
cynicism of empire that Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter detail. The fighting masculinities
of cowboys and Indians are made congruent—cowboys featured, Indians occluded—and
devoured and excreted by the “they” of mechanistic modernism. Dutch even warns
Marston that after his death “they’ll just find another monster. They have to, because they
have to justify their wages.” He is correct, of course, as the federal agents return and kill
Marston after only a few missions of relatively peaceful ranching with his family.
Dutch’s narrative equivocation is made all the more salient in its material productive
context: in this game that features well over a hundred voice actors, Dutch is voiced by
white actor Benjamin Davis, who also voices Nastas. Two performances by one actor
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“And the Truth Will Set You Free.”
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which echo white settler masculinity devouring the symbolic power of the vanishing
native.
Red Dead Redemption, Settlement, Occluded Genocide, and Colonial Anxiety
After players, as Marston, have killed off the remaining Indigenous peoples in the
game, they play several missions on his ranch in West Elizabeth. These missions are
comparatively peaceful, as Marston attempts to readjust to his “good” life with his family
and apparently morally unquestionable ranching. One mission features Marston and his
son returning to MacFarlane’s ranch, purchasing cattle, and herding them back to his own
ranch with the mechanics first learned in the early MacFarlane mission set. This idyllic
bit of narrative and gameplay is, as mentioned, cut short when Marston is murdered by
the very federal forces with which he helped exterminate the game’s remaining
Indigenous people. Meant to equivocate the destruction of Wild West settlers’ freedomloving entrepreneurial spirit with the genocide of Indigenous peoples, this utopian vision
highlights Rockstar’s ideological friction as much as its characteristic cynicism does in
snatching that idyll away. Emblematic of this friction and its appropriation of Indigeneity
is the location of Marston’s ranch. Though, as mentioned, the missions previous to the
ranch-living take place quite close to Marston’s ranch, it is not identified as such until he
returns to it in the story. A seemingly small oversight, but one that avoids an earlier
recognition that Marston’s ranch is on land that Dutch’s gang of Indigenous people
would presumably view with great hostility. Marston’s ranch, after all, is one of the
closest in-game locations to Cochinay, the mountain village where Dutch leads the
Native resistance. Cochinay is where the penultimate story battle of the game takes place;
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it is the last place players will see—and kill—Indigenous people in the game. After this
battle, the encampment disappears.
Red Dead Redemption 2 takes place before Red Dead Redemption, so fans of the
series know that Marston merely purchased his land with a bank loan. With or without
that knowledge from a sequel released eight years later, players nevertheless experience
this familial utopia at Marston’s ranch location, fraught with RDR’s thematic and
ideological connections. Marston as a character did not kill Indigenous people for his
ranch’s land in the first place, but players as Marston quite literally eliminate Indigenous
people to gain meaningful access to it—and it is the fantasy of universal access that the
frontier mythology and the settler digitality of open world games are built upon. Thus
mechanically in RDR, players eliminate Indigenous people to give Marston his
redemption: ranching as a moral masculine man like MacFarlane does. It is an
eliminative redemption, where Indigenous corporality is brought out of occlusion only
long enough to provide its settlers with their “authentic” connection to the land, and then
be murdered back into occlusion. That RDR ends with Marston’s death is Rockstar’s
cynical worldview translated into the tragic drama of RDR’s relative seriousness:
redemption is not truly possible; settlement is righteous, but righteousness is short-lived.
Marston’s and MacFarlane’s individual, private investments in ranching are disconnected
from the settler colonial project’s Turnerian “disintegrating civilization,” even while
embodying (in MacFarlane’s narrative and Marston’s gameplay) its foundational
violence against Indigenous people.
RDR’s disconnection of settlement’s individual experiences from settler colonial
violence and dispossession broadly is unsurprising. By equivocating genocidal
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colonialism with settler society’s shifting distributions of its surplus population, RDR
rehearses neoliberal formula and mythologizes frontier violence and economics in a
development of Turner’s explicitly racist frontier thesis. As noted in the previous
sections, the neoliberal tendency to individualize systemic contexts obfuscates history,
present, and possible alternative futures. Even Turner characterized the ending of the
literal frontier, the concluding chapter of manifest destiny, as one where the teleology of
civilizational development sees “fertile prairie land” moved from “out of the hands of the
government” and “passed into private possession” (294). As Barker, Coulthard, Vine
Deloria Jr., and countless other Indigenous scholars have pointed out, private property65
and privatization are more than just frameworks for accumulation of capital and the rights
of individuals; private property and privatization are the core ideological and legal
mechanisms by which settler colonialism dispossessed Indigenous peoples from their
land. As Nick Ester (Lower Brule Sioux) writes, “settlers and private property have
always been the vanguards of invasion, and the sanctity of private property never applied
to Indigenous peoples” (27). Many Indigenous groups faced with settler invasion had and
continue to engage forms of property relations that could be broadly called, as Jeffrey
Means (Oglala Lakota Sioux) does, “communalism” (18). As Estes, Coulthard, and
Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (Mississauga) have pointed out, these notions of
community ownership eschew the very possibility of private ownership of land.
Indigenous territories and Indigenous rights of “title” are typically formulated as
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There are, of course, several competing definitions of private property, including the typical Marxist
distinction between private property and personal property, where the former is related to the generation of
capital even in the absence of the owner’s personal labour, and the latter relating to possessions that are not
constitutively part of the capital relation. Precisely how these distinctions break down are matters of
debate. For our purposes here, however, private property and privatization specifically refer to the
individual or corporate ownership of land, and not necessarily, for example, the domiciles built on it.
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communal, and the personal relation to land is not one of individual right, but individual
responsibility. Settler enforcement of private property relations, then, is in and of itself
the sovereignty of Empire fracturing and disrupting Indigenous sovereignties which hold
different relations. That conflict is literalized by the processes of settlers, like MacFarlane
as fictionalized representative, simply murdering for land and claiming ownership; even
settlers who do not do the murdering nevertheless benefit from this violence that is both
literal and structural. As Estes writes,
to carry out land cessions, the US government needed settlers to hold private
property in perpetuity. Private ownership (or “fee simple”) is seen, under US law,
as the highest possible form of ownership, while Indigenous occupancy is seen as
temporary; thus, collective Indigenous ownership and use could be dissolved for
private ownership, but not the other way around. But because private property is
exclusive, the two systems of land tenure fundamentally could not overlap. (108)
Estes tracks how these original privatizations are echoed in US and corporate
infringements of Indigenous territories and rights, particularly through resource
extraction and transportation projects and real estate development. So RDR’s
equivocation of Indigenous dispossession and settler impoverishment necessarily
occludes private propertied settler ranching’s integral part in genocide and the oppression
of pre-existing sovereignties on the land so luxuriously fictionally depicted with
advanced open world graphical regimes.
Rockstar’s neoliberal ideology highlights that ideology’s material and
epistemological origins in racial capitalism and settler colonialism, and it does so with the
occlusion, equivocation, and individualization necessary to its worldview. We can here
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recall that Veracini argues settler colonialism “obscures the conditions of its own
production” precisely by flattening the systemic into the individual (where the “settler
hides behind his labour and hardship”) and disconnecting the fundamental coherence of
that labour’s part in the access and ownership of land which required Indigenous peoples
to “naturally and inevitably vanish” (Settler Colonialism 14). Rockstar’s cynicism takes
the form of elegy for white settler masculinity, where the idyll of settler family private
land ownership is merely another casualty of teleological capitalism, rather than an
expression of its foundational violence. This is how something so cynical in worldview
can be so persuasive and attractive as neoliberal “safety valve” entertainment as
articulated by Humphreys. These occlusions and disconnections, these individuations that
allow the rancher to be separate from genocide, also allow players to be separate from the
implications of their play. As Richard N. Price writes, “making empire was full of
anxiety, fear and doubt,” and the ways modern “liberal society coped with and explained
the violence that was integral to its engagement with empire” was by occluding and
naturalizing it. The anxiety and fear that Price studied in historical documents “reveals
the fragilities that were part of the empire project,” and this continued anxiety and its
resulting continued disavowal of colonial violence is “a problem that is with us still”
(44). If the frontier was an anxiety-producing concept for Imperial Rome, of a perilous
vulnerability in exposing the inside to access the outside, settler colonial culture reveals
this continued anxiety when the frontier of its own sovereignty is global. Through
occlusion and obfuscation, RDR normalizes and naturalizes the processes that led to this
global frontier, and does so in the joyful mimicry of violence in an artificial rendering of
the final chapter of the physical historical frontier.
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By individualizing and conflating the terrains of American empire’s oppression of
settlers and Indigenous peoples alike, and by indulging a fatalism about the inexorability
of those oppressions, redemption is impossible for the characters inside the magic circle.
The redemption of play, however, can relieve players’ tensions in an increasingly
ideologically self-destructive reality outside the circle. Anxiety about failing neoliberal
economic structure, and anxiety about the originating genocides of which that modern
structure is the latest development, are both soothed and salved in play. This play is
narrativized in such a way that it sterilizes the violence and culpabilities of genocidal
settler structure, and assuages and valorizes its mythological frontier settler
representatives. The historical death of settlers and Natives, mirrored by the deaths of the
characters of RDR’s narrative, are all the redemption needed. Indigenous people are both
not-there and there, both not-settled on the land and as violently defensive of it as the
cowboy masculinity the player inhabits and kills as; thus Indigenous title to the land is
passed on to fictional settlers, who pass it on to players. Dutch “can’t change gravity,”
just as the player cannot change the fundamental outcome of the story. They can,
however, enjoy the rehearsal of cowboy masculinity that echoes modern neoliberal
privileging of private propertied productivity. The anxiety of colonial violence may be
with us still, but it is a problem Rockstar can profit from by selling entertaining
treatment, a redemption of play.
Of course, Rockstar’s open world design necessarily caters to the whims of its
autonomous players, and though its “Honor” system, its dialogue, and Marston’s prewritten personality may incentivize fulfilling this settler-appropriative role, it recognizes
that many players will want, for example, to simply kill the people and animals in the
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autonomous gameplay outside of the missions that would be failed for such wanton
violence. After all, the autonomy of this influential open world game is little more than
the ability to choose the order of certain missions, to explore its massive space, to play
minigames like poker or horseshoes, to kill animals and people, and to sell their parts or
belongings. That is to say, largely violent mobility in and mastery of the game’s
environment is the freedom its systems provide. So, though the game may incentivize its
neoliberal cowboy heroism, it also encourages that simplistic violence. One such
incentivisation is the game’s achievement66 called “Manifest Destiny.” In the final area of
the game, a herd of buffalo roams near Marston’s ranch. Like every other animal in the
game, it can be killed, skinned, and its parts sold for money. Unlike every other animal in
the game, the buffalo do not respawn.67 Killing all of the buffalo, then, removes them
entirely from a game that otherwise infinitely replenishes its people, fauna, and flora.
Doing so also unlocks the “Manifest Destiny” achievement. This is possibly an attempted
cynical satire of the settler programme of eliminating buffalo to eliminate Sioux, Kiowa,
and Comanche peoples by destroying an important source of livelihood and culture;68

An “achievement,” also known as a “trophy,” and by various other names, is a meta-goal provided by the
platforms games are delivered on. For example, an Xbox game features “achievements” for games that
contribute to a “Gamer Score,” a sum of that gamer profile’s achievement values. Playstation games feature
“trophies” and the PC Steam platform also features “achievements.” As such, achievements are often not
recognized within the game’s systems proper; they are recognized outside the structure of the game in the
gamer’s platform profile. Achievements are typically awarded for difficult tasks, and sometimes strange
activities to incentivize the game’s less-explored possibilities; as their name implies, they are another way
games fulfill the “achievement” motivation of players as described in this dissertation’s introduction,
giving players bragging rights for accomplishing feats of skill (X number of kills in multiplayer) or
investment (X many hours played, storyline finished, etc).
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In gaming parlance, “respawning” is the replacement of a player character, non-player character, or
resource, after its destruction/death.
67
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Not all of the Indigenous peoples that call the Great Plains their traditional lands had the same
investments as others in buffalo hunting. Many tribes were forced into hunting, as discussed in the
introduction, as part of the destruction of Indigenous agriculture, forcing all Indigenous peoples to conform
to ways of life that fit with settler notions of savagery, which itself provided warrant for further elimination.
See the sources cited in the following footnote.
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those Indigenous peoples that did not starve to death could be more easily coerced into
the United States’ assimilative (and thus still numerically eliminative) policy aims. As
scholars have shown, what Tasha Hubbard (Cree) calls the “buffalo genocide” was, as is
typical to later stages of settler invasion, a partnership of white private interest and the
federal government—the former being enriched by the killing’s spoils, the latter
benefitting from clearing the land of Plains Tribes for privatization and further white
settlement.69 The game’s much earlier mention of “Manifest Destiny” as a myth of
American progress is here localized into a played specific instance of that genocide.
Players not content or unconcerned with removing Indigenous peoples from the game’s
environment entirely through the storyline can be rewarded for engaging a parallel
genocide in the autonomous, extractive, violent gameplay. Indeed, players can engage
both to no consequence; Rockstar’s cynical satire offers only a rehearsal of the Turnerian
frontier logic of “disintegrating forces,” its only repercussion the loss of one lateintroduced animal in a world overwrought with profitably hunted, detailed animals. This
investment in explicit genocide is made coherent with the other, implicit genocidal
appropriation of a vanishing Indigeneity for its white protagonist.
Red Dead Redemption 2: Larger World, Larger Systems, Same Appropriation
While Red Dead Redemption (RDR1) makes its contradictory genocidal
appropriation of Indigeneity for its settler hero implicit, its even more successful prequel
Red Dead Redemption 2 (RDR2) makes that appropriation all the more explicit. Player
character Arthur Morgan, a white outlaw in Dutch’s gang with John Marston, makes
multiple explicit comparisons of the plight of Indigenous peoples to his own, and to the
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For more on the buffalo genocide beyond Hubbard’s important work, see also Isenberg, and Smits.
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vanishing world of outlaws. This is, in many ways, emblematic of RDR2 as a sequel to
RDR: it is an intensification, where the systems, critique, and style are larger, more overt.
As such, RDR2 features all of the things an open world sequel requires in the escalating
technological arms race of big-budget game development: a larger world than its
predecessor, much improved photo-realistic graphics, an expansion of the first game’s
systems, and inclusion of new ones. The overall structure, however, remains the same: it
is an open world game that focuses on player autonomy for progression. Like RDR1,
RDR2 is more serious and dramatic than the GTA series, and has garnered a great deal of
critical praise for its story and characters alongside its significant sales figures. One of the
systems that returns in expanded, more emphasized form in RDR2 is the “Honor” system.
Gareth Damian Martin argues that the “Honor” system of RDR2 is demonstrative
of the “representational crisis” apparent in many video games (n.p.). Big-budget open
world games increasingly “pride themselves on the ‘realism’ of their representations, and
the powerful proficiency of their visual and technical recreation of the world,” but “they
remain unnatural, predicated on an algorithmic system” tied to every facet of its
representations. As Martin puts it, “there is nothing within a game without a
corresponding set of values and properties that dictate its exact behaviour and nature
within the world. The player is no different, and their honor is a particularly transparent
representation of that.” RDR2 features more varieties of interacting with the environment
and the people that inhabit it than RDR1; whether it is choosing how to speak to any NPC
in the world (with some mix of positive “Greet” or negative “Antagonize” prompts), or
how to handle any number of the optional encounters such as lawmen ferrying prisoners,
or swamp-dwellers picking through a camp of slaughtered civilians, RDR2 and its Honor
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system are meant to bring more substance to the choices available in its world. That said,
even measured against interacting with NPCs (including the other outlaws in Dutch’s
gang), exploration, and picking plants for crafting helpful tonics, violence is still the
primary activity of the game, particularly in the storyline missions whose completion is
necessary to unlock the entire world for exploration.
As Martin argues, this ubiquitous violence is par for the course for RDR2 and
most games like it, where violence is the “most common form of challenge, and power
their most prevalent reward.” Though the disjunction between narrative ambition and
played violent interaction is common in many games,70 Martin argues that RDR2’s
dissonance in this regard reveals precisely how violence and its algorithmic measurement
of the player’s choices in that violence outside of the storyline missions is used to give its
actions symbolic weight. RDR2’s Honor system, Martin suggests, shows that the game
attempts to both engage and evade its violence as “as symbolism and nothing else.” The
ubiquitous violence of these (and other) games, as stated in the introduction of this
dissertation, can at the very least be said to self-perpetuate as the “common form of
challenge” as per Martin. What becomes more important is the “symbolic nature” of that
violence; as Martin argues, in a video game “violence is not violence, but a symbol of
violence. . . . there is no violence in games, only the representation of violence. There is

This is akin to the much-discussed “ludonarrative dissonance” as described by Clint Hocking (2007),
where a game’s ludic elements counter its narrative representation. It has become increasingly common for
games of constant violence to in some way narratively critique that violence, which has made the popular
discussion of ludonarrative dissonance largely evaporate. Rockstar games, the games of Ubisoft (to be
discussed in the following chapter), and many other big-budget games, have largely addressed the concern
by making its protagonists anti-heroes that question their own violence. GTAV, both RDR games, and
countless others use this maneuver to smooth over the dissonance of its systems that encourage the gleeful
engagement of constant symbolic violence. As Martin’s argument implies, however, this maneuver is
largely meaningless: introducing a nominally moral nuance to symbolic activity does not change the
symbolism when the activity remains.
70

137
no moral judgement to be made on a player’s acts, as there is no physical harm, no
assault, no death.” Most importantly, when violence is merely an unquestioned mode of
interaction, pleasure can be derived not only from the skillful execution of that
interaction, but also from the meaning derived from that interaction as a destruction of a
symbolic image. It is along this line of reasoning that Martin suggests RDR2’s Honor
systematics assigns its “symbolic imagery” of violence “arbitrary values within a wider
numerical system,” demonstrating that this violence is “nothing but meaning.” It is not
violence as violence that carries symbolic weight; it is the meaning attached to that
violence narratively, and borne out by the numerical systems that are the entire
foundation of video game representation. Rockstar is willing to let players be a villain,
killing random passers-by and robbing them; indeed it encourages these actions in
various ways, in the same way it encourages being a kind, heroic cowboy. Actions of
either sort provides a “Pavlovian chime,” Martin says, “marking the player (and Arthur’s)
actions along a numerical bar that stretches from dishonorable red at one end to
honorable white at the other.” The equivocation is important, as the symbolism remains
intact, and re-establishes Rockstar’s characteristic worldview in a “landscape of tired and
cynical symbolism, trotted out to trigger the required response.” The required responses
of the design are certainly partially affective, but they are more directly a funneling of
expected play-styles into the patterns of rehearsal the game’s available interactions allow,
and from which the game’s dramatic storyline is least dissociative.
Martin’s argument suggests the moral character of these actions is less important
than the overarching symbolism that inflects that crudely numeric moral system. Players
may partially choose to what degree Arthur Morgan is a “good” person apparently
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worthy of the titular redemption, or a man lost to his most violent impulses; players may
invest themselves in Arthur as a nuanced character, or go through the motions to
experiment with the more nuanced systems of destruction and exploratory domination.
Martin points to the popular videos players upload to YouTube of their exploits in the
open world, its available encounters, and their possible outcomes: players set Ku Klux
Klan meetings aflame, the chime sounds, and the meter shifts to the good white right;
players attack a protesting suffragette and feed her to an alligator, and the meter shifts to
the bad red left. The morals are not made equivalent, but neither are they in any way
mutually exclusive; both can be done within minutes of each other, and the effect is little
more than visible subtraction and addition of the world’s algorithmic response. The sum
total when players reach the end of Arthur’s story determines whether a low-honor
Arthur is killed in a fight with an antagonist, or a high-honor Arthur dies more
cinematically from his injuries and worsening tuberculosis shortly after that same fight.
The open world gameplay is assigned values for their symbolic significance, for the sense
of immersion of a responsive world and a character arc with impact. That players do
“good” or “bad” things in RDR2 merely provides its overarching language of symbolism
weight. It is perhaps no wonder, then, that RDR2’s network of symbols is another system
carried over from its predecessor but emphasized.
The introduction to RDR, as already discussed, establishes its tone and setting
with a train ride and intercut snippets of conversation. The game’s themes of a closing
Western frontier are given room to express itself within the world’s introduction.
Emblematic of RDR2’s contrasting approach not taking any chances with its setting and
symbolic themes, RDR2 opens with appropriately weathered title cards featuring cursive
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lettering, like handwriting on a daguerreotype. “By 1899, the age of outlaws and
gunslingers was at an end,” the first reads. “America was becoming a land of laws . . .”
says the next, complete with dramatic ellipsis. “Even the west had mostly been tamed”
says the following, without apparent irony. “A few gangs still roamed but they were
being hunted down and destroyed” reads the final card, “destroyed” underlined. Much
like Arthur’s repeated connections of his position as an outlaw to the Indigenous peoples
of America, hunted and destroyed, RDR2 wants to be certain its symbolic associations are
blatantly divulged, and easily understood. It is precisely in that connection, like RDR1’s
appropriation of Indigeneity for its elegy to settler masculinity, that this power fantasy
rehearses the first game’s symbolism, only with greater emphasis and self-seriousness.
But like a title card that literally spells it out, emphasizing this appropriation of
Indigeneity requires making it more apparent by bringing Indigenous people out of
occlusion and slightly more into frame with its white protagonist.
RDR2’s map stretches from the New Mexico/Mexico border equivalent of the
first game to a New Orleans stand-in; as such, the game features even more varied
climates and regional topographies than any other Rockstar game. Much of the game’s
storyline takes place in what appears to be an amalgamation of cherry-picked terrain from
New Mexico, Colorado, the Dakotas, Nebraska, Missouri, Louisiana, and other bordered
states. Some of these areas are given stand-in state names, too: New Mexico, as in the
first game, is New Austin; Louisiana is Lemoyne. The Indigenous peoples given names
and voices in RDR2 are part of a tribe called the Wapiti. As Miner puts it, “RDR2
attempted to sidestep historical accuracy by writing a generic conglomerate of Native
U.S. cultures into the fictional Wapiti tribe” (“Surveying the Frontier” 129). Though the
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Indigenous tribe is indeed left largely vague as to its culture, there are enough clues to
suggest this amalgamation, like the rest of the game’s terrain, is drawn with some
specificity. The game’s subtitles denote that the two central characters of the Wapiti,
pacifist Chief Rains Fall and his disaffected, fight-seeking son Eagle Flies, occasionally
speak Lakota. The longest river in the game’s map is called the Dakota River and runs
next to the Wapiti reservation. When Arthur meets Rains Fall, the chief is in the process
of petitioning the American government regarding broken treaties and worsening
relations. These game events take place in 1899; that year in the real world saw the
passage of the Sioux Bill “which reduced the Great Sioux Reservation by 9 million acres”
and “separated the seven tribes of Lakota onto six new reservations” (Means 15). Thus
the amalgamated ersatz “Indian” Wapiti are obviously referential to that increasingly dire
position; they are a broad, vague, symbolically over-determined and culturally nonspecific version of the Sioux. Based upon the use of Lakota language (Lakȟótiyapi), a
mission centered on Rains Fall seeking his tribe’s “Chanupa” 71 (sacred pipe), and the
real-world equivalents of the land said to be the in-game tribe’s traditional territory, the
Wapiti are perhaps most closely appropriative of the Oglala Lakota Sioux. For land, that
symbolism is merely meant, like its Honor system, to create an immersive sense of
authenticity and significance to its inclusion; for the Wapiti, the symbolism of
Indigeneity similarly confers an immersive sense of authenticity, and then lends that
authenticity to players of its white protagonist.

This is the spelling as it appears in the game, but “Čhaŋnúŋpa” is how it appears in Standard Lakota
Orthography; see Ullrich (2008).
71
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As Indigeneity is a symbolic category for RDR2, it makes sense that one of the
most obvious connections of the game’s ersatz “Indian” tribe is with its similarly
symbolic Honor system, and that connection be made through a symbol of animal life.
Wapiti is a word that comes from Algonquin dialects72 for what is commonly known in
the North American settler nations as “elk,” the impressively antlered larger cousin to
deer. Naturally, Rockstar is unconcerned with cultural specificity; Lakȟótiyapi is a Sioux
dialect, not an Algonquin dialect, and thus the artificial tribe of RDR2 would be unlikely
to self-identify in such a way. Instead, RDR2’s use of the word appears motivated by a
symbolic visual connection of its honor system to its digital Indigeneity. Unlike RDR1, in
RDR2, player character Arthur’s dialogue in some cutscenes—and consequently his
personality—changes slightly depending on whether the player’s honor rating is in the
white, good, right side of the bar, or the bad, red, left side of the bar. A low-honor Arthur
is gruffer, meaner, and more self-interested. A low-honor Arthur has dreams and visions
of wolves and foxes; a high-honor Arthur instead sees various kinds of deer. As already
mentioned, the player’s honor also determines the exact nature of Arthur’s death. When
high-honor Arthur dies watching the sunset, players are treated to one final vision of an
impressively antlered buck, wreathed in golden light, turning to the sunset on the horizon
and disappearing. This is perhaps foreshadowing the game story’s final obvious visual
motif. The last interstitial clip played during the ending credits crawl is of Rains Fall, the
pacifist Chief alone on a clifftop, his son Eagle Flies having perished much earlier in the
game saving Arthur’s life. Rains Fall, now with greyed hair, watches an eagle literally
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flying into the horizon until finally disintegrating into the distance, occluded from view.
These similar images provide conclusive metaphors for the game’s elegiac equivocation
of Arthur’s death as a good-hearted masculine outlaw cowboy with the tragic genocide of
Indigenous peoples. Both of these elegies are themselves here connected, with the image
and name of an animal, to the game’s constant evocation of the tragic destruction of the
natural world by industry (Turner’s “disintegrating forces” all over again), uttered by
multiple characters across multiple circumstances. This is itself an aforementioned theme
carried over from the first game, which I suggested is typified by a conversation between
its protagonist and its only substantial Indigenous character. RDR2 combines what
presumably passes for subtle visual metaphor with a player character who, seconds after
meeting Rains Fall a second time, tells him that “like you, my time here is nigh on
done.”73 The game makes that explicit connection between his masculine outlawry to the
oppressed position of Indigenous peoples—through their mutually inevitable
disappearance—multiple times through the game.
Players are given the option to decline helping the Wapiti for a few missions as
they are with other storyline threads, but a few missions are not optional, and the most
obvious appropriations of Indigeneity for its white outlaw Arthur (like the quote above)
are a non-negotiable core of its narrative. One of the major climactic scenes in the main
storyline74 sees Arthur riding alongside members of the Wapiti into battle, cementing his
role, like the equivocations of RDR1, as a superior warrior masculinity with an equally
foregone conclusion of extinction. That this equivocation is more explicitly emphasized
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also bleeds into the game’s open world mechanics. Players are able to visit the Wapiti
reservation outside of missions. Unlike the rest of the world in the game, however,
players cannot use their weapons, or even use the “Antagonize” prompt on the
appropriately dejected and largely static Wapiti NPCs. The tents and buildings cannot be
entered; by and large, the space is simply less interactable than the rest of the power
fantasy sandbox. This is perhaps to avoid having YouTube videos like those mentioned
above, where players upload apparently amusing depravities of available interactivity;
murdering a suffragette is par for the course, but allowing players to conduct a one-man
genocide of a small tribe is perhaps too far a bridge even for Rockstar. More importantly,
however, it ensures that Arthur’s unavoidable self-identification with the Wapiti cannot
be invalidated by player autonomy, and enforces a clean separation of its settler cultural
elegy from the genocidal racism that is foundational to settler colonial past and present.
Consequently, just as the Wapiti NPCs on the reservation are quite simply less active
than the world’s other NPCs and certainly less interactable, they are less understandable
as living, responsive humans in a detailed open world, and more understandable as
environmental objects, symbolic referents for simplistic notions of Indigeneity.
It is this lack of interactability of the reservation and its denizens that Miner and
his theory of settler digitality and occlusion focuses on: “By not being as interactive or
dimensional as other towns, forts, and camps in RDR2, the reservation’s façades occlude
possibility for the player. Narrative collapses into linearity” (131). Miner compares this to
how these games’ very technological regimes occlude Indigenous life and stories, the
settler digitality of “the renderer’s culling algorithms, along with mesh simplification and
draw distance, serve to limit the player’s contact with Indigenous characters.” This
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occlusion and uncharacteristically restrained interactivity “leave the Native characters in
the game relatively cinematic, rather than capable of the kind of dynamic interaction
required for subjective rendering” (131). Martin’s argument that the weight of RDR2’s
violence is symbolic, and thus about the interplay—and destruction—of symbols,
suggests this interactive distantiation is related to Indigenous occlusion. To prevent
violence against these NPCs on its face seems to be an attempt at constraining players’
violent impulses against an undeserving group, but in the context of the game’s central
mechanics, actually relegates these ersatz Indians to a more outside symbolic presence,
rather than one that bears an “immersive” sense of living subjectivity. However, that is
the sum of Indigeneity’s parts for RDR2: merely a symbolic connection meant to inject
pathos, significance, and authenticity for its very appearance, rather than its subjectivity,
historical authenticity, or cultural specificity. Besides which, the game’s overdetermination of this ersatz Indian symbolism, and the barely necessary supposed
humanity of Indigeneity as an identity category, is buttressed by another aspect that is
uncharacteristic for Rockstar’s most recent games: a recognizable actor.
We may recall this chapter’s earlier discussion of Rockstar’s later titles eschewing
well-known actors to fill its roles because “most important of all,” in Houser’s words,
players “get a better sense of immersion” when the characters are played by “talented
actors whose voices you don’t recognize” (qtd. in Goldberg). One might be surprised,
then, to learn Rains Fall is played by Oscar-nominated Oneida actor Graham Greene. The
aforementioned Vulture profile of RDR2’s development, which features a rare interview
with the famously reclusive Houser, calls Greene the “most famous actor” in the game,
and says that his role as Rains Fall is “close to Dan [Houser]’s heart because it signifies
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everything that’s compelling about the game: history, politics, and a sense that this same
kind of thing could happen in the world today.” The connective tissue of symbolic
Indigeneity, real Indigenous genocide, and its relevance to the increasing surplus of
populations under neoliberal capitalism are recognized as thematic content, but without
the political or historical knowledge to do anything but rehearse the very inevitability of
its continuing logic by narratively sterilizing the structure of settler colonialism and
providing gameplay functioning on settler colonial logics. That Greene is famous is not a
problem, apparently, for Houser’s treasured immersion, as it only supports its
representation of symbolic Indigeneity. To recognize Greene would be to recognize an
“actual” Indigenous person of renown for this clichéd role of a Chief facing his people’s
destruction. Houser is quoted praising Greene for his “brilliant job of bringing this chief
character to life. The government is coming down on him hard. He’s losing his rights as
an independent king, and he’s a gentle soul in that violent world. [Greene] brought this
great depth to [the story]” (qtd. in Goldberg). Rains Fall, the gentle soul, representing the
very righteousness implied by the “good” side of the game’s honor system, is the
representative of the Wapiti, the elk, like the great antlered buck a high-honor Arthur sees
in his final moments. That Houser uses the word “king” (as Rains Fall uses for himself in
the game75) betrays precisely the lacking awareness, characteristic of the settler
“forgetting” that Turner’s thesis so influentially exhibits.
As Standing Rock Sioux scholar Vine Deloria Jr. notes, when settlers were
dependent upon Indigenous sovereignties for survival, Indigenous representatives of their
peoples were called “Kings” before they were called “Chiefs” (“Self-Determination” 22),
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and represented “the nationhood” of their people. Houser’s use of the term is only
slightly ahistorical, but it certainly represents how RDR2’s framing of Indigenous
sovereignty works in the overarching cynicism and acceptance of imperial logics that
unite the GTA and RDR franchises. Deloria highlights that the 17th and 18th century
European understandings of sovereignty was primarily interpreted—aside from the everimportant absolute authority over a jurisdiction inside borders—through the appropriate
and independent applications of warfare (22); thus Houser’s close-to-the-heart depiction
of gentle soul Rains Fall as a “King” is important. He is the symbol of his tribe’s
nationhood and its falling sovereignty, as his all too narratively appropriate name implies.
Graham Greene, as a famous Indigenous person, imbues this symbolic sovereignty with
authenticity rather than complicates its immersive qualities with pop cultural
recognisability as it presumably would for settler characters. This sovereignty, fashioned
as kingly, is not an alternative structure to what settler colonialism has wrought in
Rockstar’s ideological framework, but instead merely a tragically failed iteration of the
same kind of power and authority. Rains Fall speaks of his past seeing “death handed out
so freely,” 76 articulated as agentless conflict in the wars of his lifetime. This is another
aspect of his character Arthur explicitly states he relates to: both men are tired of the
violence that seems inescapable to their equivocated position against the Turnerian
disintegrating forces of civilization. As the following section will argue, the reality of
Lakota sovereignty and nationhood is far more specific and contrastable to the colonial
notions of sovereignty than such a simplistic symbolic equivocation can sustain.
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Oglala Communalism and Red Dead Redemption 2’s Mechanisms of Playing Indian
By the end of Arthur’s plot, the Wapiti flee from their reservation to Canada, and
as with RDR1, Indigenous people retreat from the game’s world into occlusion like an
eagle dissolving in the horizon. The reservation lies empty, and the only remaining
Indigenous NPCs can only be seen in the distance, standing in areas not accessible to the
player, watching. Here too, they cannot be interacted with. This echoes when Indigenous
figures are first seen in the game. Shortly after a tightly limited prologue in snowstormlocked mountains that serves to introduce players to the game’s mechanics, there is a
lavish cutscene more similar to the first game’s introductory train ride. In this scene that
shows off the advanced graphics by displaying the first region players are given the
opportunity to explore freely, Arthur and his gang are shown to be watched by
Indigenous figures high on a mountaintop, a shot made complete with mournful flutes to
contrast with the sweeping choral arrangement that accompanies its opening shots. This
is just one way the freedom of open world gameplay, as players’ spatial autonomy, is
immediately associated with Indigeneity. That this follows a very particular treatment of
one of the game’s most expanded and re-emphasized systems from its predecessor,
hunting, is significant.
In that aforementioned snowstorm prologue, Arthur is taught how to track and
hunt animals by Charles, the gang’s self-identified half-Black, half-Indigenous scout.
Charles is not Wapiti, and says his family’s flight from his mother’s ancestral lands and
her early death is why he “doesn’t know” his people.77 A stoic cliché of the noble savage,
Charles is often referred to as quiet and aloof by the rest of the gang, but in that early ride
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back carrying the deer he just taught Arthur how to hunt, Charles speaks openly about
how the gang, in all its post-racial wisdom, treats him “fair,” and “for a feller with a
Black father and an Indian mother, that ain’t normally the case.”78 Like GTA: San
Andreas’ multi-ethnic gang of criminal capitalists, this gang is presented as separate from
the racism that is foundational to the very metrics of settler dominance that are the core of
its power-fantasy gameplay. Though the hunting is first introduced as a way to provide
food to the gang’s itinerant camp, that system’s importance is then quickly connected to
the rest of the game’s core play: the spoils of hunting can be “crafted” into upgrades to
the gang’s camp (thus increasing its passive income), into new clothes for Arthur’s
wardrobe, into satchels that let the player carry more items and extracted/hunted
resources, and into other “trinkets” to gain more combative power like more health, or
better aim. In other words, the hunting system’s design satisfies those two important
gamer motivations for “immersion” (with cosmetic autonomy) and “achievement” (in the
extraction and crafting of items for violent prowess). The hunting system’s introduction
by Charles as an Indigenous person, and its expansion into the autonomous power fantasy
of the game whose first terrain is introduced by distant observant Indigenous peoples,
provides the gameplay with its symbolic depth via Indigeneity. Players are encouraged to
seek out high-quality animals (depicted only by a 1-to-3 star rating of the animal as it is
targeted) and to kill them with the appropriate weapon in one shot to maintain the profit
and use for crafting upgrades. Arthur gruesomely strips animals, tearing off skin easily
with quick slices of a knife and gruff tugs with his hands, as if hastily stripping carpet.
Imbuing symbolic Indigeneity to the quick, detailed gore that is a constant part of the
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game’s central system in hunting is an especially interesting emphasis given the history
of the Oglala Sioux that RDR2’s ersatz Indigeneity most directly appropriates.
The Oglala Sioux in the mid-to-late 19th century were dealing with the results of
devastating war, broken treaties, and the aforementioned buffalo genocide of the Great
Plains, and had their remaining subsistence tied to forms of property ownership and
family life that were alien to Oglala norms of kinship, sovereignty, and relationships to
land. The traditional “basic unit of Lakota society” was the tiospaye,79 “a small group of
bilaterally related kin,” whose division of labour and way of life “centered around daily
subsistence tasks,” where hunting and its products were a part of every member’s labour
and cultural life in some way (Wishert). As Paul Roberston’s The Power of the Land:
Identity, Ethnicity, and Class Among the Lakota Oglala describes, tiospaye as a notion of
extended family units is also closely connected to Oglala sovereignty and nationhood,
where this familial unit is inherently connected to other units as bands of political
organization. As Oglala scholar Jeffrey Means explains, the reservation system and rules
for federal land and cattle allotments were specifically motivated to deconstruct these
kinships and replace them with settler forms of nuclear, private-property-owning family
units. Means writes that the tiospaye relation developed to emphasize a communalist
“flexibility” for sustainable migration with and hunting of bison herds, while
simultaneously maintaining “social and political bonds of kinship and reciprocity” for
sharing food and products (4, 7).
Means details how, in the latter half of the 19th century, the Oglala’s traditional
hunting lands had been stolen, and their treaty reservation lands increasingly encroached
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upon by private interests. Treaty entitlements favoured “mixed blood families” that were
predominantly “white husbands” with “mixed-blood children” (13), and “alienated the
Oglala who favored communalism—the vast majority” (18). This meant that most Oglala
were essentially forced into the “assimilation policies and the concepts of capitalism,
materialism, and individualism,” or face starvation (11). These policies were enforced
while many Oglala attempted to transition to maintaining their traditional ways of life by
breeding herds of issued cattle that they would hunt and harvest in the field as a tiospaye.
This traditional hunting and harvesting of cattle herds saw children and the elderly take
part, a sight that a young settler called “sickening” in his account written in 1899 (qtd. in
Means 4), the year Arthur’s interactions with the Wapiti take place. It is the year “other
draconian regulations also came into effect” to inhibit these traditional hunting methods
applied to federal cattle issuances that had been going on for “more than twenty years”
(15). The “perceived ‘savagery’” of these traditional methods was cast by settler officials
as a hindrance for Oglala “progress toward civilization” (15). 1899 regulations from the
Department of the Interior were specifically aimed at reducing this traditional practice
and dividing tribal cattle holdings. These regulations gave Indian agents—the
governmental representatives given great legal authority over reservations and legally
recognized “Indians”—full discretion over who could breed and kill issued cattle and
how they were harvested. As Means notes, the hunts were ended on this discretion
“shortly after” these changes, exacerbated by the fact that all calves were required to
receive “individual brands rather than the tribal band” (18), dismantling traditional Oglala
communalist title.
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All told, the policies of 1899 meant it was the last year of this traditional form of
hunting, replaced by “the domination of the reservation cattle industry by ‘white
husbands’ and mixed-bloods,” and full-bloods were forced into “selling the animals for
cash” (18); tiospaye camps were eliminated to displace the Oglala into reservations and
make individual holdings of private property, the only settler-recognized way of life. As
Mark Rifkin writes, dismantling Indigenous kinships by enforcing settler heteronormative
nuclear family life goes hand-in-hand with the relegation of Indigeneity itself to a
supposedly quantifiable racialization of “blood.” Kinships like tiospaye are “measured
against the natural and self-evident model of nuclear conjugality,” and the “presumption
of heterocouplehood as the atom of social life helps position other logics of identification,
affiliation, and self-representation as ancillary to such blood inheritance” of “racial
Indianness” (37), a phenomena that will be more thoroughly investigated in Chapter 3.
The division and forcible redistribution of Oglala title, then, was the complementary
enforcement of a crude metric of racialization over a different social and political
structure, and of a particular relationship to land as individual property. As Means sums it
up, “by forcing individuals to segregate their property, the federal government sought to
instill individualism and material accumulation as dominant economic motivations,” an
interdiction of a “market economy” (18) over the desire imparted by Oglala Chief Lip to
settler authorities that his people should, as they always had, “have the land in common.”
(15)
It is important to recognize the significance of Means’s emphasis of 1899, the
same year the majority of RDR2’s plot takes place, as an important year in the settler
colonial structure’s concerted elimination of Oglala communalism. This communalism’s
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interrelated social, political, and economic life connects its tiospaye kinship and related
interdependent tribal sovereignty to its traditional community-involved hunts and
harvests on the plains of their lands held in common. This communalism is the important
and exactly timed cultural specificity that RDR2’s ersatz Indian Wapiti symbolic
representation of Indigeneity merely swaps for a tragic friction between pacifism
(symbolized by Rains Fall) and a warrior’s death (symbolized by Eagle Flies) against
insurmountable “disintegrating forces” of civilization. This trade-off is not simply the
product of Rockstar’s ignorance or negligence; indeed, RDR2’s gorily detailed harvesting
of animals as part of its formula of open world power-building is a classic settler cultural
“contradictory reappropriation of a foundationally disavowed Aboriginality” à la Wolfe
(389). Here, players as Arthur are inculcated in design principles that structure an
experience centered on careful awareness of the land for an individualized, stylized, and
economically incentivized version of precisely the apparent “savagery” of field
harvesting animals that was eliminated for the Oglala. This appropriation disavows
precisely how these manners of individualization and economic incentivization are the
logics that structured the very elimination of that Oglala cultural tradition as savagery.
Players use the “Focus” mechanic for spotting animals and their trails, taught to Arthur
by the Indigenous man Charles, an immediate empowerment for “savage” behaviour now
motivated to gaining power, and thus “play Indian” as per Standing Rock Sioux scholar
Philip J. Deloria Jr.’s aforementioned delineation.
By having players emphasizing and incentivizing mobile spatial autonomy
through an Indigenous unreal and an effacement of the Indigenous real, RDR2 echoes
Deloria’s connection of modern settler cultural and organizational appropriations of
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Indigenous cultures to its beginning in the early twentieth century. This exact period is
just after the Oglala turning point Means highlights and the game’s temporal setting. As
Deloria notes, this appropriation centered on connections with nature and masculine
power in wilderness, a settler fascination “with a positive exterior Indian Other, one who
represented authentic reality in the face of urban disorder and alienating mass society”
(74). The early history of American organizations adopting “Indianness” as a “role
model” to shape modern character “in children (especially boys)” was an attempt to
salvage a masculine national identity “perceived by many at the turn of the twentieth
century to be imperiled by an effeminate, postfrontier urbanism” (96). The RDR series, in
its own ways, replays this attempt and provides its players a settler-Indianness which
naturalizes its artificial frontier’s power fantasy. RDR2’s emphasized gameplay as a
detailed, “living” artificial frontier to be hunted and harvested without limit puts it in a
similar lineage as the early anxiety of the “postfrontier” period: settler appropriation
plays Indian by mimicking aspects of the “savagery” settler colonial structure constructed
and eliminated, and continues to use for further elimination of Indigenous people and
title.80 By inflecting symbolic Indigeneity on the player’s autonomy, white protagonist,
and the limitless and economically incentivized hunting and harvesting gameplay, RDR2
yet again attempts to separate the logics of the frontier’s racist genocidal structure from
its played rehearsal. Players get to play Indian, surpass Indians, and engage a one-man
mass hunt and outdoor harvest, leaving skinned corpses to rot in a savagery that bears

As per footnote 68, some of these “savageries” were actually enforced upon some Indigenous groups,
making them conform to a lifestyle of the “Indian” understandable by settlers, and thus putting them on the
same track for the logics of elimination the Oglala face as discussed here. This is the way the frontier
creates the conditions of its own necessity and realization, as noted in the introduction.
80
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greater resemblance to the private hunters that conducted the buffalo genocide than to the
Indigenous practices that are fully occluded from the game’s narrative and mechanics.
Another related part of this hunting and harvesting system expanded from RDR1
is players’ ability to pick plants, and use both these plants and animal parts as part of
multiple “crafting” mechanics for making useful items for combat, or for the cosmetic,
capacity, and combat enchantments mentioned above. In an aforementioned optional
mission where Arthur helps Rains Fall retrieve his tribe’s “Chanupa,” Rains Fall picks
some plants for Arthur to mix for treating his tuberculosis, a dramatic disease plot point
that dominates the last stages of Arthur’s story. What is particularly telling is that this
mixture cannot actually be crafted by the player even once. It is merely part of a ridealong experience for Rains Fall and Arthur to relate to one another. A missable instance
in an optional mission, this small inclusion of ersatz Indigenous knowledge is never
integrated into the game’s central systems of collection and crafting; it merits only
Arthur’s passing mention of its effectiveness in a following mission. To play Indian
means playing those activities that are coherent with the settler notions of that “exterior
Indian Other,” the outdoor warrior masculinity that RDR2, like RDR1, mourns and
celebrates with cowboys as Indians. An impactful mechanical rendering of Indigenous
knowledge to alter the protagonists’ narratively inescapable illness is not here. It is this
illness that, we may recall, relates high-honor Arthur’s foregone conclusion of extinction
to the game’s equally foregone conclusion of Indigenous peoples’ elimination. There can
be no gameplay investments into real referents of Indigenous culture, sovereignty, or
kinship in this technological microcosm of settler colonial structure. There are no
relations of communalism, no alternatives to cynicism, nor cultural specificity of the
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appropriated Indigenous real—that which is still outside the enduring frontier logics of
settler colonial culture—here, playing Indian is, as it always is for settler cultural
production, only the play of empire.
Red Dead Redemption 2: The Continuing Masculine Redemption of Settlement
When players reach the substantial epilogue section of RDR2 which takes place
years after Arthur’s death, they play the series’ previous protagonist John Marston. Set a
few years prior to the start of RDR1’s plot, RDR2’s epilogue follows Marston’s attempt
to leave his outlaw lifestyle and establish his ranch—the same ranch on the same land of
the first game where he will help kill the remaining Indigenous people. Dutch’s gang has
split up, but Marston does find and invite Charles onto his ranch as he develops it.
Marston’s core motivation is the same heteronormative propertied nuclear family unit
that was the mode of “civilization” the US government legally enforced in an attempt to
dismantle Oglala tiospaye. This civilized life is what both low- and high-honor Arthur
encourages for Marston, and what Charles, at the very end of the game, departs to
assimilate to. After spending time on Marston’s ranch, Charles says he will “go north.
Canada. Find a woman. Start a family, if I can,” because he sees John’s life, and says
“well, I’d like to try it.”81 Though Charles is not a white man,82 the game operates on an
ideology that, like the Indian agents that assaulted Oglala title and tiospaye, literally
privileges only the Indian that conforms to the modes of “civilization” acceptable to
settler colonial interests. This hopeful vision for racially inclusive settlement is typical of
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As Dia Lacina points out in her article “Red Dead Redemption 2's Redface Proves How Far Games
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modern neoliberal post-racialism and, as mentioned in the previous section, a
development of early settler appropriations of masculine “Indianness.” The game’s
characteristic saturation of symbolic parallels shows just how limited this vision is in
practice, and evades how materially exclusionary settlement and its continuing structure
was and is today.
As both RDR games cohere bygone settler productivity with Indigeneity via
clichéd representations of rugged, stoic masculinity, they rehearse the tropes of “playing
Indian” as related by Philip J. Deloria and of the formulas of “Western” literature and
cinema as identified by Klopotek. Settler colonial cultural production and the Western
genres specifically posit “imagined” Indians as “an impossibly masculine race” (251). As
such, Indigenous women are most often relegated to “playing secondary roles” (251),
usually notable only for their sexual availability to white men. There are no Indigenous
women with speaking roles in the main plot of RDR2, and none at all in the first game.
One of the only Indigenous women to appear in RDR2 is the silent pregnant wife of US
Army deserter John Weathers. This appearance takes place near the end of Arthur’s life,
in Chapter 6, when the Honor system gains a multiplier, and the opportunities for the
largest positive gains to the player’s Honor rating are available in missions locked out
from players with too-low honor,83 clearly incentivizing the correct performance of
righteous cowboy masculinity. Aiding Weathers’s escape to a new life with his wife is
among the highest honor gains available in the game, a tidy example of the games’
embrace of the Indian-agent-enforced white-husband mixed-blood family structure that

The locked mission set is titled “Do Not Seek Absolution,” and a breakdown of the values and precise
player actions/choices that change the honor rating is available from the “Honor” page of the Red Dead
Wiki.
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was used to dismantle Oglala life in the very year the game takes place. This example
with a silent Indigenous woman also tidily represents the limited white, heteronormative,
masculinity-obsessed formulas of Western cultural production that Klopotek summarizes.
It is also one of many symbolic parallels to Marston’s desired life of trading masculine
outlawry for masculine settlement.
RDR2’s representation of settler masculine identity, so relatably applicable to the
modern neoliberal sensibility, is like GTA’s extrication of racism from capitalism in that
it is a motif of appropriative equivocation that extracts legally enforced oppressive
relations from gamers’ power-fantasy settler play. This is, as in Veracini’s
aforementioned summation, a settler colonial cultural hallmark, where settler colonialism
“obscures the conditions of its own production” (Settler Colonialism 14). The final
central and compatibly neoliberal image of Marston’s propertied nuclear white family is
not changed by the player’s honor rating. This happy ending is only complicated by
gestures to its inevitable doom at the hands of the government agents stalking Marston to
begin the events of the first game; that eventual destruction only further relates the
game’s settler idyll to its ersatz Indigeneity, already occluded. It is not, however, the only
way the narrative plays out its settler mythology by well-worn method. The penultimate
combat of the game’s epilogue sees Marston and Charles fighting off attacks by a gang
called the Skinner Brothers. Said to be a mix of white American, Mexican, and
Indigenous outlaws, the Skinner Brothers are little more than a post-racial—and thus
plausibly deniable—representation of Indian savagery at its most excessive. The Skinner
Brothers live in the woods next to Marston’s ranch—the same woods in which he will
later kill the many Indigenous people of Dutch’s gang in the first game—and their camps
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are strewn with body parts and elaborate scenes of torture and gruesome death. Charles
suggests they often scalp their victims,84 a violence popularly cast as a savage trait of
“Indians” throughout Western cultural production, but one whose actual proliferation in
settling-America was the result of settler colonial incentivizations (such as scalp
bounties) and settler participation, yet another way the frontier manufactures its own
necessity through a supposedly outside savagery.85
Even exploring these forests in autonomous gameplay outside of missions can see
Marston ambushed by the Skinner Brothers, the only enemies in the game to use bows
and arrows, and who shout war cries indistinguishable from the recognizable sounds of
Indians in Wild West cinema. Marston’s survival and violent defense of his brand new
ranch is thus the same masculinity-proving battle against “tough men” Indians that
MacFarlane relates in RDR1. After the main story mission with Charles, where Marston
kills a great number of Skinner Brothers, Charles congratulates Marston on making his
home safe for his ranch and family.86 By ensuring players hear the various stereotypical
Mexican and “redneck” white American accents among the Skinner Brothers alongside
the tropes of Indians of Wild West mythology, Rockstar gets to embrace its Indians and
kill them too. Arthur’s and Marston’s cowboy masculinities get to cannibalize
Indigeneity for its authentic warrant to the land, provide equivocating elegies for
vanishing Indians and vanishing settler masculinity, and have that settler masculinity
prove its strength and warrant by slaughtering symbolic savagery to protect private
property. It is in this way that the Skinner Brothers are part and parcel of the settler
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mythology of “the Indian” as it is framed and reinterpreted through a neoliberal culture
that believes itself constitutively multicultural and post-racial. As the following, final
section shall outline, this is an expression of what Byrd terms “zombie imperialism,” and
is a symbolic representation Rockstar and other open world games have trafficked even
more explicitly elsewhere.
Zombie Imperialism and the Enduring Frontier Power Fantasies of the Besieged
Rockstar Games, as the influential standard for big-budget open world games
made in the West, thus display a number of repeated but cosmetically reshaping narrative
and gameplay formulas. This chapter elucidates a few things about this influential
standard in its expression and context: (1) Big-budget open world games are indebted to
and accelerations of neoliberal supply chains that are exploitative; (2) this neoliberal
exploitation is aided and abetted by individualization that obscures neoliberalism as
contemporarily productive of and historically founded upon racialization for that
exploitation; (3) neoliberal ideology is as such the inheritor and continuance of the settler
colonial relation; (4) national sovereignties once so important to settler identity are
compromised by the colonial and capital relation that is integral to its structure; (5) this
compromised sovereignty and the increasing failure of neoliberal policy reasserts the
need for settler colonial and neoliberal cultural expression to both disavow continuing
racism and Indigenous genocide and appropriate Indigenous identity to salve its own
identity crises and ruptures of sovereignty. Rockstar’s games are products and producers
of those listed phenomena, and the big-budget open world genre it so greatly influenced
are as such similarly representative. Later chapters will pick up on the threads here laid,
but I would like to lay some groundwork for this dissertation’s later points by way of a
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conclusion that quickly focuses on Jodi Byrd’s analysis of settler colonialism, video
games, and genre conventions, how that theory has since been evidenced, and how it fits
into my framework of these games as artificial frontiers.
It is abundantly clear that the RDR series trafficks in the masculine stereotypes of
“Indians” as noted by Klopotek. At the same time, RDR2 uses aesthetic and gameplay
cues of savagery to adopt and destroy Indianness in its absence and presence. Indigeneity
is here an alluring and threatening outside both consumed and rejected by the settler
psyche of inside. Jodi Byrd argues that Indigeneity for U.S. empire, though a limited set
of cultural images, is nevertheless a dynamic and shifting category that determines that
empire’s boundaries and targets for violence and marginalization. As argued, settlers’
“salient surplus” population is historically “the Native population” (Lloyd and Wolfe
111); Indigenous peoples’ existence outside settler sovereignty and inside its imagined or
legalistic borders contributes to what Byrd calls Indigeneity’s “transit” as an imperial
concept, where Indianness is “recycled and reproduced so that empire might cohere and
consolidate subject and object, self and other” (Transit of Empire 221). For US empire
specifically, the “Indian” is the “originary necropolitical” figure (229) enshrined in the
Declaration of Independence as “merciless Indian savages,” existential threats to
sovereign nationhood. The Indian is thus repeatedly resurrected in various forms and by
various names, a frontier danger that both produces anxiety for the safety and sanctity of
the inside, and invites access, usually violent, to the outside open for extraction.
Price notes the anxiety of empire-making that is “with us still” (44), and Lloyd
and Wolfe identify the development of new lexicons to both activate and act through that
anxiety in perpetuating empire’s violence: the War on Terror and its amorphous
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“terrorist” figure is a variation of the Indian as locus of American anxiety; this figure
undergirds the “deadly if preposterous situation” where “the most highly armed states in
the world assure their populations that they (or their interests) are under a permanent state
of siege, diffusely threatened by ragtag platoons of the dispossessed who, despite the
considerable differences between them, uniformly qualify for the indiscriminate
designation of ‘terrorists’” (110). Like Indians, terrorists partially refer to real groups, a
racialized “kaleidoscopic variety of ideologies and religious beliefs,” but are nevertheless
more broadly associated with their collapsible and simplistic part in a “narrative that . . .
has legitimated” violent empire in its continuation through the “neoliberal state” (110). In
such a way, terrorists are another development of the Indian: at once a savage existential
threat, and also a conveniently simplistic population to be removed from land and
resources targeted for extraction. The settler figure of the “Indian” is thus a legitimating
danger for actual “citizens of American Indian nations” as it is for racialized peoples in
America and abroad, as the Indian is “the origin of the stateless terrorist combatants
within U. S. enunciations of sovereignty” (Byrd 227). The anxiety of settlers—as subjects
of empire—and the mechanisms of their states—foundationally genocidal—can be
tracked by this shifting category, a quality Byrd terms the “transit” of the Indian in
empire. The Indian, as the inside/outside aggressor in that “permanent state of siege”
(Lloyd and Wolfe 110) of colonial and neoliberal anxiety, is what Byrd calls a “living
dead,” constantly reemerging “to haunt cosmopolitan colonialism,” and “serve as the
deferred melancholia of a lingering sense of retribution that hovers over a nation that
forever strives to make native the foreign through and abandonment of the native to the
foreign” (229). Indians and terrorists, and any dispossessed or disaffected group that
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invites the violence of the settler state are the already-dead and constantly reanimating
threat that will “consume the proprietary domains of a forever threatened and embattled
whiteness” (229).
It is with this “transit” of the Indian figure that Byrd relates the history of Indians
in Western cultural production to the Western pop cultural popularity of zombies.
“Indians are the original American zombies,” says Byrd, “because, within these tropes,
and especially within the generic conventions of the Western, Indians are always on the
threshold of past doneness, always signifying precipice of dead to the future” (“Red Dead
Conventions” 347-8). The continuing representations of the vanishing and dead Indians,
like Rains Fall and Eagle Flies, exhibit the settler impulse for a “contradictory
reappropriation” (Wolfe 389) of Indigeneity akin to the historical appropriation of a
“positive exterior Indian Other” (P. Deloria 74). These representations, however, merely
advance the usually white central figures of the settler imaginary (the individualistic
outlaw, the hardworking propertied settler). That advance necessitates the Indian as living
dead, or Indian as terrorist, to take the role of existentially threatening enemy against
which the settler hero must overcome as on Turner’s Indian frontier. Zombies, Byrd
argues, are such a fascinating image for settlers partially because they—and the
apocalyptic consequences they entail—exist “at the boundaries between human and
inhuman, legal and illegal, sacred and bare life that exist in the no-man’s-land that
constitutes the states of nature and exception” (Transit 225). The “zombie imperialism”
of “liberal democratic colonialism” (228) can here safely hide the genocidal impulses of
its enduring colonial anxiety behind a figuration not so obviously racialized, but
rehearsing the very dehumanizing tropes of historical colonial racialization. Thus the
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“emerging national US literature” of zombies makes the horror genre the “menacing
doppelgänger” of Wild West genre conventions (“Red Dead Conventions” 348).
As Byrd suggests the settler imaginary and its cultural production “evolved
cowboys to monopolize and dominate in a sea of living dead Indians,” it is little wonder
that as an example they cite Red Dead Redemption’s Undead Nightmare, “that literally
replaces Indians with zombies” (“Red Dead Conventions” 348). Red Dead Redemption’s
Undead Nightmare [RDRUN], released in 2010, is downloadable content (DLC) for
RDR1, a purchasable “expansion” that has players inhabit Marston again, this time
playing his nightmare of a zombie apocalypse in the same world as the original game.
Eschewing any moral ambiguity—the Honor meter is helpfully removed—for the
limitless destruction of the living dead, RDRUN is a pure expression of genocidal open
world frontier impulses, and it came during a glut of zombie narratives in video games
and other media. That many big-budget open world games after RDRUN would combine
zombies and Wild West aesthetic and sensibility speaks to Byrd’s points. Open world
zombie game series State of Decay especially leaned into a Wild West aesthetic with its
second entry released in 2018; one of its four “leader” types for players is “Sheriff,” and
the core gameplay revolves around defending settlements sieged by zombies set in maps
that resemble the American Great Plains. Days Gone, released in 2019, sees its player
character outlaw biker called “Sheriff” by characters in fortified settlements who enlist
his aid. Obvious comparisons are made of his motorcycle-riding outlaw masculinity to
horse-riding Wild West cowboy masculinity. Most importantly, one of Days Gone’s most
heavily marketed features are the roaming zombie “hordes,” which players are
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encouraged to seek out and destroy to the very last, a gameplay loop that rewards
complete genocide of migratory savages in the American Pacific Northwest.
These zombie apocalypse visions in open world gameplay play both to the
fantasies of the individual rugged hero’s dominance over space and destruction of life (or
unlife) that inhabits it, and to the enduring settler anxiety of a savage outside coming to
destroy the sovereign inside—an anxiety of projection, a “lingering sense of retribution”
(Byrd, Transit 229) for a genocide conducted, validated, forgotten, and re-validated as
with RDR’s obfuscations and equivocations. Chapter 3 will handle in greater detail the
implications of these gaming apocalyptic settler narratives; for now it is enough to say
that a fictional world of recovering or foundering civilization, besieged by mindless
savagery, is conducive to open world gameplay precisely because it opens an entire
frontier that can be pillaged without moral quandary (indeed, rather more with civilizing
heroism). Big-budget open world games and their privileging of player dominance
(“achievement”) and the believability (“immersion”) of lands modeled on those
accumulated through Indigenous dispossession would be identifiable as salve and
entertainment of the settler imaginary even without their importantly Turnerian frontier
narratives and symbolisms. With those Turnerian frameworks read in hobbyist outlets as
what makes games the premier medium of modern storytelling, and in the context of their
neoliberal productive materialities, they are products of continuing settler colonial
structure par excellence. The continuing colonial sense of siege, like Turner morphing
settler invasion into “resistance to aggression,” is rehearsed and normalized in these
games.
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RDR’s equivocation of embattled settler masculinity to Indigenous genocide is a
way of speaking to the anxieties of neoliberal mindsets that fear, as the Vulture profile
notes, elimination “could happen in the world today” (Goldberg) for the white
masculinities of its apparently relatable or laudable white protagonists. This equivocation
necessarily eclipses settler colonial structure as it is still in place; the reality of these
eliminations is that they are not a matter of could, but a matter of whom. The “lingering
sense of retribution” thus makes Indians, as post-racial savage Skinner Brothers, as
terrorists, as zombies, a still-profitable and common transit. These games play to the
desires and anxieties the frontier has always elicited for settlers. Neoliberal economics
must make the world a frontier, and the gamers being indulged by these games may be
similarly indulged by rhetoric from politicians like Donald Trump, who assuage
increasingly disaffected populations by assuring them the failures of neoliberal policy is
the result of kinds of invasion (by terrorists and criminals posing as refugees and
immigrants), threats to the inside. The central racist structure of the capital-colonial
relation and their historical forebears are denied, and these cultural expressions—games
and political rhetoric alike—suggest the individual empowerment so important to
neoliberal democratic culture is under threat not by the very contradictions of the
structure of settler sovereignty, but by outside forces, often existing inside the boundaries
of their borders. The Indian-as-zombie, and the power fantasies of Rockstar’s open world
stories and play, fit into this cultural context.
With the marketability of the psychological sense of siege of embattled neoliberal
individualism so thoroughly catered to by Rockstar’s open world games, and Rockstar’s
stripping of racism from the structure foundational to that siege mentality, racism, let
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alone capitalism or colonialism, is not a serious target of their critique or concern. As
such, the nominally non-racist neoliberal wisdom of Rockstar’s narratives—and the
gameplay structures that deliver the more important and narratively centered settler
colonial ideological empowerments—actually serve only to validate a fundamentally
racist structure and its warrant for violence. Rockstar’s influential narrative and
mechanical formulas for open world games demonstrate a celebrated cynicism, salved
anxiety, and power fantasy delivered for a settler colonial structure in its contemporary
neoliberal reality. Rockstar’s oeuvre provides ideological cover, an equivocating shrug to
allow the finely tuned gameplay to do its work in providing players with an individually
empowering sense of achievement and immersion. Whether GTA or RDR, these are
artificial frontiers: invitation to access and accumulation by violent dispossession sold to
consumers in hypnotic structures meant to be played for tens of hours at least. These are
frontiers with all the joys of accumulation with none of the attendant downsides or
unsustainability—the violence is unreal, and its extraction is infinitely repeatable. The
stories position economics, race, crime, and genocide in ways that make them palatable to
any number of grievances for subjects of empire except those that would pose empire as
anything but universal, timeless, and inevitable. This is settler cultural production,
artificial frontiers that implicitly justify a historical and continuing exploitative
relationship to land and Indigenous peoples in frontier spaces. This is what the frontier
has always been for the settler experience: a concept constructed precisely to justify that
colonial relation.
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Chapter Two: Assassin’s Creed 3, the Tribal Un/Real, and Ubisoft’s Proliferation of
Settler Simulation
If Rockstar Games is an early and consistent model for the Western big-budget
open world game genre, Ubisoft Entertainment is that genre’s premier proliferator, and at
least equally as influential for its increasingly popular formulas. Ubisoft develops and
publishes several series of games that are open world: Assassin’s Creed (more than 12
big-budget open world entries between 2007-2020), Watch Dogs (3 entries between
2014-2020), Far Cry (more than 5 open world entries between 2008-2020), The Division
(2 entries between 2016-2020). Some of the rest of the company’s catalogue include a
franchise recently made into open world games (Tom Clancy’s Ghost Recon features 2
open world entries between 2017-2020), and another open world game perhaps with
ambitions for further serialization (Immortals Fenyx Rising in 2020). No other company
boasts such a quantitatively significant library of this particularly expensive video game
genre. Indeed, though Rockstar might be considered one of the genre’s important
originators, or even its most critically acclaimed, Ubisoft’s sheer output captures a
considerable share of that genre’s cultural impact and substantially more of its market
share. The 2007 release of the first Assassin’s Creed [AC] saw Ubisoft’s first foray into
the genre that would become a central part of its business model, and contributed to the
company’s first annual self-reported earnings of more than a billion USD. This earnings
trend has only increased along with the company’s reliance upon open world game
production; the company’s earnings have hovered between 1.5 and 2.25 billion USD for
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the last few years.87 The Assassin’s Creed series, then, is at least equally if not more
important for a cultural study of open world games as the GTA or RDR series.
Since the release of the first AC, another big-budget open world game in that
series has been released every one-to-two years; as such, a wide-ranging study of the
games is likely not desirable, and certainly not feasible in this context. Instead, this
chapter will elucidate some of the series’ relevant notable traits by primarily focusing on
the game with a narrative most explicitly about settler colonialism and Indigeneity. The
Assassin’s Creed series is marketed on and praised in hobbyist media for its meticulously
represented historical settings. Despite a running through-line science fiction plot, the
games themselves mention “historical tourism”88 as constitutive of the game experience.
Assassin’s Creed III (ACIII) is largely set during the American Revolution, circa 1765 to
1783, and is to-date the only big-budget open world game to feature an explicitly
Indigenous protagonist. The game sold 12 million copies globally in under four months
of its initial release in October 2012 (Ivan), and as such, is an important representation of
an Indigenous character in the open world genre specifically, and in the billion-dollar
popular culture powerhouse that is the videogame industry broadly. ACIII’s
representation of Indigeneity and settler colonialism (depicted in the pivotal historical
moment of American Revolution) has a reach that cannot be understated for the purposes

See Ubisoft (2008 and 2020) for post-Assassin’s Creed and most recently available earnings reports;
intervening reports can be found at the Investor Center link provided in the bibliography as of August 2020.
87

Ubisoft marketing and game journalists have taken to the phrase “historical tourism” as an accurate
descriptor for the series’ draw, including Stephen Totilo’s article referenced later on. Similar phrasings are
used in Assassin’s Creed III, Assassin’s Creed IV: Black Flag and Assassin’s Creed: Rogue. For example,
the phrase “virtual tourism” is used in a message between fictional developers (in the collectible “Abstergo
Entertainment Tablet Document 4”) for the “Animus Omega” game system, which features game-setting
equivalents of the Assassin’s Creed series, a kind of meta-acknowledgement by Ubisoft of the Ubisoft
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of this dissertation’s investigation. ACIII is an excellent case study of the gaming
industry’s inscription of settler colonial fantasies of territorial expropriation and New
World belonging, and how those trends are enacted via representations of Indigeneity
specifically.
Unlike the RDR games’ ersatz Indigeneity, ACIII’s Indigenous protagonist is
Kanien'kehá:ka (Mohawk), a member of a real, existing Indigenous nation. Ubisoft hired
two Kanien'kehá:ka consultants for the game, Teiowí:sonte Thomas Deer and
Akwiratékha Martin,89 the latter also serving as the game’s voice actor for an important
Mohawk character, Kanen'tó:kon. In an interview a month after the game’s release, both
consultants articulated the perceived respect with which Ubisoft approached Mohawk
culture. Martin noted that the developers “were all very open,” and Deer pointed out that
Ubisoft was clearly invested in the game being “culturally sensitive and accurate”
(Venables, n.p.). Though Deer says the team “bounced ideas off” him, he said that
“Certainly, a big part of why I was recruited was to ensure that Ubisoft did not produce
anything that would be considered culturally offensive to our people” (qtd. in Venables).
Guarded against offense, and, in Deer’s words a month prior to the game’s release, armed
with a desire to “cover their butts,” Ubisoft could market the game as “a real, authentic
product that stood up” (qtd. in Newman). Consequently, ACIII’s storyline tackles notions
of empire and freedom (a particular focus of the AC series) quite explicitly. Although
Ubisoft attempted a respectful and nuanced approach to colonialism with its Indigenous
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in what is now New York state, and were thus embroiled in the settler colonial politics and displacement to
come during and after the American Revolution. See Snow (pp. 131-158) and Richter (pp. 130-213).
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protagonist, ACIII’s mechanics are based in settler colonial economics of acquisition, and
de-contextualizes the genocidal and continuing effects of settler colonial society. The
game perpetuates established societal assumptions about Indigeneity’s vanishing nature,
and functions as a denial of continuing settler colonial structures that still oppress
Indigenous peoples today.
In this chapter, I will highlight several aspects uniquely presented by ACIII: its
friction between critique of American Revolution mythology and its protagonist’s
confused positioning as authentically Indigenous within this critique (which the game’s
colonial assumptions muddle), and the settler colonial systematics encoded in the game’s
mechanics. The friction of its protagonist and critique, I argue, is a primary factor in the
gaming community’s divided response to the game’s central half-Mohawk character, his
eventual erasure from the series’ subsequent entries, priorities, and marketing, and the
settler colonial anxiety and desire this divided response represents. My aim is to sketch
out how the game’s narrative, gameplay, and continued marketing of the series result in
ACIII’s success as colonialist apologism disguised as critique of colonialism, and failure
as a positive representation of authentic Indigeneity. This argument is thus essentially a
close-reading of sorts, a case study of big-budget game development’s most prominent
depiction of a real-world Indigeneity in a fictional narrative. ACIII, a multi-million dollar
game about an Indigenous protagonist, apparently explicitly made with a mind to
respectful treatment of the historical and ongoing culture and experiences of
Kanien'kehá:ka, still displays a number of persistent tropes of and about settler
colonialism and Indigeneity that the previous chapter argued is encoded within the
Western big-budget open world genre. This chapter will then detail the ideological
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constraints of the broader mechanical formula of the genre—and the so-called “Ubisoft
formula” that has come to be associated with the genre’s popularity and notoriety—and
how they are emblematic of the settler colonial imaginary. The tropes of the genre and
the tropes of the settler colonial imaginary center on the paradoxical mobility of the figure
of the settler, a primarily theoretical mobility that is necessarily placed in contrast to
static Indigeneity. Ubisoft and Rockstar’s narrative, ludological, commercial, and
ideological sensibilities are essentially identical under a rubric of the settler colonial
imaginary.
Templars, Assassins, and Other Players of Settler Colonialism
ACIII, though a game that ostensibly tries to critique colonialism with a
supposedly authentically Indigenous avatar, is much like the RDR series in the way settler
colonialism’s historical atrocities and contemporarily relevant particularities are still
largely disavowed, and Indigenous authenticity or “authority” is desired. Unlike
Rockstar’s characteristic cynicism, however, Ubisoft’s games, though dystopian, are
typically more aspirational; where Rockstar games have players play assholes in a world
of assholes, the Assassin’s Creed series is largely about a never-ending battle between
good—styled as freedom—and evil—styled as tyranny. Thus ACIII and other games in
the series are explicitly designed—as their cultural consultancy implies—with a care to
represent (or at least market) a more progressively-minded depiction of these political
histories and contemporary realities. As it is for ACIII, the care only relates to a
supposedly culturally authentic representation of Mohawk peoples as a past-gone people,
and a contradictory re-enactment of the broader structural settler colonial relations.
Ubisoft’s “respectful” approach merely makes ACIII a paean for the ideologically over-
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determined Western notions of liberty and freedom that developed directly from the
exploitation and elimination of capital-colonial relations.
The Assassin’s Creed series interweaves science fiction and historical fiction. The
franchise has a mythos that connects the incredible number of games. This mythos is at
times erratic, complex, and (frankly) often overwrought. The Creed series refigures world
history as the stage of a never-ending war between two secretive factions that manipulate
world events but are not visible to or acknowledged by the global populace. These two
factions, Assassins and Templars,90 are largely representative of rather broad political
ideologies, but are also part of a sci-fi plot about an alien race, the “First Civilization,”
that created and genetically engineered humanity at some point in the ancient forgotten
past. The Templars seek global domination whereby a powerful elite controls the masses
with the alien “First Civilization” technology. The Assassins are the opposite: a rival
group of freedom fighters who seek to keep people free from Templar reign. Most plots
of the series end up focusing on powerful information or alien technology, with the
Assassins trying to stop that information and technology from falling into Templar hands.
The alternate modern-day sci-fi setting backbone to these games has this war between
Templars and Assassins raging behind the scenes. The majority of gameplay across the
series, however, is not part of the modern setting; player interaction is nearly always in an
alternate historical setting.91 Players navigate these historical settings as a character
pivotal in real historical events, albeit for alternative, fictionalized reasons and
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World.”
91

173
specifics.92 The primary quests typically relate to First Civilization technology that has
various capabilities, from mind control to earthquakes.93 It is the crucial “science fiction”
component, then, that provides the underlying meaning that connects seemingly disparate
historical contexts represented by different entries in the series. These “real” historical
events as we know them are fictionalized as “false” histories, ones edited by the
overwhelming modern success of the Templars over the Assassins.
The historical settings are part of the game’s narrative through a device called the
“Animus.” In the AC mythos, the Animus is a device that can create a sort of virtual
reality representation of the “genetic memory” of its user. When a person uses the
Animus, they can view and “play” the memories of their ancestors. As such, the primary
historical gameplay of the Assassin’s Creed series in most entries is actually a kind of
game-within-a-game in the overarching meta-narrative of Assassin-Templar conflict
itself. The gamer playing ACIII plays a character in the modern world and plays the
character in the historical setting, narratively “played” by the modern character through
the Animus. Neither the player (nor the other player character “playing” the historical
simulation) can change history; they are merely “synchronizing,” in the series’ parlance,
with the memories of that historical figure. Kill a civilian, and the game warns the player
that since the historical figure did not kill civilians, continuing to do so will
“desynchronize” the player; this leads to a game over, which in open world gameplay,
functionally, is only a brief delay of open world play, or a restart of the story mission

For example, Sir William Johnson died in 1774 of natural causes, but in ACIII he is killed by the player’s
historical avatar—albeit at the right time, 1774.
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being played. AC stories usually feature the Animus because Assassins want to view a
part of an ancestor’s memories that has information needed in the present day, and only
by proceeding through the relevant figure’s life—“synchronizing”—can they reconstruct
the memories well enough to get the desired information. As such, though the games are
of the “open world” genre, the missions (within memory “sequences”) are more tightly
structured, linear, and have defined or limited narrative outcomes, typically the
assassination of important antagonists.94
The series clearly wishes to pose itself as ethically complex. How the Assassins
and Templars fit, exactly, into each historical time and space does not always fall where
one might expect, and the dynamics of association are often presented as rapidly shifting.
Individual Templars and Assassins each have differing reasons for being involved in their
respective organizations and have differing methods for enacting their broad ideologies.
A series staple is conversation with “primary” assassination targets (those that cap off
memory “sequences”), wherein the ethics of both Templars and Assassins are called into
question. Individual Assassins, too, question their own methods,95 and in-fighting among
both organizations has been a constant across the series.96 That said, this complexity does
not compromise the series’ commitment to interpellating the player with the Assassin
ideology of “freedom” and “free will”; after all, the open world genre’s vaunted
autonomy and mobility is the apparent ludic echo of this ideology. The gray areas the
series introduces merely serve to show that enacting such ideology is complicated, messy
Player “freedom,” then, is largely constrained to where to explore, what soldiers to kill, how precisely to
achieve certain objectives (like via stealth or direct combat), and what side-missions to complete (missions
not required for the completion of the main narrative).
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work. Even with Assassin’s Creed: Rogue, where the historical player-controlled avatar
is a former Assassin turned committed Templar, and the modern-day avatar is a
nameless, mute individual being inducted into the Templars, it is clear that the Templars
are the villains. Rogue’s play-the-bad-guy narrative merely shows how the road to hell
can be paved with its travellers’ good intentions, but the destination (the hell of
authoritarianism) remains the same. The modern-day storyline literally ends with a
sequence where modern day Templar masters provide the nameless player character the
opportunity to join or die, and the historical avatar acknowledges that he may have
become a “monster” when he became a Templar.97
What is telling, however, is what is taken for granted in the alternate history the
series creates, and the supposed moral ambiguity that ostensibly underpins this historical
trajectory. This approach to alternate history, alongside the player’s inhabitation of roles
centrally important to this history, naturally carries some ideological assumptions.
Perhaps most obviously, this approach requires a kind of “Great Man theory” of history,
where massive social changes, political events, and even environmental changes are often
the result, essentially, of one person putting a blade into the neck of another. Here
particularly, these individuals are the ones fighting an apparently trans-historical and
post-racial struggle, presented as ideologically global, and yet only articulated in an overdeterminedly Western liberalized discourse. The “secret history” of Assassin’s Creed
does not, of course, push people to believe that the “hidden events” of its historical plot
are true, but it does require the player to think it credible that material contexts are
conditional upon individual action, rather than the other way around, or even a

Sequence 5, Memory 2, “Bravado.” The word “monster” as self-accepted term for protagonist Shay
comes up again in the game’s final cutscene.
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particularly complicated meeting of either. As the previous chapter’s outlining of
neoliberalism’s individuating culture and apparatuses highlights, the AC series’ treatment
of history is a neoliberal lens through which enough individual deaths and individual
efforts are primarily responsible for historical shifts. Indeed, the series’ focus on broad,
Western-stylized freedom and “liberty” as the Assassins’ primary ideological goal across
space and time, the focus on individuals and their exceptional economic and violent
acquisition or disruption of power are not dissimilar from the hyper-individualism of
Rockstar-style neoliberalism. These neoliberal individualizations are a set of principles
Kanien'kehá:ka scholar Audra Simpson, in Mohawk Interruptus, characterizes as settler
colonial assumptions. Simpson says “the values of individual rights over ‘collective’
rights—the ahistorical and presumed evenhandedness of liberalism to determine and
render justice, in part, through presumed shared values of freedom, justice, equality,
individualism . . . are the same values” that many Mohawk find “intrusive and forcible”
(14).
What is even more telling about this particular brand of alternate history, which is
actually the hegemonic, typically imperial history of the world reframed by way of sci-fi
conspiracy theory, is who is assumed to have agency and power within it. Wolfe points
out that “thoroughgoing diminution of native entitlement was axiomatic to [settler
colonialism’s so-called] discovery,” and that “the discourse was primarily addressed to
relations between European sovereigns rather than to relations between Europeans and
natives” (390). The diminution of Indigenous title is most clearly visible in the European
colonial powers’ “doctrine of discovery,” where particular land could be bartered for or
taken from Indigenous peoples only by the European power that “discovered” them. This
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“distinction between dominion and occupancy illuminates the settler-colonial project’s
reliance on the elimination of native societies” (390). The massive, globe-spanning war
and politics of the Assassins and Templars is, throughout the series, more concerned with
creating fiction within the borders of European dominion narratives than earnestly
troubling or exploring the alternatives that have existed and continue to exist. Thus these
depictions are again frontiers, invitations of access to the fictionalized historical margins
of colonial sovereignty, where the player’s violence, power-building accumulation, and
autonomous mobility carry the same values identified in the previous chapter. In ACIII
specifically, it is a re-enactment of the diminution of Indigenous title, replaced by the
relations of apparently de-racialized global (but certainly not Indigenous) powers.
Indigenous societies, as we shall see, are relegated at best to vanishing pawns in a global
game, and Indigenous individuals are either assimilated into Assassin “liberty” or are
irrelevant.
ACIII, Narrative, and Indigenous Past and Future
ACIII is part of the series’ original “trilogy.”98 The trilogy’s modern-day setting
and overarching plot focuses on Desmond Miles, a white American born into a family of
Assassins, and gameplay largely revolves around Desmond (and the player) playing the
memories of his ancestors to uncover information and First Civilization technology
critical to the cloak-and-dagger war between Assassins and Templars. In the process,
Desmond saves the planet from a massive apocalyptic event, a coronal mass ejection. In
ACIII, the ancestor who Desmond (and by extension, players) primarily control is

The trilogy is actually 5 entries, but Assassin’s Creed II, Assassin’s Creed: Brotherhood, and Assassin’s
Creed: Revelations is often considered by developers and fans alike as one large narrative entry—further
held by the fact that ACIII was released after ACII, Brotherhood, and Revelations, and ends Desmond’s
story; it is, however, the fifth game made in the main series.
98
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Ratonhnhaké:ton, a half-Mohawk, half-British Assassin who is given the name “Connor”
by his eventual Assassin mentor, and is largely referred to by that name throughout by all
characters except others from his Kanien'kehá:ka village. The son of Haytham Kenway,
a high-ranking British Templar, and Kaniehtí:io, a female Mohawk warrior,
Ratonhnhaké:ton is eventually inducted into the Assassins, and then largely fights to
secure the success of the American Revolution as it happens in history. The Templars,
who control the British crown at this point in history, desire British victory, or to steer the
Revolution to Templar agents like historical Continental Army general and George
Washington-rival Charles Lee (who is the game’s final antagonist and target for
assassination). ACIII is not, however, an overly obvious pro-United States tale.
Ratonhnhaké:ton consistently questions the motives of the Founding Fathers; the player
is free to kill Continental Army soldiers as freely as they kill British soldiers (to little
consequence either way99), and an “Epilogue Mission” available after completing the
main storyline missions perhaps caps off the game’s narrative ambivalence about
America. This “mission” is actually an unplayable cutscene that shows Ratonhnhaké:ton
witnessing Evacuation Day, when the last British forces leave America. Immediately
after turning from the sight of the British ships leaving New York harbour,
Ratonhnhaké:ton looks upon a nearby slave auction, his facial expression one of obvious
disgust. He simply walks away.

Though killing “civilians” (unarmed non-player characters that are not targets or soldiers) will lead to a
“game over” for the player’s actions not “synchronizing” with Ratonhnhaké:ton, Continental and British
soldiers in the free-roam gameplay and tightly scripted missions of the game can be killed at will. Again,
even though violence is the prime mover of political ideology in the series, it is only the “important” targets
that are given any attention in the narrative, whether hundreds or thousands of soldiers die by
Ratonhnhaké:ton’s hand.
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Ratonhnhaké:ton, as the half-British half-Indigenous protagonist, is the vehicle
for narrative parallels of familial relations and colonial politics and identities, the main
sites of the game’s political ambivalence. In varying degrees, “Patriot” colonists and
Indigenous peoples are associated with the “freedom” of Assassin values and influence,
while Loyalist colonists and the British Empire are associated with Templar values and
influence. In a sense, Patriot colonists become de-racialized Indigenous peoples; they
become equally legitimate claimants to land as part of their overwhelming association
with the broader ideology of the Assassin-Templar war. This ambivalent equivocation, of
course, presents some rather striking problematics. Ratonhnhaké:ton, who is a freedomfighting Assassin child of a British Templar father100 is obviously positioned as a
counterpart with or allegory for American colonists fighting British tyranny, an
equivocation in favour of the “settled on the land” populace rejecting the paternalism of
its originating empire. Indeed, that Ratonhnhaké:ton fights for the American Revolution,
despite personal reservations, merely to combat the Templar threat makes this connection
all too obvious. Ratonhnhaké:ton questions the Founding Fathers’ efforts, noting that it
appears “one must be a landed white man to be free.” But when he asks “What of
someone like me? Or Surry [Samuel Adam’s emancipated slave]?” he poses the question
as “What role for us is there in this New World?” [emphasis mine].101 Even
Ratonhnhaké:ton articulates the struggle over the land in the naming and authentication
of the colonizers, rather than his Mohawk heritage. Ratonhnhaké:ton’s hybrid race not
only allows him to blend successfully into white society, it also quickly assimilates him

The player actually controls Haytham, the Templar father, in the game’s prologue, when Desmond and
his modern day Assassin partners are trying to synchronize with the correct memory sequences.
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All of this dialogue comes from the narration that introduces Sequence 10.
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into the Euro-settler project’s apparent inevitability. This inevitability is what I call
futurity: not simply that which has future occurrence, but that which is constitutively
characterized by its inevitable continuance in the present and beyond, a no-escape
certainty like that of Rockstar’s cynical worldview. Ratonhnhaké:ton’s assimilation into
and representation of white settler futurity—imbued with his Indigeneity’s of-thelandness—makes him a successful Assassin in the fight for the settler American project
for which his multi-racialization is a metaphor.
Even Kaniehtí:io, Ratonhnhaké:ton’s Mohawk warrior mother, further illustrates
this racial hybridity’s parallel with the struggle for American independence. In an
introductory scene before her death in a Templar raid of the Mohawk village, the player
hears narration by Kaniehtí:io about her growing child. She mentions that she cut
Haytham, the British father, out of her life and the life of her child because of his
Templar associations. She refers to his Templar allegiance as his “eyes to the future,” a
future where “he and his Templar brethren controlled all.” She notes that
Ratonhnhaké:ton has “his father's features, but enough of me that he did not appear a
stranger” to the Kanien'kehá:ka. However, Kanienhti:io worries that someday she will
look into Ratonhnhaké:ton’s eyes “and see the same dark hunger there.” This, in a way,
racializes the ideology of settlement through Ratonhnhaké:ton: half his features and eyes
betray his British, Templar half, as dark but necessarily of futurity, while the other half
represents the Mohawk “people” and their apparently natural association with freedom
and a kind of proto-multicultralism. The Mohawk, his mother says “loved him as their
own” [emphasis mine]. 102
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In creating these shifting parallels and equivocations, the game re-enacts a
consistent trope of colonial representation: Ratonhnhaké:ton’s Indigeneity is associated
with being “American.” He must struggle against the Templar half of his heritage (read in
this context as British) to fully embrace the “freedom” of his role as an Assassin, one
inherently tied to the “freedom” associated with American independence, and
substantiated by the Indigenous half of his heritage—he is loved as one of them, but his
destiny is not with them. This representation of Indigeneity is typical of Indigeneity in
settler colonial literature, as Terry Goldie points out in Fear and Temptation: The Image
of the Indigene in Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Literature, where white
characters gain “soul and the potential to become of the land” (16) through their
connections to Indigeneity, precisely as the RDR protagonists do. Goldie asserts that
settler colonial literature reveals simultaneous settler colonial revulsion for the “nature in
human form” (16) that is the Indigenous person, and desire for the Indigenous person’s
concomitant natural belonging to the land they inhabit. But Ubisofts’ cosmetic difference
from Rockstar’s unabashedly cynical anti-heroic investment in a paradoxical but equally
vanishing Indian-styled savagery and outlaw-styled liberty is worth noting, if only for
that difference’s fundamental similarity. Ratonhnhaké:ton’s hybridity combines the soul
and of-the-landness Indigeneity with a whiteness of futurity that handily addresses the AC
series’ thematic explorations, and provides a marketably multi-racial identity for gamers
to explore those thematics through. After all, as Goldie says, “the ‘natural’ character of
the indigene is etymologically obvious in the term itself,” where Indigeneity “represents
beginnings” (21). As such, the “authentic” Indigenous protagonist here mobilizes that
“natural” authority of the land from his Mohawk tribe on behalf of the settler colonial
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struggle for sovereignty. That the settler sovereignty seeks to impose itself on the same
lands Indigenous people inhabit is treated as a messy but necessary consequence, and no
attention is paid to the particularities of Kanien'kehá:ka sovereignty much older than
settler history. ACIII, then, is similar to the “sensitive novels of appropriation” that
Goldie studies, and “the few basic moves which the indigenous pawn has been allowed to
make” (15) in settler colonial literature are remade in play. The “New World” here is a
staging ground for a fight between liberty and oppression, but that fight is no longer (or,
for the Assassins more explicitly, never has been) between Indigenous peoples and settler
colonialism. The fight is part of a global war of importance that is and can only be fully
realized, won or lost, in the machinery of settler colonialism and its governance on land
that once belonged to Indigenous peoples. Ratonhnhaké:ton’s Indigeneity in the game is
symbolic of the natural, free belonging to the land that the liberty-loving settlers are
fighting for, all along familiar colonial tropes.
This appropriation of Indigenous peoples’ natural freedom by European/settler
liberty is established almost as soon as the player is first given control of
Ratonhnhaké:ton; those opening moments are also where ACIII introduces its mechanical
gameplay additions to the series. As Goldie posits regarding the traditional European
philosophical binary of art/culture and nature, “the most natural” Indigenous person is
“the least evolved,” and this trope plays out in colonial literature as part of the settler’s
alienness “in spatial terms” to the land, compared to the Indigenous people (21). This
connection to and familiarity with the land is one of Ratonhnhaké:ton’s strengths, but a
strength only to become fully realized on behalf of settler colonial politics and logics and,
in turn, a strength eventually completely divested from Indigenous peoples.
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Ratonhnhaké:ton is the first character of the series that traverses vast wilderness in
different seasons, and, with Ratonhnhaké:ton as the avatar, the player can hunt animals
and skin them for sale or to create products for greater profits. This hunting mechanic
(similar to that of the RDR series) is established when the player first inhabits
Ratonhnhaké:ton as a young boy, living in his Mohawk village, unaware of Templars or
Assassins. Ratonhnhaké:ton’s early Indigenous experiences are central to his role as
hyper-mobile Assassin. This sequence also introduces the ability to climb quickly in the
countryside, allowing the player to scale enormous rocks and trees and leap from branch
to branch; heretofore the series’ “freerunning” movement mechanics only allowed fast
vertical and horizontal spatial mastery of urban edifices. The introduced mechanics of
hunting and tree-climbing spatial dominance of nature are literally the majority of the
player’s experience of Ratonhnhaké:ton’s Mohawk life. Echoed by RDR2’s introduction
of hunting and harvesting by the Indigenous character Charles, Ratonhnhaké:ton’s young
life as part of his Mohawk community is a tutorial of sorts, merely a few skills for the
player to take into a life more fruitfully devoted to death and settler economics (as will be
further discussed in a later section). Tom van Nuenen similarly analyzes ACIII’s
introduction of natural-world spatial mastery and hunting/animal harvesting to the series
in his connection of Assassin’s Creed series gameplay to so-called “anti-tourism.” The
“colonial ideology” (36) of spatial-mastery mechanics will also be further discussed in a
later section. For now, it is enough to highlight these specific mechanics’ introduction
alongside the games’ early and most sustained attention to an “authentic” historical
depiction of Mohawk life and culture. Van Nuenen suggests these mechanics can be
broadly interpreted as “hunter-gatherer mechanics commonly associated with the
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‘native’” to give the game’s “spatiotemporal environment” a sense of “authenticity and
belonging” for the player (34).
Ratonhnhaké:ton’s village has been a secret protector of a First Civilization
artifact that the Templars seek. His tribe, then, is a kind of familial, racialized group of
Assassins who are not even aware of the Assassins and the vast conspiracies they
conduct, nor do they have specific, complete knowledge of the First Civilization whose
artifact they hide. His fellow Mohawk, exposed to the artifacts and given glimpses of the
First Civilization that demand protection and secrecy, are “natural” Assassins, if you will,
in the same vein as they are “naturally” free peoples who, like the American colonists
struggling against British tyranny, are the ignorant pawns of the Assassin-Templar war.
The Mohawk are presented, as in Goldie’s phrasing, as the less “evolved” Assassins, with
incomplete knowledge and capability, merely a close connection to the land (here, a
sacred place that turns out to be a First Civilization ruin) that places vague responsibility
on them that they cannot handle in the future. The American colonists are the true
inheritors of this war, for their struggle defines a much grander scheme of power—a
struggle for a Western notion of “freedom.” This succession of responsibility away from
Indigenous peoples appears as quite natural; after all, the Indigenous peoples of the “New
World” are simply different groups of people whose genesis lay also in their forgotten
creation and direction by alien gods, less equipped to handle this fight than those
European colonial and settler colonial superpowers.
Ratonhnhaké:ton’s consistent distrust and criticism of the Patriot figures he aids is
a defining character trait, and appears to be the most prominent vehicle for Ubisoft’s
depiction of the “ugly” side of America’s birth, of racism and marginalization alongside
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lofty goals of freedom. We can here recall the aforementioned post-game cutscene with
the slave market, for example. That Ratonhnhaké:ton simply walks away, however, is
consistent with that distrust and criticism: it amounts to little more than complaining.
Ratonhnhaké:ton’s cynicism is not the “refusal” of Audra Simpson’s Mohawk
Interruptus, a historical and modern political and personal strategy of Mohawk peoples
refusing to live in accordance to settler colonial norms, laws, and institutions.
Ratonhnhaké:ton repeatedly questions those he aids for their colonial assumptions and
perspectives, but he does so generally, with little to no reference to the specific
differences from Mohawk culture and governance, or the effects of colonization
thereupon. Simpson calls Mohawk refusals “assertions based upon the validity and
vitality of their own philosophical governmental systems, systems that predate the advent
of the settler state” (19). Compare that modality of political vitality and resistance to
Ratonhnhaké:ton’s narration describing his training by Assassin mentor Achilles, where
“for every lesson that concerned the body, there were two that concerned the mind.
Language, philosophy, logic, the arts” and “most often of the Assassins and Templars,
their structures, origins, and purpose.”103 None of these lessons on language, philosophy,
logic, or “the arts” are located by origin, for they are apparently inextricably associated
with the Assassins and Templars, an apparently timeless and placeless ideological global
struggle. Ratonhnhaké:ton’s life and knowledge of Mohawk culture apparently equip him
with little “philosophy” or “logic” that will help him. His depiction is instead consistent
with the “least artful” and “least evolved” Indigenous person that Goldie identifies in
settler colonial literature. He cannot mount a refusal of these lessons any more than he
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can reject the “structures, origins, and purpose” of his newfound allegiance. 104 There is
no assertion of “validity and vitality” of Mohawk philosophy or politics, even if the game
does acknowledge things like the American Constitution’s intellectual debt to the
Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace in its “Animus Database” of historical information,
like a small placard in a recreation center for playing Indian.
The game’s consistent failure to acknowledge the “validity and vitality” of
Kanien'kehá:ka knowledge and culture is partnered with its inconsistent acknowledgment
of Kanien'kehá:ka land claims and history. The game of course presents Indigenous
dispossession as tragic, but when Achilles shows off the armour of John de la Tour, “first
Assassin in the Colonies,” to Ratonhnhaké:ton, he says: “It is your duty to keep it. It
serves as a reminder for how long our brotherhood has really been here. How long we've
been protecting the people of the land . . . I know you appreciate what it is.”105
Ratonhnhaké:ton, a member of the Mohawk, is assumed to appreciate “how long” the
Assassins have been there—approximately 70 years—protecting “the people of this
land,” which is to say “the Colonies.” Ratonhnhaké:ton remains silent, apparently
appreciating it appropriately, despite the laughably short period in question compared to
his own people’s history of deep time on the land. The occasional egregious disregard,

Indeed, Ratonhnhaké:ton’s Indigeneity often appears to be used as a cypher for a complete lack of
knowledge so the player can be “taught” things alongside him, and to have the character remain
questioning rather than refusing, à la Simpson. When asked to officiate a marriage on his Homestead
property (in the mission “The Marriage”), Connor tells the priest that he does not know “colonial wedding
customs,” by which he apparently means a Christian marriage. This appears to be a rather significant
historical oversight, as many of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy (Iroquois), of which the Mohawk were a
part, were of Christian faith. Many Mohawk, for example, were Catholic at this time. Even if
Ratonhnhaké:ton’s tribe stands apart, as it is repeatedly said they do, that they would have little to no
knowledge of the customs, adopted or otherwise, of the rest of the nation’s people appears rather absurd.
That’s just a small example of the kind of positioning of Ratonhnhaké:ton’s solitary tribal identity as little
more than a state of knowledgelessness. For more on Iroquois and religion at this time, see Snow and
Richter.
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like this, for what the game poses as central to Ratonhnhaké:ton’s characterization (his
distrust of colonial independence in the face of Indigenous suffering) further betrays the
settler colonial ideology and futurity that are the real motivating forces behind the game’s
narrative.
Though Ratonhnhaké:ton often argues (emptily) with non-Templar American
Revolutionary figures and his Assassin mentor throughout the game, his journey ends
with his full integration into Assassin ideology and acceptance of Assassin
responsibilities. These responsibilities lead to the historical end of the American
Revolution as we know it: the overthrow of British domination and the supposed
liberation of the American nation. More importantly, his final act as an Assassin, and the
very reason Desmond is replaying Ratonhnhaké:ton’s memories, is his retrieval and
concealment of the First Civilization artifact from his ancestral lands after his village’s
expulsion by the new American Congress. His people forced off their land,
Ratonhnhaké:ton, now an Assassin of Western notions of freedom, removes their
protected “sacred” artifact, puts it on his settler colonial “Homestead” for his
multiracially lineaged—but white—descendant Desmond to take and use to save the
world. The world Desmond saves is a contemporary alternate modern world, where the
current state of Indigenous peoples is not mentioned by a single character even once.
Their land, and their role protecting “artifacts” is no longer theirs. The multiple current
Kanienʼkehá꞉ka communities, from only one of which Ubisoft drew consultants and
voice actors, inside and between the national borders of two settler nations, with
historical and continuing refusals of settler domination, are sovereignties themselves
successfully resisting exactly the oppressions the AC series typifies as Templar tyranny.
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But Kanienʼkehá꞉ka futurity, or even current sovereignty, is not of importance to the
aforementioned and optionally perusable Animus Database. The global ideological war
of the series can exist no other way, and that the artifact of the storyline—necessary for
modern day Assassins to save the world—is taken from Indigenous stewardship is
presented as a natural, even heroic, inevitable progression.
Perhaps the most telling moment of the game’s narrative treatment of
Ratonhnhaké:ton’s racialized identity is a mission106 that involves Ratonhnhaké:ton
racing to save his tribe from Continental soldiers. The game acknowledges that most
Mohawk tribes sided with the British, but Ratonhnhaké:ton’s particular village, secretly
tasked with protecting the land to hide the First Civilization artifact, had remained neutral
in the conflict. However, Ratonhnhaké:ton discovers that Washington, who up to this
point had been an ally, has ordered the destruction of his village, thinking it is no
different from the Mohawk allied with the British. Ratonhnhaké:ton kills the messengers
of this order, and eventually the Continental troops are recalled to take part in the Battle
of Monmouth.107 Once Ratonhnhaké:ton arrives at the village, however, his childhood
Mohawk friend, Kanen'tó:kon,108 influenced by Templar agents, attacks
Ratonhnhaké:ton. After a brief struggle, Ratonhnhaké:ton kills Kanen'tó:kon. While
dying, Kanen'tó:kon reiterates that his actions were to protect his people from destruction
at American hands. Once his former friend dies, Ratonhnhaké:ton says “It seems our
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Also worth mentioning here is that with this wave of the hand (the troops being sent to Monmouth), the
game eschews further mention of Washington’s direct orders in the further destruction of Iroquois land and
people with the Sullivan Expedition. Ratonhnhaké:ton even continues to aid Washington, characteristic
cynicism-with-acceptance in tow. For more on the Sullivan Expedition and its crippling blows to the
Iroquois people, see Graymont.
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people will never be safe,” eliding any possible culpability for the murder of his friend,
and the eventual and inevitable disappearance of his Indigenous people. These are things
for which not even the individualized history-changing superhero Assassin can be
ascribed any agency. Though Ratonhnhaké:ton had previously angrily renounced his
partnership with Washington, he begrudgingly helps him many more times in the game.
The goals of the Assassins have primacy, after all. As Achilles says, Ratonhnhaké:ton’s
“struggle is the colonists’ struggle,”109 despite the fact that even in the game’s narrative
the Patriots displace and kill Indigenous peoples. By killing Kanen'tó:kon and merely
accepting that his “people will never be safe,” Ratonhnhaké:ton essentially renounces his
Indigeneity in its racialized, colonially oppressed realities. Instead, his Indigeneity can be
fully mobilized as a symbolic “natural freedom” associated with the very land he was
born on, a freedom which Assassins fight for, and which American colonists must slowly
mature into, eventually figuring out how to stop enslaving and exterminating non-white
peoples. A true Assassin now, one aligned with American liberty, Ratonhnhaké:ton takes
up the critically important protection of the artifact his Mohawk people can no longer
handle, for they are apparently not long for this world. Freedom, as we shall further see,
is the right—and under guardianship—of white settler colonists and runaway slaves,
here.
My claims regarding ACIII’s treatment of Indigeneity are substantiated by the
next game in the series, Assassin’s Creed IV: Black Flag, which features Edward
Kenway, a Welsh-born Caribbean pirate grandfather of Ratonhnhaké:ton. He, like all
protagonists in the AC series, has supernatural powers of sight. Edward and
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Ratonhnhaké:ton both possess this talent without any Assassin training. In Black Flag,
Assassin Mary Read explains the ability to Edward in these terms: “Every Man and
Woman on Earth has in them a kind of Intuition hidden deep away . . . Most never find it.
Others it takes Years to tease out. But for a rare Few it comes as natural as Breathing.”
This natural power is inherent in humans due to their lineage with the “First
Civilization,” who were an “ancient People . . . a wonderful Race,”110 according to the
Sage of Black Flag, a human iterative reincarnation of a First Civilization member. All of
the played protagonists of the AC series are “naturally” gifted with this genetic trait of an
ancient “Race,” where some bloodlines express their alien godhood more purely than
others. It is clear that lineage is deeply important to those crucial individual heroes of the
global war between Assassins and Templars. This treatment of lineage perhaps
retroactively explains why the role of Ratonhnhaké:ton’s village as protector of a First
Civilization site and artifact, despite being ignorant of their purposes or histories, is left
unexplained in its genealogy. Players should apparently simply be comfortable
understanding that a group of Kanien'kehá:ka would blindly follow the vague
commandments of the planet’s first true “Race” provided by an alien site and artifact they
do not fully understand. The games use stereotypes of (super-)natural spiritualism that it
closely associates with Indigeneity, and then does away with Indigeneity after using it as
warrant for those same values.
Black Flag makes the series’ use of Indigeneity as authenticating identity of the
“natural” freedom associated with the Assassins completely blatant, then, when Mary

Black Flag, Sequence 10, Memory 3, “The Observatory.” The particular capitalizations used here is as
they appear in the subtitles of the game, which somewhat mimics Early Modern English in those
conventions.
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Read describes the first contact of European Assassins with Indigenous peoples: “The
Natives of this New World had a Philosophy like our Creed for as long as they’ve been
here. And when Europeans arrived, our Groups sort of… matched up.”111 This odd, panIndigenous claim112 essentially literalizes the connection I have interpreted with ACIII;
Indigenous peoples are the ignorant forebears of a freedom more clearly articulated, and
in perpetuity solely maintained by, the supposedly global but clearly Western liberally
coded Assassins. As Read continues, “Cultures and Religions and Languages keep Folks
divided… but there’s something in the Assassin’s Creed that crosses all Boundaries. A
Fondness for Life and Liberty.”113 This sentiment is echoed by Taino Assassin Opía
Apito when speaking to a fatally injured Templar, saying, “You believe we wasted
Freedom by living freely? You die a Prisoner of your Templar mores.” What this
“freedom” means to the Taino is never explained; the word is just a simplistic appeal to
the natural “freedom” of living on the land they belong to and are associated with (as
discussed in the third section of this chapter with Goldie). For Black Flag, long gone are
the “Animus database” entries on Indigenous culture; now there is only a remark that
though the Mayan civilization “collapsed around a thousand years ago,” there are still
“plenty of Mayans in that part of the world with their own culture.”114 Indigeneity’s
authenticating value is swallowed whole, and the Indigenous characters and cultures fade
into the background of an otherwise meticulously historical fantasy, with much longer

Ibid. Sequence 4, Memory 2, “Nothing Is True…” Ellipses and capitalizations are as the text appears in
the game subtitles.
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detailed entries on, for example, the political history—specifically the colonial history—
of Kingston, Jamaica.
The Homesteading Indian Fantasy and the Vanishing Protagonist
If these narrative themes were not enough to encode the logic of settler
colonialism, unconcerned with Indigenous knowledge, culture, philosophy, or politics as
part of the game’s ideological framework, the largest new game mechanic addition ACIII
brings to the series, makes that ideology abundantly clear. One set of player interactions
that does not have even a token gesture of ethical complication in the game’s narrative is
Ratonhnhaké:ton’s leadership of the “Homestead.” Ratonhnhaké:ton lives in his Assassin
mentor’s manor in Massachusetts, “Davenport Manor,” and he can develop the
surrounding lands with a tavern, a lumber mill, a Church, and so on, if the player
completes side-missions wherein Ratonhnhaké:ton invites settlers and a couple of
runaway slaves to “settle”115 on the lands surrounding Davenport Manor. In so doing,
Ratonhnhaké:ton develops an entire community of which he is the de facto leader. In yet
another instance of the dissonance between character trait and actual narrative and
mechanical outcome, Ratonhnhaké:ton repeatedly refuses titles of “lord” and “leader,”
but as the player’s actions, through Ratonhnhaké:ton, are the only ways to develop the
Homestead, he acts as lord and leader. Through Ratonhnhaké:ton’s leadership of the
Homestead, ACIII encodes Veracini’s previously cited settler colonial culture’s
disavowal, “where the actual operation of settler colonial practices is concealed behind
other occurrences” (Settler Colonialism 14).

Ratonhnhaké:ton does, tellingly, use the word “settle” repeatedly, such as when he invites the carpenter
Lance O’Donnell to the Homestead.
115
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ACIII lazily conceals the “actual operation of settler colonial practices” with an
Indigenous protagonist who simply rejects the terminology that might make obvious his
role as an economic developer for a land he populates with non-Indigenous settlers. None
of the cast of characters that players can invite onto the land are Indigenous, but all fit
cleanly into Veracini’s identified strategy of settler colonialism hiding the negative
activity of “settlers elsewhere, behind the persecuted, the migrant, even the refugee (the
settler has suffered elsewhere and ‘is seeking refuge in a new land’)” (14). All end up on
the Homestead to escape other persecution, such as the tailor getting away from an
abusive husband, the innkeepers looking for somewhere to go after a politicallymotivated eviction from Boston, and a settler deserting his company of British troops
(because he “don’t much agree with the fight” and “love[s] this country”116). All the
while, Ratonhnhaké:ton enacts a comforting rhetorical distance from his position of
colonizing leadership. Yet, Ratonhnhaké:ton’s Assassin mentor Achilles tells another
character that Ratonhnhaké:ton is there to “restore the property” to its former glory of
Assassin prominence in the colonies,117 and restore colonial property he does.
Ratonhnhaké:ton acts as guardian to colonist whites and former slaves on this
Homestead, all of whom engage in the foundations of settler colonial production and
economics for the reward of in-game currency and equipment.118 Ratonhnhaké:ton, in
this way, acts as a champion of settler colonialism in the game’s most extensive
mechanical additions to the series. By using a ledger in Davenport Manor or any settler
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Homestead Mission, “Blacksmith 1 (Deserter).”
Sequence 5, Mission 5, “The Hard Way.”

Though these missions are not technically required or necessary for completing the game’s main story,
the money and equipment given as rewards are nearly indispensable for doing so, so most players would be
exposed to at least some of this otherwise optional gameplay.
118

194
“general store” in the game world, players can procure, produce, and export goods
depending upon how far they have progressed in Homestead side missions. For example,
if the player has completed enough missions with hunter Myriam or lumberjacks Godfrey
and Terry, they can pay a minor fee to secure bear pelts or rosewood lumber, which can
then be sold at a profit at general stores the player unlocks around the game world.
Players can also raise their profit margins by capturing forts held by British forces in
order to lower taxation rates on their trade convoys—and if ever there were a crudely
neoliberal historical fantasy, it would be violence lowering taxation on a growing,
vertically integrated trading power. Trading cannot be done with any Indigenous tribes or
individuals—apparently Ratonhnhaké:ton, despite being Iroquois, has no relationships
with Indigenous trade of any kind. His profit margins are tied directly to the success of
Patriot settler colonists, which historically were themselves dependent upon trade with
Indigenous peoples. Similar to how Turner must elide the importance of Indigenous trade
and agriculture for his notion of the “trading frontier” to develop into the “farming
frontier,” ACIII cleanly eschews Indigenous trade power altogether, rather than having to
contend with it as something that settler states had to violently remove rather than
compete with or benefit from.
The resource pool the Homestead draws from can only be exhausted temporarily,
as everything slowly regenerates and can never be completely depleted. Resources, if
they have been unlocked by completing missions, are apparently infinite on the
Homestead—a paradisiacal rendering of the New World’s “land of plenty,” where
resources are obtained with no notion of sustainability, ecology, or exploitation, just the
limitless profit and expansion of an artificial frontier. One of Veracini’s points about the
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invisibility of settler colonialism is that it is often expressed in a theoretical
“differentiation” between colonialism and colonisation. The Homestead’s depiction of
settler economics neatly expresses this differentiation, as it separates Ratonhnhaké:ton’s
settling of up-to-that-point empty land from the very processes of settler colonialism that
the game half-heartedly questions. This kind of differentiation, says Veracini, “is
premised on the systematic disavowal of any indigenous presence, recurrently
representing ‘colonialism’ as something done by someone else and ‘colonisation’ as an
act that is exercised exclusively over the land,” and that “sustains fantasies of ‘pristine
wilderness’ and innocent ‘pioneering endeavour’” (14). Indigenous people and trade are
absent from the Homestead’s developing settlement—instead players are invited to fill up
a beautiful but empty land with economic engines. That this economic development in
“pristine wilderness” aids the player’s destructive capabilities by accumulating wealth to
purchase or craft better equipment is an unintentional replay of Veracini's identification
of the false, evasive differentiation of colonialism and colonisation.
The Homestead economics are the game’s primary method of acquiring enough
in-game currency to experience the totality of the game’s content and narrative with the
non-Indigenous denizens of the Homestead. Settler colonialism, it seems, is central to
whatever freedom Ratonhnhaké:ton can foresee; after all, his people “will never be safe.”
Settler colonial acquisition and domination is the only ludic and narrative option for the
liberty Ratonhnhaké:ton apparently fights for. The game unwittingly acts as proof to
Patrick Wolfe’s claim that settler colonial “invasion” is a “structure not an event” (388),
insofar as it is not a series of acts containable in a limited timeframe, but rather a
structure of governance and economics, executing the same logic of elimination via
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different strategies. These strategies continue in perpetuity after colonization is
supposedly complete. The game’s very ludic components, the structural mechanics of the
player’s interaction with the game, privilege settler colonialism as the only approach to
fully “synchronizing” with Ratonhnhaké:ton’s story and as the positive expression of the
Assassin ideology of “freedom.” That freedom, apparently, is a free pursuit of the
marketplace, an economics of acquisition, and the “pioneering endeavour” of settlement
in an infinitely resourced “pristine wilderness.”
This economic gameplay ties together the series’ themes of freedom in a postracial but non-Indigenous fantasy for a happy outcome of the American frontier. The
Homestead as profit-generating collection of settler relationships is a utopian fantasy that
ejects nuance and invests in settler economics as a depiction of rewarding freedom. That
depiction both flattens the racializing and eliminative nature of the colonial relation, and
elevates these economics as paramount to the positive futurity of the artificial frontier. As
Audra Simpson points out,
In the case of settler societies, there is an old Aristotelian problem of how to
govern alterity, how to order it, how to make sense of that which is not yours—a
question that is not normative but rather tactical, and it reemerges, violently. The
ideal of transcendent principles, still divine and sometimes democratically
inflected, animate the governance of these territories (Mohawk Interruptus 16).
The Homestead is the central depiction of ACIII’s freedom-loving imaginary, and in the
Homestead there is no sense to be made of alterity: all are united under settler economics.
Its transcendent principle is “freedom,” supposedly universal but explicitly associated
with Western philosophical tradition and the mechanics of settlement. Everything can be
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yours, and there is no need to contest with any complex history or relationship with the
land or its Indigenous inhabitants and neighbours. When Stephen Totilo, writing in
defense of the game for popular gaming news blog Kotaku, called the Homestead part of
how “the game is actually able to criticize what actually happened in the founding of
America while simultaneously celebrating the spirit and intent of the idea of America”
(“Nine More Hours,” n.p.). Totilo specifically refers to Ratonhnhaké:ton’s Indigeneity in
that critique and celebration. Ratonhnhaké:ton’s Indigeneity is presented simply as his
part of a racialized group Totilo says “is going to lose no matter what” in the American
Revolution. But with the Homestead, writes Totilo, “the player builds a whole new
community away from the British and Washington and all their warfare. The homestead
is the realization of the American frontier . . . In a way, it’s a little, idealized America.
Connor [Ratonhnhaké:ton] is its founding father” (Totilo, Comment). Thus even
Ratonhnhaké:ton’s alterity is flattened, and here too associated with and legitimation of
the American settler colonial project, which finds its modern expression in the current
United States. As Simpson asserts, the “modern order itself is entwined with capital as
this accumulative and acquisitive force,” which “further detaches people from places and
moves them into other zones for productivity, accumulation, and territorial settlement”
(17). Ratonhnhaké:ton’s fullest characterization is represented as part of the capitalist
project in its settler colonial nascence, removed from his ancestral lands, and leading a
community of productivity, accumulation, and territorial settlement. That characterization
is partnered, of course, with his primary (for both character and player) activities as an
Assassin, an explicitly violent reemerging tactical ideology if ever there was one.
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Jodi Byrd’s lecture on ACIII highlights that Desmond, the game’s modern-day
white protagonist (the character that unites the series’ original trilogy), has these multiracial ancestors as part of his “modern post-racial, if not non-racial construction, where
whiteness and citizenship are the fulfilment of character.” Byrd says this “neoliberal
multiculturalism, tied to the acknowledgment of the difference that is not really
[difference] . . . moves race comfortably out of the social and into another seemingly less
contentious realm,” an instrumental realm for convenient mobilization. This move is
made all the more obvious by the game’s refusal, Byrd says, “to assign any futurity to
Connor's [Ratonhnhaké:ton] role as a Mohawk ancestor,” and instead we are left with a
“stoic, inanimate, and past-tense” character in the series mythos. This point is not a small
one, as Byrd rightly points out “how quick developers have been to move beyond him as
a subject of the series.” A week before the release of ACIII, associate producer Julien
Laferrière noted that the previous three entries of the series (all of which fell under the
Assassin’s Creed II sub-trilogy119) featured the same ancestor of Desmond, Ezio Auditore
(an Italian Assassin from the Renaissance), “because people loved Ezio.” At the time, he
said: “We're going to see how players react to the guy [Ratonhnhaké:ton] for sure. You'll
get to experience portions of his life, you'll see why he becomes an assassin and what his
motivations are . . . The more you know about Connor the more you'll love him, but in
the end we'll see what the reception is like” (qtd. in Phillips). A month after ACIII’s
release, Ubisoft ran consumer polls asking players if they would like to see
Ratonhnhaké:ton return as a protagonist (Robinson, “Assassin’s Creed Survey” n.p.).
Ubisoft never released the results, but two years down the line, Darby McDevitt, lead
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writer of many entries of the series (though not ACIII), did a Reddit “Ask Me Anything”
Q&A in which he confirmed Ratonhnhaké:ton would not return as a primary figure. His
explanation:
[W]e planned the Edward [Ratonhnhaké:ton’s grandfather], Haytham
[Ratonhnhaké:ton’s father], Connor [Ratonhnhaké:ton] saga more than 2 years ago,
long before any of you had heard Connor's name or learned his backstory. We had
no idea how he (or Haytham) would be received, but we had our own long story to
tell, and we embraced it. And it was our hope that -- taken together -- this saga
would represent the story of a family... a migration, a mixing of cultures, and a
dashing of ideals [. . .] Don't rely on us to deliver new content... make your own
stories.
Those final lines are in response to the healthy community of Ratonhnhaké:ton fans
among cosplayers and Tumblr users,120 but it is also something of a mantra for
developers and gamers defending a lack of diversity in videogame representation. The
defense is also rather suspect; the polls two years before these statements contradict a
solid, unchangeable plan. That McDevitt also frames this multiracial lineage as
“migration” and “mixing,” does little to contradict Byrd’s contention that Desmond is a
“multiracial” or “non-racial” avatar of neoliberal multiculturalism, one that devours
Indigeneity for its apparent symbolic powers of rightful heritage and natural freedom, and
excretes settler mythology. The fans of the character have to make their own stories for
Ratonhnhaké:ton now; Ubisoft certainly will not.
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Whether this decision to shelve the character was based on player response or not
is difficult, if not impossible, for me to know. Even a brief Google search will show that
among gaming communities Connor is a divisive figure, but one that was largely disliked
upon initial reception. Luke Plunkett, also writing for Kotaku,121 celebrated that “the
series has swiftly moved on without him,” and characterized Ratonhnhaké:ton as
“[s]ucking much of the life out of the franchise with his solemn frown and humour
deficiency.” Characterizing Ratonhnhaké:ton as “humourless” and “solemn” fits neatly
with the character’s reception as something of a noble savage, and Plunkett’s added
rebuttal to criticism is telling. He says, “I often wonder whether the Tumblr cult122 are so
attached to him because he's such a blank canvas. They can project whatever they want
onto him, since there's so little to show for his appearance in the actual game” (n.p.).
Byrd also argues Ratonhnhaké:ton is presented as “stoic” and “inanimate,” but more
accurately notes that the narrative’s failure is not that Ratonhnhaké:ton is a “blank
canvas.” Instead, Byrd argues that “the narrative investments continually avoid
addressing the normative materiality of racialization and colonization by framing both
through the state-sanctioned multi-culturalism of neoliberal capitalism” (“Nothing is
True”).
Stephen Totilo has pointed out that originally playing the game and ignoring the
Homestead missions (in the interest of completing the game’s main “required” missions
more quickly) left him feeling Ratonhnhaké:ton’s “attitude and his discomfort with
nearly everyone in the game's main story” was “justified,” but he was nevertheless “hard

The headline, “Assassin’s Creed’s Connor, Who Was The Worst, Is Done For” speaks to some of the
popular reception of Ratonhnhaké:ton.
122
This is in reference to a sizable community on the website Tumblr that created a great deal of fan-art of
the protagonist.
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to like.” After returning to the game and playing the many aforementioned Homestead
missions where Ratonhnhaké:ton is given the most characterization—and most
thoroughly invested in the mythology and economics of settler colonialism—Totilo found
the character “more likeable and interesting” (“Nine More Hours”). These two
perspectives from Kotaku writers appear to me largely consistent with the split of opinion
on Ratonhnhaké:ton among gamers. Both, I think, reveal the same thing about the
character’s depiction: he is a largely dissonant character, whose justifications for sullen
behaviour (the historical, ongoing, and future genocidal practices of his allies) could be
more sensibly motivated towards a Mohawk refusal à la Simpson. Even his sullen
behaviour is undercut by his consistent acquiescence to the Patriot cause, and completely
gutted by his total investment in the settler colonial project with the Homestead, his
“little, idealized America” (Totilo, Comment). This mixed-race character is a catch-all for
Ubisoft, where they can gently critique American colonialism while having gamers “play
Indian” in the mechanics of literal settlement.
Much like Rockstar’s semi-utopian moments (the endings of San Andreas, GTAV,
and the ranching of RDR1 and 2), for ACIII, post-racial settler economic accumulation is
the only available felicitous and uncompromised narrative reward in gargantuan power
fantasies on artificial frontiers. Veracini’s noted obscuration of settler history through an
anxious differentiation between “colonialism” and “colonization” has a rather complete
expression in ACIII. Just as RDR2 does, ACIII depicts the problems of colonialism
(violence against and dispossession of racialized peoples) as bad, but the very causes of
those problems (the economic and ideological frameworks of the colonial relation) as
good. Ratonhnhaké:ton achieves fullest characterization as a settler, and his Indigeneity is

202
an apparently exhaustible—or exhausting—resource in a colonial fantasy of infinite
natural resources of profit.
The Manifest Manners of Playing Ubisoft’s Simulated Indian
Ratonhnhaké:ton’s role in gaming culture (and the wider pop culture it is a part
of) is perhaps a more damaging representation of Indigeneity for a product consumed far
more by non-Indigenous, settler colonial, or colonial individuals than Indigenous
demographics.123 I have already pointed out, following Byrd’s lead, the various ways the
game plays into the trope of the disappearing Native. There is no future for
Ratonhnhaké:ton’s people in the narrative; the mechanics almost completely ignore them,
and it appears that Ratonhnhaké:ton, too, immediately outlived his usefulness for the
Creed series. Both narrative and mechanics make clear that it is settler colonialism that
inherits the freedom the Assassins fight for, and Indigenous peoples themselves are
simply an ignorant casualty of the wider war that the post-racial/non-racial Assassins
wage. Indigeneity here is an authorizing, justifying identity category associated with
rights and freedoms, but it is one to be superceded by others. This depiction fits well with
the notion of Manifest Destiny, or perhaps more accurately, Gerald Vizenor’s notion of
“manifest manners.” Vizenor, in Manifest Manners: Narratives on Postindian
Survivance, calls the Western artistic representations of Indigeneity that follow such lines
the “simulations of manifest manners” (4). They are “simulations” because they simulate
Indigeneity in a way that centralize things like disappearance, or barbarism, and so on, as
inextricable from Indigenous identity. These works, which include ACIII and the RDR
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Though this is a rather broad assumption, it is one I make based upon statistics regarding gaming
demographics generally (see, for example, the Pew Research Center’s 2008 “Adults and Video Games”
study of American gamer demographics, which does not even count Indigenous demographics, or Asian
demographics, for that matter), and ACIII’s high sales.
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series, draw from the same ideological tradition, one that is functionally identical to the
teleology of Turner’s frontier and the ascension of a “fit race” to “free land.” They are
“manifest manners” because they are part of a culture that continues to perpetuate its
dominance with these simulations of dominance and Indigenous marginalization that is
like a culturally modern variant of Manifest Destiny. As Vizenor notes,
Manifest Destiny would cause the death of millions of tribal people from
massacres, diseases, and the loneliness of reservations. Entire cultures have been
terminated in the course of nationalism. These histories are now the simulations of
dominance, and the causes of the conditions that have become manifest manners in
literature . . . The simulations of manifest manners are the continuance of the
surveillance and domination of the tribes in literature. Simulations are the absence
of the tribal real. (4)
Vizenor’s claims are particularly applicable to the simulations of videogames, where the
simulation is played, enacted with the audience’s own input. That interactivity is a step
beyond the manifest manners of textual literature or passively viewed film. With its
Indigenous simulation, ACIII—like Rockstar’s artificial frontiers—gets the player
mechanically involved in activities associated with Manifest Destiny.
Vizenor is clear on the debilitating affect these kinds of simulations can have:
“The once bankable simulations of the savage as an impediment to developmental
civilization, the simulations that audiences would consume in Western literature and
motion pictures, protracted extermination of tribal cultures” (6). While ACIII does not
necessarily pose its Indigenous simulations as civilizational impediments (they are
perhaps too vanished for even that), the tropes of this kind of simulation are still very
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“bankable” in today’s dominant Western cultural climate. As James Patton writes in
“Colonising History: The Culture and Politics of Assassin’s Creed,” ACIII “fits neatly
into an existing genre of media . . . in which white people get to relive the (now
unacceptable) colonial era and behave nicely instead” (n.p.). With current cultural norms,
Ubisoft was bound to play up a stance that the historical treatment of Indigenous peoples
was terrible, but the game’s fundamental thematics render colonialism’s depravity pasttense, positing players under post-racial neoliberalism as disconnected from the errors of
history. As Patton points out, though Ratonhnhaké:ton is not strictly white, “he passes as
white, spends most of the game in white-dominated environments rather than tribal
ones,” and is likely very often controlled by a white player. Settler players, then, get to
act out their manifest mannered simulations and fully associate themselves with the
broad, Western Enlightenment-style forms of freedom that the Assassins represent, in all
their “presumed homogeneity” (as in Simpson’s formulation). This homogeneity, this
apparently self-evident and universal freedom, can use Indigeneity and eject it. Settler
players can cluck their tongues at the evils of colonialism and its treatment of Indigenous
peoples, all while taking the behaviours and methods, the “structures, origins, and
purpose” of those evils as fundamental, as inevitable if not righteous.
It is clear that ACIII’s manifest manners rehearse the genre tropes of settler
entertainment’s depiction of Indigeneity. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang highlight
scholarship that suggests “another component of a desire to play Indian is a settler desire
to be made innocent, to find some mercy or relief in face of the relentlessness of settler
guilt. . . Directly and indirectly benefitting from the erasure and assimilation of
Indigenous peoples is a difficult reality for settlers to accept” (9) in modern
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circumstances. Even before this post-racial neoliberal guilt had time to fully develop,
however, the formulas of playing Indian were simply an antidote for another form of
anxiety: the lack of a coherent settler identity. Philip Deloria’s Playing Indian, as
mentioned in the previous chapter, analyzes these tropes in canonical American literature
like the works of Henry David Thoreau, Herman Melville, and Walt Whitman. His study
finds a particular “contradiction” of these depictions; what better word than
“contradiction” is there for an idealized colonial settlement run by an idealized Indian,
one whose Indigeneity is both authenticating and vanishing? Deloria calls the
contradiction a consequence of settlers “wanting to savor both civilized order and savage
freedom at the same time” (3). Byrd’s use of American empire’s “transit” of the Indian is
similar to Deloria’s argument that “Savage Indians served Americans as oppositional
figures against whom one might imagine a civilized national Self” (3). Playing Indian
describes how, by the time the frontier closed, early American 20th century literature,
organizations, and culture used “wild Indianness” (3) to imagine that “civilized national
Self.” I should note this was the same time period when Turner’s reformulation and mishistory of the frontier’s existence and stages was first en vogue. Now “coded as
freedom,” a desirable and invented Indigeneity was an antidote for “the anxiety of urban
industrial and postindustrial life,” (7) a “postfrontier” (96) character in need of inspiration
from stoic, noble savagery. Playing Indian, both as modern neoliberal maneuver of guilt
and as settler modernity’s desire for a coherent cultural identity (in the midst of what my
introduction quotes Turner calling the “social ills” of postfrontier life), is still necessarily
the “transit” of empire as per Byrd. Playing Indian is what Deloria calls a “dialectic of
simultaneous desire and repulsion” where the “awkward tendency” of Americans “to
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define themselves by what they were not” (3) is expressed by what I have consistently
cited as the settler “contradictory reappropriation of a foundationally disavowed
Aboriginality” (Wolfe 389). Though ACIII mobilizes a “tribal real” (Vizenor 4) for its
past-tense historical authenticity, it is a simulation, a tribal unreal that necessarily locates
futurity in settler neoliberalism.
This contradictory tribal un/real dynamic of playing Indian is encapsulated by
ACIII’s rehearsal of the manifest manners of an historical event it depicts: the Boston Tea
Party. Deloria uses the Boston Tea Party as an early case study of the settler trends of
playing Indian. In the actual historical event, when settlers dumped British tea in protest
of British taxation, they did so in costumes they believed resembled Mohawk garb.
Participants “took pains to offer up Indian identities, grunting and speaking stage Indian
words that had to be “translated” into English . . . they cared immensely about the idea of
disguise and its powerful imputation of Indian identity” (6). This temporarily adopted
identity was meant to create an association between settlers and Indigenous peoples, and
thus fulfil that “awkward” desire to define oneself by what they are not: in this case, their
British oppressors. This event, popularly held as an important historical colonial event of
symbolic importance in creating a cultural identity, thus saw settlers play Indian and
define that identity by two disavowals: disavowal of British taxation, and an inhabited
disavowal of grunting savagery that nevertheless appropriates its inherent association to
the land those settlers occupy and its difference from the taxing authority. As Deloria
puts it, “dressing as an Indian allowed these pretend Mohawks to translate texts, images,
and ideologies into physical reality. In doing so, they lived out the cultural ideas that
surrounded Noble Savagery as concrete gesture that possessed physical and emotional
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meaning” (6). This translation of cultural identity through the transit of imagined
Indianness (at the ongoing expense, or at least disavowal, of the Indigenous Real) would
go on to become a consistent part of the burgeoning American settler identity.
Revolutionaries-turned-politicians of the new settler state and national poets of the
twentieth century donned Indian garb and simulated Indian ritual for the embodied
symbolic power the acts conferred (7).
In the alternate history version of the Boston Tea Party in ACIII, the settlers do
not engage in this roleplay, which might appear awkward to contemporary sensibilities.
Instead, the historical record’s remembrance of this Playing Indian is fictionalized as
Ratonhnhaké:ton taking part in the Boston Tea Party at the behest of American
revolutionaries. It is an almost comic congruence to turn the historical settlers’ desperate
appeal to the symbolic warrant of a simulated Indigeneity into an opportunity to literalize
that appeal with a simulated Mohawk for gamers to inhabit. Just as the false Mohawk
garb of the Boston Tea Party participants brought “ideologies into physical reality” (6),
this gameplay has players digitally embody that exact transmission in simulated
circumstances. It is play that literally associates Mohawk identity with this appropriative
and symbolically catalytic event of nascent American identity. For white settler players
and all others, ACIII provides the opportunity to translate players’ own reality into this
broad, contradictory political construction. Ratonhnhaké:ton, the divisive figure, largely
lamented for his humourlessness and relenting stoicism that need be understood through
the coterie of settlers he collects, is a literalization of the stoic grunting Indian stage play,
an Indian virtual reality in an artificial frontier. If seeing settlers donning Indian garb and
grunting might have been precisely the kind of offensive depiction that Deer said Ubisoft
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wished to avoid, it appears the temptation to have players embody this exact ideological
manifestation themselves is unavoidable.
The Ubisoft Formula and the Mobility of the Settler Subject
Gameplay in Ubisoft open world games is popularly recognized to conform to
several traits, a collection of activities and design principles that have come to be
colloquially known in hobbyist media as the “Ubisoft formula.” Clayton Purdom, writing
for A/V Club, used the term “map games” to highlight the prevalence of particular aspects
of most Western big-budget open world games:
a big open world, with a few distinct regions, and you have a couple of different
weapons and a skill tree, and you get missions and collect things and occasionally
climb towers that clear up portions of the map. It’s a map game; you spend a ton
of time looking at a map and thinking, “What the hell else can I do while I’m
around here?” and the answer is always, “A ton of shit” . . . This vast sense of
empowering leisure—of endless activities, all yearning to make you stronger—is
the defining characteristic[.]
The particular reference to climbing towers to reveal activities on the map is a direct
result of the Ubisoft formula. The first Assassin’s Creed introduced this trope, and it has
appeared in some form in so many Ubisoft and non-Ubisoft open world games that the
co-creator of the AC series Patrice Desilets humorously apologized for its ubiquity
(Grimm). What exactly makes up the Ubisoft formula, like most delineations of genre
forms, is a cluster concept that is not complete in and of itself, and each example rarely
exhibits every trait identified. Early AC games did not have “skill trees” where players
get to choose what skills to upgrade (though later entries do), and not all open world
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games that are otherwise extremely similar to Ubisoft’s games feature tower-climbing to
reveal its myriad activities. But the open worlds that are recognizably influenced by the
Ubisoft formula are all filled with activities; the Ubisoft formula may be best understood
as steering the open world genre into “a steady, ceaseless dopamine drip of busywork”
(Margini). Traversing a map and accomplishing tasks to grow in power is the artificial
frontier’s invitation, gameplay meant to draw in players with feelings of empowerment in
the same way Turner’s frontier was meant to empower a nationality.
At a basic level, open world games as map games/Ubisoft formula games, nearly
always appeal to the simplistic motivation of “achievement” noted in the introduction,
and that appeal’s satisfaction in game design is comparable to the frontier as “invitation
to access.” The Ubisoft formula currently breaks down to various forms of a broader
format. This format is about dominance over an over-filled gamespace, accomplishing
myriad immediate-reward goals, eliminating icons of tasks on a map, and thus
encouraging players to move on to fresh new areas with repeated modalities of
achievement. This format has led to critics calling the Ubisoft formula a “checklist” style
of gameplay (Purdom). Vacuuming up the land’s possibility (in terms of its interactive
capabilities and empowering rewards) to then move on to the next area and repeat the
process is a bluntly colonialist set of priorities tailored to be psychologically rewarding in
these games. The “dopamine drip” is, in many cases for big-budget open world games,
the result of neuroscience and psychological research applied to game design. Large
game development companies increasingly employ psychologists and behavioural
scientists for honing their design principles (Clay). It is not, of course, that these
colonialist and neoliberal ideologies are inherently more psychologically rewarding to the
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human brain. Instead, the advance of these scientific studies in game design are, as
psychologist Laura Crawford suggests, geared primarily toward “controlling player
behavior” (qtd. in Wawro). In other words, it is not just that these games are designed
specifically to fulfill players’ motivations of play, it is that they are designed to direct and
shape those motivations and their fulfillment through play. The settler and neoliberal
ideologies that inflect the design and narrative of these artificial frontiers (and their
access-invitation dopamine drip-feeds) are far more reflective of the cultural contexts in
which they are produced and played than any universalities of human nature.
The previous chapter established big-budget open world game design as one
necessarily indebted to neoliberal ideology in material context and productive practice.
The ubiquity and same-ness of the Ubisoft formula’s dependence on spatial dominance
and abundant, repetitive empowerment is reflected by the concurrent settler colonial
depictions the gameplay engenders and is engendered by. Joshua Jackson suggests the
big-budget “videogame production and consumption process mimics the more insidious
aspects” of neoliberal cultural production, “conditioning consumers to
think/act/perpetuate certain things and actions (or become subjectivized by that media)”
(45). Given the reach of the videogame industry, and the billion-dollar revenues of
Ubisoft’s open worlds, Jackson’s claims regarding the industry are specifically applicable
to Ubisoft:
Capitalism has allowed videogame production to target certain audiences, readily
subjectivize them to accept certain bodily, racial, and sexual portrayals as valid.
Any attempt to break with those readily recognizable tropes would mean that the
entire industry would have to radically reformat not only itself and who it is
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marketing to, or risk the entire medium crumbling in on itself from alienating
faithful consumers. Again, this is played out in the culture of videogame
production spaces; the bodies at work creating the subjectivizing material have
themselves been subjectivized into accepting the validity of only certain bodies,
and whether consciously or not, that subjectivization has embedded itself in
workplace cultures that actively favor (mostly white) straight men for meritocratic
purposes (51).
Ratonhnhaké:ton’s white-passing simulated Mohawk ancestry barely stretches the
boundaries of neoliberal post-racialism, and Ubisoft is often featured in reporting on the
white straight male dominance of the Western video game industry.124 Ubisoft is now
notorious for its workplace culture; recent allegations have focused primarily on sexism,
sexual harassment, and managerial reprisal on employees (Gach). Though every AC
game opens with a disclaimer about it being a “work of fiction, designed, developed and
produced by a multicultural team”—a pre-emptory message to guard against offense—
“its powerful Editorial group, a senior team that oversees the work done by the
company’s many studios” is, in 2020, “a group of seven white men” (Gach). This
Editorial department, with overwhelming creative control, can use its neoliberal
multiculturalism to outsource labour and use the varied ethnicities of its precarious and
exploited employees as an apparent warrant for its cultural production, which is itself
predictably settler colonial and neoliberal in expression.
All told, a confluence of factors underpins particular developments in open world
game design as expressed by the Ubisoft formula. Homogeneity of the ideology and
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demographic of its authoritative creators is the Ubisoft productive model, and the
refinement of repeated gameplay activities for guiding played behaviours into expected
outcomes is the Ubisoft formula. That these games are both produced by and cater to
settler colonial norms is a consequence of these factors, results that subjectivize
consumers into those very productive ideological bases. Essentially a self-fulfilling
prophecy, this neoliberal network of production and play persists precisely because the
artificial frontier of the open world game is—just like the conceptual frontier through
history—an exceptionally profitable model. The profits then engender further investment,
devouring more and more capital for fine-tuning the achievement-and-reward gameplay,
and for marketing these frontiers globally. These titles are meant to keep players in their
digital worlds for tens to hundreds of hours, and it is consequently unsurprising that the
Ubisoft formula features an escalating inclusion of the microtransaction model discussed
in the previous chapter.
Manveer Heir, a game developer who formerly worked at Bioware after its
acquisition by game publishing giant Electronic Arts, spoke at length on Waypoint Radio
about large game development corporations “pushing for more open world games”
(“Episode 106”). Heir points out that this kind of game development “scaled up our
budgets to a hundred plus million dollars . . . big publishers in general only care about the
highest return on investment.” Furthermore, “in the west” the major video game
companies have “consolidated,” and have a shared “conservative” ethos, with ballooning
team sizes and “middle management bloat.” The corporate ethos’ response is to make
these open world frontiers places where gamers settle for a great length of time—until the
next artificial frontier is available—and target these settlers as “repeatable income.” This
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logic is put into practice, Heir claims, though microtransactions. Indeed, all of the latest
AC games that have no multiplayer component (Origins, Odyssey, Valhalla) include
microtransactions for access to special equipment and cosmetics, and for in-game
resources that reduce the in-game labour—the so-called “grind”—required to empower
the player’s avatar to effectively dominate the open world. These digital goods are
available in Ubisoft’s store as “time saver packages,” where gamers can pay more money
on top of the initial sale price to reduce the substantial amount of time it would take to
finish even a non-completionist play-through of each open world game’s central
narrative.
Jackson, Heir, and Austin Walker—interviewing Heir (“Episode 106”)—all in
some way connect these financial accumulative logics to the aforementioned
homogeneity of demographic and ideology in the Western video game industry. Heir
speaks about the development of a game he worked on, Mass Effect: Andromeda, before
leaving Bioware. The game was pushed into open world design by the publisher, and
took the established Mass Effect series into a new setting, with a storyline that focused on
settling new worlds. Heir suggests he and other developers raised concerns about the
treatment of “colonialism” in the game, and were repeatedly shut down by leadership
composed entirely of white men. Walker in turn suggests these issues can be particularly
difficult to engage because of corporate structure: the cellular nature of distant teams, and
hierarchies where final creative decisions are made in absentia and with prejudice by
these demographically homogenous authorities. That the power fantasy gameplay
experiences (with less in-game labour required for those with the money to purchase a
time-saver package) play as they do with the narratives they do is connected to historical
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and ideological debts. The historical progression of settler colonial economics and
racialization to modern material realities of corporate practice and demographics, as well
as the abstract inheritances of settler mythology developing into neoliberal capitalist
ideology, go some length to explaining the Ubisoft formula’s form and development.
The previous chapter also highlighted how capitalist accumulation has shifted
from actual space to the non-physical frontiers of digitality, and this too is pertinent for
understanding how the Ubisoft model and formula is now so desirable for other
companies to mimic. As Jackson notes, in neoliberal practice, “physical proximity no
longer plays a substantial role in capital production, nor in social and cultural production”
(45), and the ways in which bloated companies like Ubisoft and Rockstar make bloated
digital worlds is interestingly symptomatic of these settler neoliberal logics. Just as, in
Veracini’s words, “Capital is thus literally settling on space that is made empty through
financialization” (“Containment” 119), the deeply financialized, microtransactionaddicted open world game genre has gamers settling on artificial frontiers, unreal spaces
that are functionally empty without players’ progression of dominance. Massive game
development companies like Ubisoft settle gamers into non-physical spaces for
simulations of self-empowerment. The formula consequently refines itself to extract more
and more money from those players settled on unreal space for their leisure.
These virtual spaces, empty of physicality, are designed to be emptied of their
simulated content and possible reward, letting players move through and dominate
frontiers, only to be replaced by yet more inviting spaces in more iterations of multimillion dollar franchises. Thankfully for the bottom lines of Ubisoft and its ilk, that
design engenders a continuous cycle: larger budgets for larger worlds with hopefully

215
larger returns, providing gamers renewed fresh access to fresh frontiers, and exploiting
more globalized labour as detailed in the previous chapter. As such, these artificial
frontiers and the Ubisoft formula necessarily highlight the most important trait of the
settler throughout the history of settler colonial cultural production: mobility. The Ubisoft
formula’s emphases are its use of open worlds as spatial experiences. The desired
“immersion” is part of these games’ baked-in fantasy of power, power of violent
dominance, power of the accumulation of currency, and collectible items and
equipment—a fantasy that is expressed through constant mobility in that world. The
unreal space of the virtual frontier, and the proliferation of multi-entry franchises based
around repetition of mobile dominance over new, inviting lands to be dominant through
(and down the checklist) reveal another way Western big budget open world game design
is emblematic of the settler colonial imaginary, and neoliberal cultural production
broadly.
My argument that the Ubisoft formula and open worlds are expressions of, and
cater to, desire and anxiety around settlement may seem paradoxical to this mobility, I
draw the position from a great deal of scholarship’s identification of “mobility” as a
central settler colonial and Western neoliberal cultural hallmark. Lloyd and Wolfe note
that “Colonial settlement, of course, depends on the mobility of the settler who migrates,
whether that displacement was initially coerced or voluntary, and thus furnishes an icon
of the modern subject defined by movement” (115). Cherryl Smith (Ngati Apa,
Whanganui, Te Aitanga a Hauiti) argues that an obsession with “collecting” is a settler
colonial modality that has developed into a modern neoliberal one. Contrasting settler
“collection” with Māori modalities of “collectivity,” Smith argues that “with
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colonisation, it was the pioneering spirit that encapsulated the dreams of advancement”
(69). In its current neoliberal form, “it is the entrepreneurial spirit that encapsulates the
dream of roaming the world and discovering untapped resources, of being able to achieve
a sense of freedom through gathering and accumulating” (69-70). Open world games,
particularly of the Ubisoft “checklist” model, are easily understandable as digital
realizations of that dream: roaming, untapped and infinite resources, and a “sense of
freedom through gathering and accumulating” (70). The player’s advancement in open
worlds is in this roaming accumulation, and an attendant violence to roam into the
frontier’s great danger. The advancement of the player’s character in achieving a positive
“spirit” in these fantasies is so often, as with ACIII and the RDR series, pioneering
settlement purchased with that mobile accumulation and violence. That the very
experience of freedom is characterized specifically as an accumulative mobility, in a
checklist open world, is an enduring settler and neoliberal cultural expression, and the
rave reviews of these big-budget open world games often highlight “tremendous
freedom” (MacDonald) along exactly these lines.
As noted, however, the “freedom,” or “autonomy” of open world games is
deceptively limited. The available activities of these open worlds conform to particular
standards—the neoliberal priorities of Rockstar and Ubisoft games—and are precisely
tested and designed to direct player behaviour to experience the “immersion” into and
“achievement” of violent accumulative power the genre provides. Western big-budget
open world game developers, evidenced by Rockstar design and the Ubisoft formula
alike, provide a sense of “freedom” through a rather simplistic set of these enduring
cultural hallmarks: mobility over an inviting land, and a mostly illusive autonomy to
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choose where to go and what to do. The autonomy of mobility in gameplay combat in the
Ubisoft formula is also structured on different literal approaches to the engagement (does
the player climb the roof and drop down, or find a hole in the wall?), or the style of
violence engaged, be it stealthy or immediately hostile. This autonomy is illusive
precisely because the available interactions are tightly coded, literally programmatically
for the optimal direction of player behaviour, as well as in pre-set unlocking availability
of missions and activities to provide the correct progressive sense of “achievement.” The
autonomy is also tightly coded ideologically. The actual gameplay experience of this
freedom and autonomy is located in the affective allure of the artificial frontier: a large
open space that invites the player to traverse and grow in power. The opportunity for
gamers to voluntarily choose which available experiences are engaged, and when, in a
detailed gamespace, is the open world’s digitalized experience of “freedom.”
One of the points of connection Maria Bargh (Te Arawa, Ngāti Awa) uses to track
the coherence of settler colonial ideology with neoliberal ideology is precisely in this
kind of illusive sense of autonomy. Bargh says “neoliberals essentially take the status quo
of social and political economic relations in society as impermeable, and leave
individuals to their fate. This assumption arises because neoliberals equate ‘free’ with
‘voluntary’” (9). This view is necessary to uphold the neoliberal sanctification of the
market as the core expression and predictor of human society. All behaviour not
immediately and obviously coerced is thus voluntary, and therefore not subject to moral
quandary in a hopefully “free” market, nor should these interactions inspire political
resistance. Bargh notes that this of course neglects the wide and variable forms of
coercion, and “how ‘needs’ and ‘wants’ actually function in the marketplace . . . [supply
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and demand does not determine every transaction in a free market because] the market
does not necessarily respond to people’s demands in the form of needs. Instead the
market responds to money and those who have the power and privileges to pay for their
wants” (9). Ubisoft’s “time-saver” microtransactions are microcosmic demonstrations of
how not all autonomies are equal in the market. The sense of freedom given by an
illusion of autonomy, even on the artificial frontier, is negotiable depending on the
amount of money one may spend. Regardless of how much money each player brings to
the table, however, the freedom and autonomy, based on voluntary mobility, is the broad
strokes power fantasy born of the settler colonial imaginary and its newer entrepreneurial
bent. Players of ACIII can engage as much or as little of the Homestead missions and
economics as they desire somewhat in the order of their choosing, but all paths in the
open world lead to the accumulation of the mobile settler.
Third-Person Perspective and the Settler as Universal Subject
I must conclude this chapter by analyzing one of the Ubisoft formula’s enduring
visual regimes, overwhelmingly popular in open world design. After all, if mobility is
key to the artificial frontier’s allure, how that mobility is visually represented is deeply
important to understanding that allure’s characteristics. In the Ubisoft formula that
mobility is presented, in video game parlance, in a third-person perspective. Players do
not see out of their avatar’s eyes, but instead control a camera tethered to that avatar
simultaneously as they control the avatar’s actions. In a study of player embodiment in
third-person games, Daniel Black notes that “video games have demonstrated an ability
to create a sense of immediacy and involvement in players, which suggests that a sense of
involvement in their represented events and agency in their simulated environments is a
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key part of their appeal” (197). That “sense of involvement” is the “immersion” that these
games’ sense of freedom is motivated to empowering. Comparing third-person
perspective to first-person perspective in games, Black is careful to point out that even in
a first-person game the player is not utterly convinced their virtual embodiment is a direct
consequence of their literal embodiment. Controlling the avatar via gamepads or
keyboard-and-mouse schemes necessarily separates virtual embodiment from physical
embodiment. The available interactions and movements of an avatar are necessarily
limited in programmed possibility, albeit ultra-empowered in the intensity of the available
mobility to climb buildings, and so forth. In Black’s words, it is “implausible” to suggest
that simulated embodiment of video games, regardless of perspective, “swamp” players’
“existing subjectivity or [physically] embodied experiences” (197). Instead, Black argues,
video games create
another layer of embodied experience that is able to articulate with the foundation
of embodied experience that is with us all the time, creating novel combinations.
Rather than confusing or replacing our everyday sense of where our bodies are or
how they can sense or act upon our world, video games provide an experience of
vision and action that is multiple and distributed across physical and simulated
space. (197)
Third-person perspective’s multiplicity and distribution is different from first-person
perspective, but both provide a level of distantiated embodiment, an immersion staked on
the “simultaneity of the activity represented in the game and the actions of the player’s
body, which are generated in response to that activity in a circular fashion” (195). An
open world video game’s “simultaneity can only ever be imperfect and unstable” (195),
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but I argue the Ubisoft formula’s third-person—seen in the majority of Western bigbudget open world games—carries with it a kind of immersion and achievement
associated with the settler colonial imaginary.
I have argued that the Ubisoft formula avatar is a figure of the mobile settler. Yet
again relevant is van Nuenen’s suggestion that the spatial mastery of the AC series—
associated with “the ‘native’” in ACIII’s addition of tree-climbing—is akin to the
phenomenon of so-called “anti-tourism” in its colonial ideology. Anti-tourism is still
simply a form of tourism, but one that hopes to eschew the “commonalities of crowds . . .
superficial experiences that are associated with traditional tourism” and instead gain a
more “authentic” experience (30). Of course, the anti-tourist is a subject defined by their
mobility, and the authenticity achieved is still nevertheless one predicated upon a
superiority over regular tourism and the locals whose life and culture the anti-tourist has
the privilege to supposedly temporarily sample and transcend. As I argue above, van
Nuenen highlights Ratonhnhaké:ton’s Mohawk ancestry is part of what relates the
Ubisoft formula’s “spatiotemporal” dominance to “a notion of authenticity and
belonging” (34). That players can see Ratonhnhaké:ton in their control, and can see their
simulated embodiment’s spatiotemporal dominance with and as him, provides players
with another layer of colonial embodiment.
This extra layer of embodiment is that of the mobile settler, an avatar for all
players to play Indian and surpass Indians as a settler-in-training-and-action. In analyzing
the modern settler colonial imaginary’s construction by literature and law, and drawing
from Radhika Mohanram, Sherene Razack notes “the European settler becomes the
disembodied Universal Subject” (13). In the artificial frontier, third-person perspective
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provides that disembodied subjectivity. Mohanram herself calls the figure of the settler “a
subject who is able to take anyone’s place” (15); this relationship is mirrored by the
relationship of player and played Indian. All players of ACIII take the place of the
Indigenous protagonist via disembodied subjectivity and simultaneity, and it is the
player’s input that actualizes Ratonhnhaké:ton’s development into the neoliberal settler
hero the game’s arc and gameplay entail. Just as importantly, this third-person
perspective allows players to see their avatar literally rise above the “commonalities of
crowds” (van Nuenen 30) represented by NPCs. The Ubisoft formula’s focus on players’
vertical ascent of urban and natural settings is further buttressed by these NPCs’
disappearance in destruction by the player’s actions and by their literal programmed
occlusion every time they fall beyond the limits of the player’s view as explained by
Miner. For players to see their mobile settler’s visual dominance of a purely visual space
is an important characteristic of the formula; players seeing their avatar’s dominance
contrasted with the comparatively static NPCs is an integral element of the Ubisoft
flavour of power fantasy. After all, the “Universal Subject” of the mobile settler is only
sensible as an empowered figure in contrast to its oppositional figure par excellence, the
Indigenous person, who in Mohanram’s words is “immobile against the repeated
onslaught of the settler” (15) in the settler colonial imaginary.
Lloyd and Wolfe also point out that the literal and conceptual mobility of the
settler is necessarily constructed in opposition. The settler’s very existence on the frontier
requires the “perpetual unsettlement” of Indigenous peoples and other surplus
populations. This unsettlement “dialectically links the figure of the mobile pioneer to its
other, the immobilized, exterminated, dispossessed Indigenous” (115). Indigenous
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peoples’ sequestration physically on reservations and legally through legislation is
partnered with the settler colonial imaginary’s narratives of Indigenous death and
displacement as an inevitability, a Turnerian civilizing force of settler subjects meeting
an immovable but destructible object. The previous chapter noted Saskia Sassen’s
argument that the contemporary reality and rhetoric of neoliberal ideology is similar:
though mobility is often posed as the primary characteristic of the modern subject,
burgeoning surplus populations are “warehoused” formally and informally, in “refugee
camps . . . prisons . . . ghettoes and slums” (“Expelled” 198). Open world games provide
a fantasy of the mobile settler subject, visually transcending the simulated sequestered
others. In so doing, these games replay the allure of the Turnerian frontier, where
dangerous permeability is overcome and replaced by the supposed safety of borders.
After all, as Lloyd and Wolfe articulate, “[e]nclosure, the first movement of accumulation
by dispossession, is the institution of boundaries and limits, dividing the world between
territory declared to be appropriable or unoccupied (‘free land’) and publicly or privately
appropriated domains” (115-6). The confines of the magic circle makes the simulation of
this process one that is never a true danger for its participants: the third-person
perspective of the Ubisoft formula’s Universal Subject does not replace players’ physical
embodiment; it provides a pre-bordered embodiment of accumulative power in an
artificial frontier. The artificial frontier has only play-danger, and its third-person
Universal Subject, the hypermobile violent accumulator, are important mechanical
characteristics of the frontier logics inherently encoded in the Ubisoft formula, and
rehearses those logics’ forms of cultural (mis)remembrance.
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It is then a natural consequence of the Ubisoft formula’s popularity, and the bigbudget open world games’ settler neoliberal production and cultural context, that there
are so many games in the genre with repeated specific treatments of Indigeneity and
colonialism. Manveer Heir’s experience of the production of Mass Effect: Andromeda
turned into an open world game that glorifies and sanitizes colonialism is certainly not an
isolated case. The artificial frontier, where the avatar is a Universal Subject of dominant
mobility, necessarily produces narrative content that appropriates simulated Indigeneity
literally (as in ACIII), or by association (in the RDR series). The open world avatar as
mobile settler gains even more affective traction when it engages that time-tested favorite
play of the settler colonial imaginary: playing Indian.

224
Chapter Three: The Settler Frontier Overlap of Neoliberalism and Fascism:
Horizon Zero Dawn, Hypertopian Spectacle, and the Nomos of Open Worlds
As there are so many games that could fall under my admittedly overstuffed
guiding phrase “Western big-budget open world games” and be relevant to my argument
about that genre’s revealing qualities, my work on this dissertation encountered a kind of
choice paralysis. With so many examples, it has been difficult to choose which games to
deeply investigate. Horizon Zero Dawn [HZD], however, is an obvious necessity, even if
it was not produced by powerhouses of the genre like Rockstar and Ubisoft. HZD is
particularly emblematic of my dissertation’s findings, and rather blatantly combines
central elements of the previous chapters: neoliberal production and ideology, as well as
settler colonial formulas of Indigenous representation. As such, this chapter relies heavily
on the theoretical frameworks set up previously, and is perhaps somewhat dismissive of
HZD’s particularity compared to the more exhaustive treatments of the previous two
chapters. It is also where this dissertation finally engages its proposed aim of highlighting
how these games demonstrate the intelligibility between settler colonialism’s modern
neoliberal expression with fascism, both historical and emergent. I begin by summarizing
HZD’s gameplay and plot, as well as the role its protagonist plays in this particular
iteration of playing Indian. I then proceed a discussion of the game’s depiction of its
space, based on real-world referent and shorn of the real Indigenous sovereignties that
persist to this day. I argue it is what I call a hypertopia, where white/settler supremacy is
coded into a distracting spectacle of perfection, where the alterity of real Indigenous
history and culture can be erased and replaced by a tribal unreal that can be contained and
surpassed. I then move on to the game’s competing discourses of identity, and its primary
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narrative thrust of genetic destiny, arguing that it is hypertopian settler supremacy,
ultimately akin to the “gene fetishism” of real-world settler searches for “Native
American DNA.” Finally, I rely upon the previous chapters’ theoretical work to
summarize how all the games here studied exemplify the settler colonial imaginary’s
coherence with fascist ideology: they are purveyors of the neoliberal illusion of the
“sovereign consumer,” spectacles understandable through Walter Benjamin’s theories of
art under capitalism and fascism, and their inescapably ludic structure “beyond the line”
of law and morality as in Nazi theorist Carl Schmitt’s nomos reveals the genocidal
genealogy of the settler neoliberal imaginary.
Aloy, the “Brave” that Surpasses All Others
Horizon Zero Dawn’s gameplay is derivative of other successful open world
games and particularly draws from the later developments of the Ubisoft formula. As
such, like many of its contemporaries, it features heavy emphases on vertical and
horizontal hyper-mobility, resource collection (from plants and enemies), and crafting
systems for gaining and upgrading items and weaponry. HZD even includes a version of
the map-revealing tower-climbing challenges (mentioned in the previous chapter) which
the Assassin’s Creed series started and proliferated in the open world genre. This
proliferation was already a point of popular ridicule by the year of HZD’s release,125 and
it is indicative of the “advances” HZD’s gameplay brings to the genre. The towers in
HZD are massive, mobile robotic dinosaurs. The mechanics of puzzling out how best to
reach the top and the rewards for doing so are the same as in the Assassin’s Creed series
(and, for example, the Infamous open world series), but the mobility of the “tower” itself
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adds an extra visual spectacle. In other words, in terms of gameplay, HZD set itself apart
from the glut of other contemporary open world games with cosmetic enhancement.
However, HZD received a glowing critical reception, winning a British Academy of Film
and Television Arts award for “Best Original Property” and an “Outstanding
Achievement in Videogame Writing” award from the Writers Guild of America.
Apparently, these cosmetic enhancements and the game’s narrative trappings were deeply
important to its success in a market already saturated with open world games.
HZD’s setting is that of a post-apocalyptic Earth. It is, however, an almost
utopian, gorgeous vision of nature—and robot dinosaurs—overtaking the ruins of the
previous human society which was destroyed by a robot army. The titular “Zero Dawn”
project was a pre-apocalypse last-ditch effort by a group of scientists, academics, artists,
and corporate and government officials to secure a post-apocalyptic hope of human life.
Zero Dawn was the creation of a new artificial intelligence that would, after the
inevitable 2060 robot annihilation of the human race and Earth’s ecology, eventually “reseed” the planet with flora and fauna via terraformers—the robot dinosaurs—and gestate
humans from automated underground genetic facilities. The setting of the game takes
place some 800 years after this AI-destroyed and AI-regrown Earth has been seeded with
humans. In an interview with NoClip, the lead writer of HZD, John Gonzalez, revealed
that when he came onto production, the game’s concept was already set with “triballooking” peoples with what he called a “pre-industrial level of development” in an
underequipped struggle against robot dinosaurs in a lush but still distinctly postapocalyptic setting. Gonzalez said his first challenge was to explain the tribal ignorance
of the world’s humans, and why they lost “scientific and technological knowledge.” His
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solution was Zero Dawn not going according to plan. Zero Dawn’s world-rebuilding AI,
titled GAIA, has separate subsystems, each with a different function and predictable
name from the Ancient Greek pantheon. Just before the complete extinction of the human
race, one of the project’s corporate billionaires destroys APOLLO, the subsystem
designed to educate humans in their bunker labs, guiding them into adulthood before
settling the new Earth. This loss, along with other system failures, meant that these newly
gestated humans were without the crucial training of APOLLO on the technological and
historical knowledge required for appropriate settlement. They were instead released as
adolescents from their robot-staffed bunkers, and survived long enough for tribes to form.
Within 800 years, these tribes, with all their apparent primitivity, largely forget their own
origins as bunker-living AI-babysat genetically farmed humans. Instead, these examples
of the tribal unreal have stereotypically tribal mythologies about their origins that are
allegorically in distant proximity of truth but blatantly wrong enough for any substantial
self-awareness. Oral history, as this sci-fi variant of settler stereotype goes, is apparently
a frail substitute for technological education. Tribal societal historical knowledge and
cultural transmission is here a sad civilizational impediment compared to robots teaching
humans math, history, and how to make a gun from the parts of robot dinosaurs. The
narratively important matriarchal Nora tribe, for instance, live by the mountain bunker
entrance to one of these genetic facilities, and worship its locked door as the “AllMother,” the deity that birthed them.
Players control Aloy, an exile of the Nora tribe, a white woman outfitted in
HZD’s culturally appropriative mish-mash of tribal-looking clothing. Aloy, who appeared
outside All-Mother as a baby, was exiled by the Nora tribe’s matriarchal council because
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of their fear of the pre-apocalypse technology the All-Mother represents. Players first
control Aloy as a little girl after she accidentally falls into some ruins of the “Ancient
Ones,” the future-past of pre-extinction humanity. The Nora, with their past-future ways,
forbid entrance to these ruins and the use of the technology inside. Aloy the exile is not
bound to these easy stereotypical cues of primitive superstitions, however, and finds a
device called the “Focus.” The Focus provides the game’s user interface. The Focus,
narratively, teaches Aloy bits and pieces of the future-past, but more importantly to both
narrative and gameplay, it provides her the ability to see the world in technological,
survivalist, and extractive terms. The Focus highlights resources that can be collected,
reveals humans, robots, and wildlife through obstacles and points out their weaknesses
for easier kills, and displays routes to player-chosen objectives through the game world.
The Focus is the narrative metonym for the user interface geared to the gameplay’s
progressive empowerment, and makes Aloy the ultimate tech-warrior. When the NoClip
interviewer called the focus Aloy’s “superpower,” akin to the radioactive spider that
made Spider-man out of Peter Parker, Gonzalez enthusiastically agrees. After all, it is
Aloy’s relationship to the technology of the Ancient Ones, represented by the Focus,
which grows her prowess to surpass the Nora tribe.
Aloy returns to the Nora and wins the “proving,” which allows her to become a
“Brave,” a fully-fledged warrior of the tribe. That community and kinship is not her goal,
however: Aloy is more interested in discovering her “true” origins, and eventually her
goal is stopping another apocalypse. Her tech-warriorness allows her to martially and
intellectually surpass every tribal unreal person in the game, and save humanity from a
second extinction. As such, Philip Deloria’s identified “dialectic of simultaneous desire
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and repulsion” for the Indian in the settler psychology of playing Indian (3) is quite
explicit in HZD’s progression. Importantly, HZD’s tribal unreal avatar and narrative also
just as explicitly reveal that dialectic’s characteristic sense of superiority; it is a
superiority born of technological power, the “knowledge” to create and wield it (often
destructively), and relies on the righteousness of that tech-knowledge’s superiority
wielded responsibly. These implications are bluntly communicated in the late-game main
quest “The Heart of the Nora,” which is thick with plot reveals, including Aloy’s
discovery of the exact details of Zero Dawn and thus the origins of her world. After a
climactic battle requiring Aloy’s (and the player’s) by-now extensive technological
armaments, Aloy is said to have done “what no Brave or warchief could do . . . save the
Nora.” The (white) saviour must then enter All-Mother, to the consternation of some of
the Nora’s matriarchal leadership. Teersa, the one elder that unequivocally supports Aloy
and her entrance into the All-Mother (and revealing the secrets of the genetic facility
within), quite literally steps aside. In a luxuriously climactic cutscene, the doors to the
facility open and Aloy looks back to Teersa; a mournful flute accompanies the shot, a
formulaic motif of vanishing Indian media stereotype (used to similar effect, as
mentioned in the first chapter, in RDR2). Aloy turns back to the facility being revealed,
bathing the shot in a hagiographic blue light the game consistently associates with preapocalypse technology. The music shifts to a decidedly more advanced string scoring
reminiscent of European classical. Aloy’s ascension from “Brave” to something closer to
the primary target audience, technologically knowledgeable Western gamers under
neoliberalism, is given the appropriate dramatic flair.
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Tribal Real Erasure in the Hypertopia
HZD’s tech-saviour-surpassing-tribes narrative and gameplay echoes Vine
Deloria Jr.’s description of Western settler culture’s vision of its own teleology, written
in 1994 and referencing the internet era “on the horizon”:
Western civilization, unfortunately, does not link knowledge and morality but
rather, it connects knowledge and power and makes them equivalent. Today with
an information ‘superhighway’ now looming on the horizon, we are told that a
lack of access to information will doom people to a life of meaninglessness and
poverty. As we look around and observe modern industrial society, however,
there is no question that information, in and of itself, is useless, and that as more
data is generated, ethical and moral decisions are taking on a fantasy dimension in
which a ‘lack of evidence to indict’ is the moral equivalent of the good deed. (vii,
“Foreword”)
HZD inhabits just such a fantasy dimension. It proposes Western-settler-centric notions
of knowledge, relationships to the world, and the technology of post-industrial neoliberal
society as the only possible responses to the imagined cataclysmic failures of that same
knowledge, relationships, and technology. HZD’s aesthetics and the narrative tropes of its
tribal unreal are shorthands for the settler stereotype of tribal peoples as little more than a
nascence of civilizational development to be surpassed by a “fit people” armed (literally)
with an apparently incompatible technological knowledge. Unindicted by the tribal real
that HZD’s tribal unreal eclipses, HZD’s narrative “good deed” is the tech-warrior tribal
protagonist surpassing other tribal peoples and preventing another world-ending
cataclysm by learning fresh-start applications of the extractive, neoliberal settler
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relationships typified by the game’s open world mechanics. HZD’s setting alone makes
the absolute absence of the tribal real particularly salient.
HZD re-presents a post-apocalyptic new world, to use a pointed phrase. The game
takes place in and around a re-imagined Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and
Nevada. The locations are made overt with the inclusion of landmarks, surviving ruins of
the former United States. As detailed in the first chapter, HZD’s development was typical
of other big budget open world games in that it heavily relied on out-sourced asset
production, with Michael Tomsen reporting HZD’s developer Guerilla Games utilized 18
different “asset farm” companies. Clearly a great deal of attention was paid to the natural
and urban spaces of the Southwestern United States.126 The attention paid is most clearly
demonstrated by the game’s “Vantage Points,” an optional activity to find audio-logs and
attached images of the world before the apocalypse. These vantages include real world
buildings in Southwestern US urban spaces, and natural landmarks that are a part of the
national US identity today: from Eagle Canyon in the San Rafael Swell to the city of
Colorado Springs, from Monument Valley to the Colorado Pioneer’s Museum, which the
game perhaps guiltily renames as “Explorer’s Museum.” The natural spaces are depicted
in their broadest postcard-style visual motifs, whereas the ruins of settler civilization are
more closely detailed. The NFL stadium in Denver and the Red Rocks Amphitheatre
concert venue, for example, are given heavily detailed pre- and post-apocalyptic
depictions as part of the “Vantage Points.” The game never once mentions, however, that
these lands today have some of the largest and most populous Indigenous nations and

The attention is quite literally “paid,” as detailed in the first chapter, in huge production budgets spent
on in-house and out-sourced asset creation for the heavily detailed open worlds, building “production
value” to achieve the much-desired “immersion.”
126
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federal reservations within United States borders.127 In a Vantage Point, HZD lets players
bask in the splendor of an NFL stadium in both its current form and in its imagined postapocalyptic ruin to provide the setting a believably dramatic coherence and aesthetic
pleasure. Though HZD also peppers its world with tribal unreal paintings and petroglyphs
on cliff faces to complete the experience of playing Indian as Aloy, it must necessarily
efface, then, the tribal real that contextualizes those lands in even greater relief. The
Colorado Plateau, beautifully rendered in the game, does not feature a single glimpse or
mention of, for example, its tens of thousands of years of rock art made by Indigenous
peoples, including the ancestors of the Diné (also known as the Navajo), Ute, and Hopi
peoples that still live on the surrounding lands.128 The Indigenous stone art of the region,
which has a great deal of cultural, historical, and spiritual significance to the tribal real
these lands are still home to, has survived the deep stretches of time HZD’s postapocalypse narrative instead tries to leverage with sights like iconic mountain ranges and
a concert venue opened in 1941.129 To include the real rock art would be to make this
artificial frontier too porous to comfortably inhabit its desired fantasy dimension.
Allowing a tribal real to exist where it wants players to settle as tribal unreal (and
ultimately be superior to that tribal unreal as a tech-warrior representation of settler
modernity) would be to draw itself too closely to the ugly implications of its Turnerian

See, for example, the Navajo Nation’s Department of Information Technology (DIT) official “History”
webpage, which points out that the Navajo Nation itself is larger than 10 of America’s 50 states, and the
population of Diné peoples (not necessarily living in the legally recognized borders of the Navajo Nation)
“surpass 250,000.”
127
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For the connection between ancient and more recent cave art on the Colorado Plateau with the
Indigenous tribes still living in the surrounding lands, see the “Rock Art and Cultures of the Colorado
Plateau” page of the Museum of Western Colorado website for a very brief overview, Malotki and Weaver
for a more in-depth overview (2002), and Kelley Hays-Gilpin (2008) for an overview of the literature
focusing on specifically Navajo and Pueblo/Hopi rock art.
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See the “Red Rocks History” page of the official Red Rocks Amphitheater webpage.
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teleology. The tribal real cannot remain, as the “lack of evidence to indict” the tribal
unreal validates settler norms and provides space for Aloy’s “good deeds” as a heroic,
Indigenized white protagonist who surpasses the other tribal peoples.
Unindicted by the tribal real, this tribal unreal land, even though a vision of the
post-apocalypse, can make itself inviting through visual regimes akin to Miner’s settler
digitality described in the first chapter. Shoshana Magnet coined the term “gamescape” to
analyze how video game landscapes are “actively constructed within an ideological
framework” (142), similar to Atkinson’s ludodrome. HZD’s “New World” that GAIA has
created is an ideologically heavy gamescape with utopian aesthetic visuals. Magnet notes
that some gamescapes are comparable to Foucault’s concept of heterotopia. Similar to but
distinct from utopias, heterotopias are spaces both real and unreal, and in Foucault’s
words, are “a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites . . . that can be
found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted” (24).
Foucault uses the mirror as analogous to heterotopian spaces, because they feature both
“real” and “unreal” or “virtual” space: “it makes this place that I occupy at the moment
when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the space
that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass
through this virtual point which is over there” (24). The mirror is physical object, one that
creates a virtual space that (re-)contextualizes the real space that physical object and its
observer inhabit. Thus heterotopias (in all their “quite varied forms”) are “a sort of
simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the space in which we live” (24). In HZD,
the lands of historical and current tribal real are represented, contested, and inverted to be
a tribal unreal of settler myth. The real physical activity expended to play in the virtual
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space makes HZD a kind of heterotopian experience, one that contests a real space of
Indigenous sovereignty as an anxious-but-empowering frontier space of tribal unreal.
Foucault argues that the role of some heterotopias is to “create a space that is other . . . as
perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill-constructed, and jumbled,” a
heterotopia “of compensation” (27). Compensating for the historical and continued truths
about the actual frontier requires precisely that kind of utopian-adjacency, a heterotopia
meant to contain an idealized other. HZD’s gamescape is of course a highly programmed,
quality assurance-tested playground in the ubiquitous open world gameplay formula, an
utopian tribal unreal, a re-realized artificial frontier to compensate settler sensibilities and
anxieties like the other games previously discussed. As such, the “perfect, meticulous”
heterotopian nature of HZD’s gamescape was made to precise parameters.
Players can marvel at stunning vistas, day-night cycles, and weather patterns in
HZD, but as is always the case with these big budget open world games, the gamespace is
exactingly programmed. Jan-Bart van Beek, the game’s art director, called HZD’s
technical and artistic design of the landscape “hyper-realism.” In an interview given after
the game was showered with accolades, van Beek explained the process this way:
[I]t was not a matter of turning the beauty to 11. It was a matter of removing
anything less than a 9.5 on the epic nature scale. It’s not a ‘reality’ simulation, it’s
all very controlled. If we like a certain amount of fog at a particular time-of-day
because of the nice lighting effect it gave, we simply set it up so that amount of
fog was the ONLY amount of fog ever allowed at that time of day. If we only
liked a certain amount of snowfall, then that would be the only amount of
snowfall ever allowed (qtd. in Hernandez, n.p.).
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This paradisiacal visual framework, a hyper-representation of heterotopian space, recalls
Miner’s concept of settler digitality: a technical settler gaze that prioritizes an inviting
beauty of virtual land by its exclusion of all other elements that fall outside the settler’s
gaze. Here, even that which would not be most beautiful, an invitation for a settler hypergaze, is excised. HZD’s hyper-beauty is the invitation, and the violent, extractive
domination of that beauty is the play of the frontier. Hyper-beauty is here both spectacle
and invitation to express power as an experience of space, a literal exclusion of anything
not precisely chosen as “beautiful”—determined by very narrow aesthetic principle—
meant to inspire further settlement in virtual space. HZD organizes a real space into a
virtual space of monolithic beauty in a way that belies its reliance upon the settler gaze—
and its desire for power over land—rather than the natural world’s visual and organic
spectrum in reality, an ever-dynamic balancing act even in industrialized and ecologically
damaged circumstances.
The balance of the natural world with humans and human activity is an important
part of the Diné concept of hózhǫ́. Hózhǫ́ can be translated at times to “beauty,” but as
Vincent Werito (Diné) explains, it is a “multifaceted” term that can be understood as
harmony in “a positive ideal environment” (26). More importantly, hózhǫ́ is “central to
Navajo life” and Diné teachings like the hózhǫ́ǫ́jí, a ceremony of harmony to balance
“integral to our inherent human quality for making sense of our lives” (27) spatially and
theoretically. HZD’s hyper-beautiful landscape erases anything less-than-inviting for the
settler gaze, and simultaneously erases Diné culture, and its formulation of “beauty” as an
inherently qualified, complex, and dynamic state that emphasizes “balance and harmony”
(34) instead of invitation and human gratification. Balance and harmony are absolutely
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disruptive to the power fantasy that HZD’s open world gameplay constitutes, where the
individual is empowered to extract, craft, and destroy with ever-increasing dominant
capability. Werito writes that though hózhǫ́ “could be interpreted as a state of being or a
state of existence with harmony and peace, it is really about how the idea or concept
influences a person’s manner of living and thinking” (29); as such, it is a conception of
beauty wholly counter to HZD’s beauty as seductive both for and as power of a solitary
player-as-hero. Melanie Yazzie (Diné) argues that the poetry of Sherwin Bitsui (Diné)
demonstrates the poet’s “ceremonial knowledge and the ordinary effects of hózhǫ́ǫ́jí” by
using English to create an apocalyptic but harmonious vision which “narrates the
unfolding processes of perversity that mark common forms of modern power, such as
capitalist greed, state-sanctioned violence, and colonial domination” (86). Bitsui’s poem
“The Scent of Burning Hair” sets that narration “at dawn—the holiest moment of the day
for Diné peoples” (86), and is emblematic of hózhǫ́ǫ́jí practice “because it evokes several
interrelated, visceral images of power that are at once disturbing and elegiac, forceful and
real” (87), emphasizing balances of ecological degradation and ecological survival, of
personal position in natural order and industrialized colonial extraction. Bitsui’s
balancing of what could be conventionally “beautiful” to settlers with visions of
destruction wrought by the settler colonial structure, for Yazzie, signals the “unwelcomed
forms of power” imposed upon Diné land, people, and culture, but describes their
continued and “impending . . . unruliness . . . as real and intractable elements of everyday
Diné life” that must be understood in a new, dynamically constituted harmony. The
individual relationship to “beauty” is one necessarily negotiated with what could be
considered ugliness, and hózhǫ́ǫ́jí is meant to bring an individual’s selfhood and activity
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to a harmonious relationship between individual, community, and land. As Yazzie points
out, “there is no equivalent concept, and therefore no equivalent word, in Diné for
“power” (91); what is clear for the visual regime of HZD and the gaze of settler digitality,
is that harmony is merely an impediment to “beauty,” which in the settler gaze is a
scalable measurement, a ranking to be ascended, a characteristic congruent with power as
expression and desire.
HZD’s hyper-real aesthetic then, is more accurately hyper-heterotopian,
surpassing the real in favour of an inviting hypertopia to be dominated. I use hypertopia
to denote a sense of superiority130 coded into this schema of –topias, a superiority typified
by the power fantasies these open world games represent. Rather than merely containing
otherness as a heterotopia, the hypertopia compensates by refiguring otherness as
playable virtual selfhood, and virtualizing real land as impossibly beautiful inviting land,
created for violent dominance. Harmony is dispensed with for the total embrace of
individual empowerment. HZD’s hypertopia re-envisions domination as liberation,
eclipses actual genocide for an anxiety of fictionalized annihilation, and does away with
it by the narrative and gameplay goal of superiority. The hypertopia’s visual design
marries a natural world of controlled, excessive beauty, to a gameplay and narrative that
are explicitly and implicitly about surpassing its denizens, humans and otherwise. HZD,
like the AC and RDR series, is an artificial frontier, an invitation to master the land to
which its represented Indigeneity necessarily—and for the settler, anxiously—holds title.
The land’s inviting “perfect” beauty goes-hand-in-hand with its total cleansing of actual
Indigeneity. As Vizenor argues in Fugitive Poses, the simulated Indian “is the absence of

I use the hyper- prefix, then, not only for its connection to van Beek’s “hyper-real,” but also for its
denotation of “over” or “above.”
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the native” (145). The titular fugitive poses of the simulated Indian, the tribal unreal, are
“pageantry and portraiture of dominance.” The hypertopia of HZD is just such an inviting
fantasy of dominance. Of course, again much like the AC and RDR series, HZD has
infinitely renewing resources for player extraction and crafting, all in an immense land of
this intensely precise beauty, a land of infinity rather than plenty. Just as late-1800s settler
colonial tourist literature of HZD’s represented lands did, HZD’s inviting artificial
frontier and its hypertopian sense of individualist superiority seems to have inspired
desire in its audience to turn a virtual experience into a real experience.
Matt Miller, writing for the website of the most popular video game magazine
Game Informer,131 suggested that dedicated fans of HZD could embark on a real-world
tour of the landmarks the game represents, sharing a mapped route that takes gamers
through “some of America’s most beautiful and engaging vacation spots” (n.p.). The tour
would see fans driving through the Navajo Nation itself, the Ute Mountain Reservation,
and the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation; Miller does not mention this, and the
notion that the United States of America contains these “spots” as tourist sites is
dependent upon that neglect. These tribal lands are home to diverse peoples, all of which
have deep cultural ties to the land HZD represents and erases them from. Any trace of the
tribal real, the actual Diné, Ute, and Hopi matriarchal cultures of the region, are
completely absent from the game’s world, instead simulated by stereotypical and
simplistic tribes with mish-mashed cultural and aesthetic referents drawn from varied
examples of tribal real and unreal, like the tech-fearing matriarchal Nora that Aloy
transcends.
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Hopi scholar Loma Ishii writes about the “intellectual colonialism” of the late1800s popular tourist literature and its related academic literature, all of which was rather
“imaginatively constructed” (35). The expanding railroad and government tourist services
this literature served to authorize depicted the “mysterious” Hopi lives and cultures as
part and parcel of the wondrous land to be explored. Ishii quotes John Bourke, the first
non-academic to publish a book describing the Hopi: “Their religion, system of
government, apparel, manufactures, no less the romantic positions of their villages,
appeal to the curiosity or sympathy of almost every class of traveler . . . demonstrating
that our South Western Territories contain much that is fully worthy of the attention and
study of people of intelligence” (qtd. in Ishii 36). The language of territorial containment
here is heterotopian: both real in space and unreal in ascribed quality, and here stretched
over the beautiful land and its othered Indigenous people. The language and the tourist
literature it is from is also hypertopian in the sense of superiority over Indigenous peoples
that is part of its touring spectacle. Philip Deloria’s identified “dialectic of simultaneous
desire and repulsion” (3) is echoed by Ishii’s claim that “in all these texts there is a
separation or otherness [of Indigenous peoples] that is both inviting and repulsive” (39).
These very same factors are at work in HZD, and it is of little wonder that gamers who
loved “playing Indian” as Aloy wanted to bring that experience into real spatial
experience, to bring the hypertopian game into a heterotopian half-real of actual settler
tourism. Players are invited to play as tribal, and become heroes through their repulsion:
technological mastery brings them above the apparently primitive cultural signifiers. For
gamers to translate that feeling into touring real land is a predictable consequence. Ishii
says the tourist literature and its connected industries provide “danger, discovery,
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independence, the taming of the wilderness, [and] a superior temporal cognizance of the
region and its people” (39-40) These very attributes could go on the back of HZD’s box:
danger, discovery, and the independence of the player as individualistic survivalist
techno-saviour Aloy. Gamers adopt her “superior temporal cognizance” of the origin of
the virtual world, its people, and most importantly, its technology, and map that sense of
superiority onto the real world. Hypertopia serves to regulate tribal life and Indigeneity as
nothing more than a nascence of human development, an authenticity to be toured on the
way to technological domination and individualist independence.
The hypertopian aspects of HZD (and the tourist literature analyzed by Ishii) are
comparable to the connections of “anti-tourism” van Nuenen makes to ACIII. Just like the
protagonist of ACIII, Aloy combines “spatiotemporal” dominance through the open
world power-gaining gameplay, and “a notion of authenticity and belonging” (34)
through her tribal aesthetics. Also like ACIII, HZD’s anti-tourist structure uses that
“authenticity” to provide a sense of superiority over the denizens of the toured area in
hypertopian fashion. Indeed, van Nuenen even points out that the anti-tourist structure of
Ubisoft open world mechanics, together with the authenticating Indigeneity of its player
avatar, allows the player “to enact neo-colonial and anti-touristic attitudes yet remain the
underdog all the same” (35). To be an underdog elides the moral problematics invoked by
the gameplay’s spatiotemporal mastery and the attendant narrative of dominance. HZD’s
inverted replication of that underdog Indigeneity is in Aloy’s exile from the Nora. Indeed,
during the NoClip interview, Gonzalez tellingly reveals that his decision to write Aloy as
an exile was made to elicit players’ “empathy for the underdog” to connect with her.
With an already-given white Indigeneity via aesthetic and setting, Aloy’s authenticity is
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never in question in the lands of the tribal unreal, unindicted by the tribal real. Thus her
exile sets up Aloy’s progression as an underdog within the tribal unreal, a relatable,
sympathetic protagonist who will transcend the backwards tribal ways she was exiled
from, and gain the power of technological knowledge (including the true scientific
history of the world the primitives do not know). Surrounded by tribal people, Aloy
retains her Indigeneity as an innocent victim of their ways and bearer of their
authenticity, but assimilating instead into a tech-cowboy rugged individualist, alone,
riding a robot horse to kill and extract her way to victory. HZD’s Indigeneity is mirror to
RDR’s inversion, where the neoliberal cowboy adopts Indigeneity. Aloy gets to be the
Indian that becomes something more, at once an underdog and an epic hero above all
else, a hypertopian figure of both technological supremacy and Indigeneity.
HZD’s hypertopia retains elements of Foucault’s heterotopia as a venue for
“compensation” (27), here a compensation for the anxieties of settler colonial guilt and
innocence discussed in the previous chapters. As it summons an artificial Indigeneity as
constitutive of its gamescape, it is unsurprising HZD focuses on extermination as both
origin of its setting and as central narrative threat for Aloy to quell. As Byrd has been
cited earlier arguing, the settler colonial cultural anxieties produced by founding
extermination continue “to haunt cosmopolitan colonialism” and “serve as the deferred
melancholia of a lingering sense of retribution” (Transit of Empire 229). As Tuck and
Yang have argued, much settler fiction that deals with Indigeneity “spins a fantasy that an
individual settler can become innocent, indeed heroic and indigenized, against a backdrop
of national guilt” (14), a guilt that HZD can dispense with for its white Indian underdog.
HZD is in the same tradition as these narratives, a story that “absolves [settlers] from the
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inheritance of settler crimes and that bequeaths a new inheritance of Native-ness and
claims to land (which is a reaffirmation of what the settler project has been all along)”
(14). Both Aloy’s dominance of the hypertopian gamescape and gamer-tourists heading
into real tribal lands as American sites the gamescape represents are expressions of
exactly the way these narratives function as absolving curative for settler anxieties. HZD
provides another digital frontier for a settler identity to indigenize itself and validate the
continuing “structure” (à la Wolfe) of settler colonialism and its elimination of real
Indigenous peoples and sovereignties.
Cacophony, and the Indigenizing Settlers of Gene Fetishism
The tidy erasure of the tribal real in HZD seems to have made popular media
coverage of the game quite comfortable embracing what Indigenous writer and artist Dia
Lacina pointed to as HZD’s questionable terminology. Lacina’s article, “What We Talk
About, When We Don’t Talk About Natives,” argues coverage of the game blithely and
confidently uses terms the game also features heavily: “Tribal. Primitive. Braves.
Savage” (n.p.). As Lacina says of the high-scoring reviews,
[I]n all those thousands of words, those dozens of instances of that particular list,
no one calls them into question. Not a single review makes mention of the
historical usage of those words, or the tropes reflected in Horizon that caused the
writers to use them without hesitancy . . . the uncritical use of words like
‘primitive’ and ‘savage’ to describe appropriated cultural signifiers on large
media platforms serves to reinforce racist and colonialist ideas about [I]ndigenous
people. (n.p.)
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Lacina makes a comparison of the game to the stereotypical representation of Indigenous
peoples in Western popular culture, at one point joking “Nothing says “Indian Princess”
like a white girl in fringed leather, earth tones, turquoise, and wielding a bow.” Lacina’s
words are a perfect description of Aloy’s iconic look and the results of any Google image
search for “Aloy cosplay,” with fans from around the world playing Indian in Aloy’s
appropriated aesthetic. The reaction to Lacina’s brief, comedic targeting of popular game
critics was predictably hostile, considering the pop cultural terrain of representational
matters, and in the often reactionary games industry and community.132 Even Gonzalez
responded to Lacina’s article when interviewed in a Waypoint article. Gonzalez argued
that the team wanted to “make sure we were sensitive to the cultural concerns of our
audience” (qtd. in Diver). Who, precisely, makes up that audience is left unclear, but
what is clear is how quickly white reviewers indulged and praised the game’s tribal
unreal positioning.
As mentioned, HZD heavily uses “Brave” as a collective capitalized noun for the
Nora tribe warriors, and many characters refer to Aloy simply as “Brave” in general
through the entire game. Gonzalez said of that word particularly,
our research into it was that it was not a term that would seem to be offensive . . .
It was a term that [we felt] was not derogatory, as we came across some terms that
were definitely slurs against Native Americans and other groups throughout
history. And so, our decision was based on ‘brave’ not being a ‘hot button’ term .
. . with the kind of culture of the internet that we have right now, it’s impossible
to predict what it is that may offend. (qtd. in Diver)
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It is instead rather predictable that Gonzalez would cite both “hot button” issues and
“internet culture” to plead innocence, and either intentionally exclude or be ignorant of a
long history of contestation by Indigenous groups in multiple spheres of popular culture.
The American baseball team the Atlanta Braves have had public protests over the name
and associated merchandise by Indigenous groups since at least 1991 (Jamieson), and
continued to draw criticism from these groups for nearly twenty years (Edwards). Equally
noteworthy is Gonzalez’s claim that Brave and other terms were used in lieu of “terms
that were definitely slurs against Native Americans,” implicitly accepting that the design
appropriated the primary cultural signifiers of its tribal unreal from the lands which it
digitized, fictionalized, and erased of the tribal real. That slurs were at one point in
development considered fair game and later dispensed with highlights that the game’s
invitation to access Indigeneity and the frontier it exists on is a simultaneously derogatory
and celebratory impulse. It is, like the many American team names that also appropriate
Indigenous signifiers and slurs, a celebratory derogation. Again, to play Indian entails a
conception of the Indian as “inviting” and “repulsive.” The cannibalization of an ersatz
Indigeneity is to play the role but not inhabit the reality, to be enticed by authenticity and
connection to the land, but to be repulsed by the ascribed intellectual inferiority and
civilizational impediment. Playing Indian on the artificial frontier is inviting for the
feeling of being a sympathetic underdog while achieving supremacy, and the concomitant
feeling of “authentic” identity suggesting the land is for you. The repulsion of the Indian
figure, in the open world game, is in that genre’s inherent progression of mastery away
from savagery as underpowered ignorance; the boxes are checked, the knowledge and
power gained.
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Perhaps one reason reviewers felt so comfortable using this loaded, racialized
language is that the depiction of these simulated tribes is noticeably post-racial133:
characters are defined by their place in simplistic tribal cultures rather than the diverse
colours of their skin. Reviewers at the time of release, and game critics well after release,
note this cosmetic diversity. This kind of post-racialism, as previously discussed, is a way
for historical and continuing racialization to be eclipsed by a sensibility of the “imperial
global rainbow” (Hardt and Negri, xiii). Byrd’s analysis of the “transit” of “Indianness”
also highlights that “liberal multiculturalism” is still an attempt to claim the authenticity
of Indigenous originary warrant to the land. Byrd writes,
As liberal multicultural settler colonialism attempts to flex the exceptions and
exclusions that first constituted the United States to now provisionally include
those people othered and abjected from the nation-state’s origins, it instead
creates a cacophony of moral claims that help to deflect progressive and
transformative activism from dismantling the ongoing conditions of colonialism .
. . One reason why a “postracial” and just democratic society is a lost cause in the
United States is that it is always already conceived through the prior disavowed
and misremembered colonization of indigenous lands that cannot be ended by
further inclusion or more participation (xvii-xxvi).
Thus settler colonial structure, now styled as multi-cultural and multi-racial, creates
“competing cacophonies of race, colonialism, and imperialism that enjamb settlers,
arrivants,134 and natives into a competition for hegemonic signification” through “U.S.
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Byrd’s term for the various groups not so easily put into a possible Indigenous or settler binary
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national geographies” (12). Cacophony opens space for a kind of “settler Indigeneity,” as
far back at least to the Boston Tea Party that (as the second chapter argues) ACIII
revisions as a mutual confluence of settler-Indigenous identity. HZD’s post-racialism,
defined by its uniformly conventionally attractive, racially diverse characters and postracial cultural mish-mash simulated tribal world, is just such a cacophonous cultural
production that makes these kinds of identities legible. Indigeneity can be shorn of its
historical referents and cleansed of the legislated racialization that would problematize its
adoption by white people. As Gonzalez said in his response to Lacina, the team drew
from tribal peoples around the world to design their tribal unreal; the Nora tribe wears
clothes obviously reminiscent of the Indigenous cultures in North America, but their
architecture is Norse, their symbology at times Celtic. HZD is overfilled with cultural
signifiers for its tribal unreal, resulting in a cacophony that “is always a deferment or
erasure of ‘originary’ experience, [and] only serves to cast off the ‘native’ yet again”
(65). HZD’s post-racial depiction, in the game’s plot, is the result of the Zero Dawn
project’s multicultural team and multiracial genetic databanks the tribes were produced
from. That explanation is not, however, the plot’s premier concern with genetics.
The game’s most dramatic plot reveal is that Aloy is the genetic clone of white
pre-extinction scientist Elisabeth Sobeck, the genius that predicted humanity’s
annihilation, and was the lead project designer of Project Zero Dawn. Thus, as Gonzalez
says in the NoClip interview where he agreed the “Focus” is Aloy’s superpower, he
amends to say that “her real superpower” is that she has “the same genetic signature as
Elizabeth Sobeck.” Not only does this genetic signature provide Aloy access to the
bunker that teaches her the origin of her world, it presumably explains why she is so
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intelligent and able to quickly gain the technological prowess that will save that world.
Indeed, the game’s cutscene finale features a series of long shots that would only look out
of place in a spaghetti Western because the horse Aloy rides is robotic. These distant
perspectives in a hazy desert environ eventually reveal Aloy is visiting her mother-self
corpse at “Sobeck Ranch.” The ending is yet another use of the cowboy-Indian-ranching
individualist hero as the centerpiece to open world narrative pathos, easily comparable to
RDR and ACIII. In HZD’s hypertopia, above the cacophony of competing, simplified,
jumbled, post-racial tribal identities, tones a resonant note of techno-white supremacy, of
settler victory, a reclamation of ranching on the New World frontier. The forthcoming
HZD sequel will presumably pull this thread even further: it is subtitled Forbidden West.
That Aloy is genetically destined for supremacy and still, as in ACIII, a
protagonist encoded with Indigeneity-as-freedom, is similar to the AC series’ increasing
focus not just on their “genetic memory” plots, but also on the literal genetic godhood of
the series’ heroes. The “First Civilization” of AC mythos have, in later entries like
Odyssey and Valhalla, gone from cryptic distant gods to literal genetic ancestors and
clones of the superhuman protagonists of the series, likely in part to explain these
protagonists’ abilities becoming more extreme than previous entries. Indeed, the focus on
superpowered genetics is connected to both the more recent entries of the AC series and
HZD as newer variants of the Ubisoft formula: all tasks are rewarded with “experience
points,” which eventually provide skill points to progressively strengthen and expand the
avatar’s capabilities. The player is ever-increasing their power, and thus progressively
more able to lay waste to growing numbers of humans and other foes. Gonzalez may be
less literal when he calls Aloy’s identical genetics to Sobeck her “superpower,” but it is
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precisely what connects Aloy to the “Ancient Ones” her fellow tribal people fear and do
not understand, and precisely why she excels at using martial technology where all others
have failed. The fictional narratives of cacophonous identity, strongly founded on a
fictional “originary” genetic supremacy, have comparable phenomena in the real world.
As Kim Tallbear (Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate), J. Kēhaulani Kauanui (Kanaka
Maoli)135, Circe Sturm, and Angela Saini have variously argued, white settlers genetically
identifying with forms of Indigeneity is a re-inscription of the colonial race science that
validated settler elimination of Indigenous peoples. Whereas race science was once
mobilized to prove the inferiority of Indigenous peoples (and thus invalidate their claim
to land), it now acts as both exclusionary “definitional authority” (Alfred and Corntassel,
600) to define Indigenous peoples out of existence by limiting legal recognition and
sovereignty, and acts as an inclusionary metric by which white settlers can access the
perceived legal, economic, or “spiritual” benefits of an assumed Indigeneity. Tallbear’s
book Native American DNA studies multiple companies that have “prominently targeted
the Native American-ancestry market” (69), and highlights how their scientific
practices—and the cultural interpretations of the results of those practices—are deeply
flawed and contradictory136. Tallbear notes that for Indigenous communities, “it has been
common to joke about the ‘Cherokee’ or ‘Indian Princess’ phenomenon, in which stories
of a long-ago Native American ancestor—confirmed or not—lead individuals to

Kauanui’s book Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity is
particularly relevant here.
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To put it as simply as possible, genetic “markers are not ‘unique to specific populations.’ Rather,
ancestry markers of interest are found at higher frequencies in some populations and at lower frequencies in
others . . . [The] claim that markers are unique to populations oversimplifies the relationship between
genetics and human sociality” (82). As Tallbear repeatedly highlights, these genetic ancestry testing
practices often cannot tell the difference between “Native American ancestry” and “Asian ancestry” (134).
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(re)script their identities as Native American, most often Cherokee” (135). Lacina poked
fun at Aloy as a character that draws from the “Indian princess” settler stereotype, and
indeed the character appears to combine tribal authenticity with the status of a sovereign:
Gonzalez says “the riddle of her birth and her origins are essentially the riddle of how this
entire world came to be” (NoClip). As Vine Deloria Jr. argues, the settler claims of
lineage to an Indian princess is “royalty for the taking” (Custer Died 4), but here that
royalty is actually the result not of her artificial Indigeneity, but her white genius
genetics. The inversion is, much like the different applications of race science and the
emerging obsession with genetic Indigeneity among settlers, coherent with “playing
Indian” and living as settler.
Sturm’s Becoming Indian highlights “race-shifting” whites adopting Indigeneity
as a retreat from guilt over foundational genocides of settler identity, and fulfilling a
desire for authentic, spiritual connections to the land on which they live. Tallbear also
notes some adoptions of “Native American” identity are motivated by what one DNA
ancestry company’s marketing called “the new economic opportunities afforded Native
Americans” (85), and there is anecdotal evidence some claim this genetic heritage for “an
affirmative-action leg up in competitive admissions processes” at Ivy League schools
(68). White settlers armed with specious scientific “knowledge” diluting opportunities
meant for Indigenous people is itself one of the many uses of this “knowledge” that
“mirror the kinds of claims that whites have made to other forms of Native American
patrimony—whether land, resources, remains, or cultural artifacts” (136). As Tallbear
sums it up, “in addition to the law, the biological technosciences are becoming
increasingly important in the exercise of property claims that sustain our racial
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formations” (136). However, these claims are not the full force of what Donna Haraway
calls (and Tallbear cites) “gene fetishism.” As mentioned in the dissertation introduction,
Indigeneity is less about racialized genetic markers, and much more about relationality,
forms of kinship and sovereignty (such as the Oglala communalism of tiospaye described
in the first chapter) that are as dynamic and culturally determined as whiteness and
neoliberal post-racialism. Unlike whiteness and neoliberal post-racialism, however,
Indigeneity is more akin to Coulthard’s aforementioned “grounded normativity”: the
dynamic “modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and longstanding
experiential knowledge” are more important expressions of this identity category as it
exists in the world. Proclaiming genetic markers as indicative of Indigeneity can be
thought of as an expression of “gene fetishism,” which Haraway claims “is about
mistaking heterogeneous relationality for a fixed, seemingly objective thing” (142). That
such an objective thing can be utilized in different but connected ways is demonstrated by
Tallbear’s study of a community of genetic ancestry company consumers in the early-mid
2000s, “comprised largely [of] self-identified whites” (128).
Tallbear’s study of those whites doing “native American-ancestor searching”
(132) highlights that many whose ancestry results showed “recent Native American
ancestry” would “still identify as white” (133). These consumers, “with white racial
identities intact . . . had little trouble reconciling the possibility of Native American
ancestry with their whiteness” (134). Tallbear argues that while she was surprised not to
find more “race shifting” as in Sturm’s study, it is still a gene fetishism similar to raceshifting: both styles of identity formations rest on the pre-existing “social power”
afforded by their whiteness (139). What Sturm’s race-shifters and Tallbear’s “Native
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American DNA” whites “share is a ‘language of choice that they use to describe their
racial becoming—without realizing that choice itself is a subtle marker of whiteness’”
(Tallbear 139). Having the choice of how to racially identify is a privilege only of
whiteness in the neoliberal settler context. Importantly for the gene fetishists, writes
Tallbear, by locating Indigeneity in genetics, they “seek the benefits of the modern,
neoliberal age. They actively build their subjectivities and visibly derive fulfillment as
rational and rigorous thinkers within a broader genealogical and scientific community”
(135). The connection between “rational thinkers,” knowledgeable about personal
scientific genetic “truth,” to both race-shifting and “intact whiteness” is critical to my
reading of Aloy’s white Indigeneity. Important for her white technological genius
genetics and her tribal unreality, Aloy—and the increasing obsession with genetics in the
AC series—represents that neoliberal technologically endowed knowledge of settlers
central to modern settler identity. This post-racial neoliberal construction, “a new form of
whiteness—constituted through the enactment of a scientific subjectivity” (141)—
nevertheless keeps white settlers as the “pinnacle” in the “history of all humankind,” and
simultaneously makes room for the race-shifters who are living embodiments of the same
notion Aloy fictionally represents: Indigeneity was “actually white(r) all along” (140).
That Aloy and HZD’s plot are made whole through her scientific knowledge of her
genetic ancestry merges her artificial Indigeneity with her whiteness, and makes her as
narratively powerful as the player has made her through gameplay. The cacophonous
signifiers of identity and culture are thus subordinated to the neoliberal human of
technological/scientific knowledge. Knowledge is power in the Western settler teleology,
and that power can access, adopt, and dispense with Indigeneity at will.
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Neoliberal Sovereign Consumers of Spectacle, and the Fascist Nomos
of the Magic Circle
As I will now argue these open world games demonstrate settler cultural
production’s comfort with fascist ideology, I would be remiss not to point out that gene
fetishism (in both game narrative and real world “Native American DNA”-seeking) is
coherent with Nazi ideology rather than distinct from it. As Angela Saini notes, Nazi
archaeology was motivated by a desire to find Germanic/Nordic ethnic history
everywhere, including among the Ancient Greeks (139), whose mythology HZD
nominally uses as the technology interrupted in its task to bring modern humans into the
New World instead of backwards primitives. A recent entry of the AC series, Odyssey,
takes place in a carefully de-racialized Ancient Greece, and even suggests the Ancient
Greek pantheon is a direct representation of the “First Civilization” godhood origin story
of humankind—yet again making the history of the world “white(r) all along” (Tallbear
140). Saini quotes Bettina Arnold, who argues the Nazis were committed to “‘proving
that there was some kind of [. . .] genetic racial [. . .] commonality’ in service of
expanding the boundaries of the traditional homeland using race as a rationale” (137).
Even the specific contradiction of Indianness as simultaneously “inviting” and
“repulsive” was intact in the Nazi German context. Hitler and other Nazis were fans of
the cowboy-and-Indian novels of Karl May137; Hitler specifically liked May’s invented
and stereotypical Indian chief character Winnetou for his “tactical skills and cunning,”
which Hitler believed his generals should study (Ryback 180). The embrace of the tribal
unreal is not a contradiction of, but rather coherent with his admiration for the American
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genocide of Indigenous peoples, and with the Nazi genocidal structure’s partial
inspiration by the settler colonial structure’s eliminative Manifest Destiny.138 Just as the
Nazis would seek archaeological precedent for Germanic/Nordic heritage existing around
the globe and validating Nazi dominance, modern day neoliberal cacophony and gene
fetishism—and its historical and current frontierism—subsumes Indigeneity for
continued dominance as well. As Byrd writes,
It is nothing new within American Indian studies now to point to the ways in
which the US colonial culture continually underwrites its mastery by subsuming
and assuming Indigenous markers to define itself. As the United States progresses
toward an imperial “new era of peace,” the story it seeks to create about itself is
an appropriative version—a playing Indian narratology . . . with that first- person
obsession that inserts its own interests to maintain the illusion that new and
improved American tribal interests have superseded if not entirely replaced
Indigenous peoples. (“Tribal 2.0” 59)
HZD is precisely this form of playing Indian narratology, one that replaces Indigenous
histories with technological—and white-accessible—mythology, and does so in such a
way that displays the congruence of Nazi and neoliberal worldviews and their coherent
contradictions.
In the first chapter, I cited the Indian figure as part of Lloyd and Wolfe’s
characterization of neoliberal culture existing in a “deadly if preposterous situation”
where “the most highly armed states in the world assure their populations that they (or

James Whitman’s Hitler’s American Model makes this connection to Manifest Destiny clear, defends
against claims to the contrary, supplies a list of scholarship that validates this historical consensus (167),
and at points highlights the references to settler genocide in the Americas in Mein Kampf.
138
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their interests) are under a permanent state of siege” (110). The Nazi state inhabited a
similar situation with its racial ideology, where “Nordic peoples were represented as
simultaneously the most superior and the most vulnerable of the world's races” (Arnold
9). The perpetual state of siege, as I argued at the end of that chapter, is a hallmark of
neoliberal settler ideology and, consequently, western big budget open world games.
HZD’s threatened narrative apocalypse (both past and future) fits into this sieged formula
of cultural production, born of and catering to settler anxiety. If the hypertopia is a utopia
of cultural compensation for a fear of genocidal retribution, it makes sense that these
open world narratives and gameplay structures would veer towards playing Indian rather
than simple elimination of the Indian alone, or even avoidance. As Grace L. Dillon
(Anishinaabe) says, “the Native Apocalypse, if contemplated seriously, has already taken
place” (8), and though the frontier’s invitation is for extraction and dominance, the
invitation of Indianness is at least partially for inhabiting the underdog who can triumph
over threatened extermination. In all games studied heretofore, playing Indian must still
nevertheless find its full, ethical fruition in settler neoliberal developments, be it
homesteading or genetic tech-knowledge destiny. Indigeneity and signifiers of alternative
forms of sovereignty not subsumable under the logic of Empire are simply cast as
civilizational nascence, and/or a tragically vanishing impossibility.
Fascism, as Aimé Césaire and others have famously argued, sees the logics of
colonialism turned inward. Western subjects’ horror about Nazi barbarism is the product
of, Césaire argued, not just that barbarism’s infliction upon those very same subjects, but
also from their complicity in that barbarism in the Western colonial context: “that before
they were its victims, they were its accomplices” at home and abroad (14). Similarly,
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neoliberalism’s collapsing prosperity in the settler states, which outsourced and exported
the system’s most pernicious violence and exploitation, results in state violence and
exploitation intensifying in those same states. This collapse has only accelerated the
fascist tendencies of neoliberalism, both in the success of political fascism in Western
states and in the cultural reinvestment into the kinds of exculpatory narratives delineated
by Tuck and Yang, Byrd, and others. The Western big-budget open world genre, being a
thoroughly neoliberal productive context, is a premier example of just such a cultural
reinvestment. Turner’s frontier, as a founding mythology of settler culture, gains renewed
traction in artificial frontiers of the multi-billion dollar video game industry, itself
dependent upon the neoliberal frontier of globalized supply chains and exploited surplus
populations of labour. Salves for the anxieties and guilt of settlers, propaganda for settler
technological relationships with the world, and eminently neoliberal in production and
content, it is of little surprise that these games are remarkably uniform in their treatments
of Indigeneity even in all their nuanced particularities, and the marketed allures of the
non-physical space on which gamers are meant to settle.
The modern connection of neoliberalism to fascism has been demonstrated in
multiple disciplines; William E. Connolly points to the fertile ground neoliberal
privatization policy has tilled for modern fascist politics to flourish in Western states, a
view buttressed by studies like Germà Bel’s, which show privatization’s origins in Nazi
economic policy, important for strengthening capitalist industrialism and thus securing a
top-down powerbase of elites against labour. The first chapter argued neoliberalism’s
faltering promises of prosperity display the colonial logics (and material processes)
embedded within the ideology; it also highlighted Sassen’s critique of the ways the
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burgeoning surplus populations in neoliberalism has led to its most common current
expressions existing not in spatial liberty, but containment (“Expelled” 198). The second
chapter emphasized Bargh’s argument that the neoliberal equivocation of “free” with
“voluntary” creates a political, economic, and moral landscape that subsumes all into the
hegemony of “the market,” which only “responds to money” rather than labour and life
(9). Together, these theories and the study of fascist-neoliberal privatization suggest that
the liberty available to subjects of Empire primarily frames individual subjectivity and
autonomy strictly as consumption in a marketplace. The scholarly work on early
neoliberal ideology, contemporary with the fascism of Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco,
argues that ideology retains a structural belief in the “sovereign consumer,” and it
remains a crucial part of neoliberal ideology today.
Niklas Olsen points out that “[v]irtually all proponents of neoliberal ideology,
from Ludwig von Mises to Milton Friedman, have portrayed free consumer choice as the
defining feature of a desirable market economy, and the sovereign consumer as an agent
who is capable of dictating economic production and driving political activity” (n.p.).
The “sovereign consumer,” Quinn Slobodian explains, was coined by William H. Hutt
and quickly adopted by still-influential neoliberal Friedrich Hayek in the 1930s, a
rhetorical flourish meant to describe the individualist belief that under market capitalism,
“it was not the nation-state represented by legislatures that was sovereign but the
individual within it” (118). This sovereignty, atomized into individual consumption, of
course, is a false freedom in fascism as much as modern neoliberalism:
As national self-determination was becoming the buzzword worldwide, [Hayek]
reasserted the notion of individual consumer self-determination. The apparent
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dissolution of the state to the granular level of the sovereign consumer, however,
was always an illusion. For Hayek, individual consumer sovereignty was only
made possible by the superstructure of the federation. Attacking economic and
monetary nationalism did not devolve power down to the individual. Instead it
split sovereignty—down to the consumer and up to the superstate (118).
The superstate concept in neoliberal thought, most prominently used by von Mises, in
effect presages the degradation of national sovereignty in favour of the global frontier of
global capital. In other words, the superstate is the achievement of globalized Empire,
developed into its current globalized neoliberal form as identified by Hardt and Negri. As
Slobodian argues, the neoliberal doctrine of the superstate places national government
sovereignties into “its proper limited—but intensive—role in safeguarding trade,
investment, and migration” (108). The mobility of the individual, though loftily framed
by neoliberal ideology, is important only insofar as it is labour and consumption in that
matrix of trade, investment, and migration.
The second chapter argued that the particularly neoliberal illusion of freedom is
microcosmically demonstrated by the vaunted “freedom” of open world games: a set of
voluntary choices which promotes the feeling of autonomy (of being free to do as one
chooses), but one that actually takes place under highly programmed circumstances. The
illusion of political power for the sovereign consumer in their actual political
circumstances is the real-world mirror of the ultimately pre-determined autonomy of big
budget open world games. Furthermore, the illusory consumer sovereignty of the average
gamer in their material political context is indicative of the limits of political expression
within the production and content of the games themselves. Walter Benjamin famously
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argued fascism relies on the aestheticization of political life to compensate for the lack of
political autonomy in society at large, “giving [the] masses not their right, but instead a
chance to express themselves. The masses have a right to change property relations;
Fascism seeks to give them an expression while preserving property” (Mechanical
Reproduction 29). These games, and the popular reviews that praise the ubiquitous (or at
least desired) feeling of immersive “freedom,” are exactly the kind of “illusion-promoting
spectacles” (19) he saw as typifying the relationship of Nazi cultural production and the
capitalist Hollywood film industry alike with the masses captured by both.
Though Benjamin was primarily describing the early developments of cinema, his
analysis is only more relevant to video games broadly, and big-budget open world games
specifically are even more demonstrative of Benjamin’s arguments about the
technological and affective nature of Hollywood and fascist spectacle. For Benjamin, this
form of spectacle was the “height of artifice” (20) because the process of editing and
style of filmmaking under capitalism and fascism tends to use artifice—the technological
equipment required to film and reproduce the fiction—to make media that appears as a
kind of alternate, simultaneous reality. By hiding the apparatuses (the “mechanical
equipment”) of film technology from the audience’s vision and consciousness (among
other techniques), cinema “has penetrated so deeply into reality” that its “illusionary
nature” is wholly constitutive of its experience, rather than partially so as with stage
theater (20). The design of these open world games is even more heavily concerned with
a “viewpoint” that hides its machinery from players (compared to the “spectators” of
cinema), and of course targets the same affective experience of immersive alternate
reality. Cinema’s great power as a medium of spectacle—and how that spectacle is both
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informed by and informs the audience’s relationship to their material reality—is a result
of that technological penetration of reality. If, as Benjamin argues, cinema’s techniques
reproduce physical reality in new technological and mass-consumable form, then the
open world game’s commitment to completely virtualizing a new reality achieves similar
spectacular result. Benjamin points out things like cinematic slow motion provide
audiences the opportunity to make that which they unconsciously experience (every small
iteration of experienced motion in normal space-time) into something technology
refigures, represents, and reproduces as a different kind of spatial experience. Open world
games, on the other hand, do not even need a physical space to be virtualized, and instead
are spatial experiences of artifice from top to bottom.
If cinema provides spectacle where “an unconsciously penetrated space is
substituted for a space consciously explored by man” (24), these video games are a
higher order of intensity. The autonomy and “freedom” experienced by players of open
world games is the heterotopian half-real, the spectacles that recreate the experience of a
spatial reality for play. The technological (and labour) constraints of western big budget
open world game production described in the previous two chapters—where staggering
budgets for exploitative corporate supply chains produce increasingly large and formulaic
worlds for desired return in mass consumption—is remarkably similar to how Benjamin
characterized the early film industry’s technological advances and business modelling to
achieve the desired spectacle. In other words, the massive neoliberal infrastructure
required for the technology of these games essentially necessitates its form and content,
just as the “technological reproducibility of films is based directly on the technology of
their production. This not only makes possible the mass dissemination” of these games
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and films, “but actually compels it” within the economic context in which they are
developed (“Technological Reproducibility” 17). Benjamin argues the “simultaneity of
the two phenomena” of rising fascism and the business demands of technological
cinematic spectacle “results from the economic crisis” that repeats in capitalism (17); I
argue the proliferation of open world games arriving and accelerating at the same time
explicit fascism again gains traction in capitalist democracies is an identical twinned
development. The “same disorders” of exploitation which led to “an attempt to maintain
existing property relations by brute force—that is, in fascist form—induced film” and
video game “capital, under threat of crisis, to speed up the development” of the
technology to create the appropriate spectacle (17). For film, Benjamin argues this
particular development for film was the introduction of sound; for video games, it was
the rendering techniques and globalized asset production described in the first chapter.
For video games, just as for film as argued by Benjamin, these developments
“brought temporary relief” from the crisis of faltering prosperity and increasingly
financialized economics, for “the masses” entranced by spectacle, and for “monopoly
capital” broadly among the interrelated corporate interests that maintain globalized
supply chains (17). The repeating crises of privatization and property under capitalism
necessitate cultural production that maintains those relations economically and culturally
in the particular forms and content of the spectacle to be consumed.
For Benjamin, the reason technological spectacle is so useful to capitalist and
fascist cultural maintenance is precisely because of the aforementioned ability to summon
new, controlled, artificial spatial experience for the masses. Open world games create a
wholly virtual space where film virtualizes real space with the camera’s intervention and
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editing. Benjamin’s analysis of playing as human activity—and its relation to his analysis
of film’s spectacle—completes my extension of his argument to these games. Benjamin
argued that play [Spiel] is often connected to an impulse for repetition. The previous
chapter highlighted how open world games, increasingly dominated by the Ubisoft
formula, are vast virtual spaces where actions are repeated over and over again in
different locales, precisely catering to this impulse. This impulse (and its gratification in
play) is not necessarily negative, of course. As Miriam Bratu Hansen puts it, “Benjamin
attributes to repetition in play an at once therapeutic and pedagogic function: ‘the
transformation of a shattering experience into habit’” (5); repetition in play alters
experiences (from the traumatic to the dull) to be reformed and re-integrated as
procedural, livable, or even fun. Hansen argues that for Benjamin, “repetition in play [is]
a quasi-utopian quest for happiness and . . . a liberating and apotropaic function” (5). The
issue with play is how its affects of liberation and apotropaism are, under capitalist and
fascist cultural production, used to maintain their shared economic structure. The
heterotopian (and hypertopian) half-real virtual frontiers of open world games, replete
with active repetition and inviting beauty, are as such even more effectively positioned
than film to provide a sense of liberation, warding off the anxiety produced by capitalist
and fascist structure.
Throughout this dissertation I have argued these games salve settler neoliberal
anxieties and validate the settler colonial structure’s continuing inequities; Benjamin’s
analysis of spectacle and play in capitalism and fascism substantiate the same function.
The technological nature of cinema—of greater intensity for video games—is part of its
appeal as salve for the masses, because the narratives and forms produced by it re-asserts
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humanity with that technology. Workers in settler states, even more so than in
Benjamin’s time, “have to relinquish their humanity in the face of the apparatus,”
technological implements and means of production that increase the worker’s production,
but does not increase their share in consequential profit (23). Thus gaming, just as
cinema, allows the “masses . . . to experience” a “revenge . . . by asserting [their]
humanity (or what appears to them as such) against the apparatus by placing that
apparatus in the service of his triumph” (23). “The apparatus,” then, can be understood as
both the specific technologies used to produce and play these works, as well as the
structure of capital that defines their use societally. This is why Benjamin argues the
“social function” of film, and I argue for these games, is “to establish equilibrium
between human beings and the apparatus” (30); these open world games use spectacle
and repetition to turn the alienating “shattering experience” of life under capitalism and
fascism into experience of habit, normalizing both the structure and its technological
means. The power fantasies of these artificial frontiers and their constant empowerment
and victory is an echo of this social function. The player’s active participation creates an
even more powerful sense of victory, the illusion of empowerment in a disempowering
societal context outside the magic circle. Benjamin, just as argued in the previous
chapters, suggests capitalist and fascist societies are defined materially by containment,
but their cultural production is defined by the illusion of freedom; spectacle of cinema
and games maintains containment because it “assures us [the masses] of a vast”
Spielraum, a room-for-play139, “so that now we can set off calmly on journeys of
adventure” (30) which favourably reshapes the masses’ experience of their real worlds as
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subjects of capital. Sovereign consumer gamers, picking from a wide library of massive
artificial frontiers, can experience empowered hypermobility, technology cathartically
providing a sense of autonomy completely missing from the real material political
context their consumer sovereignty is useless to affect.
Where Benjamin argues that cinema’s “representation of human beings by means
of an apparatus has made possible a highly productive use of the human being’s selfalienation” (23), he is echoed not only by my argument that open world games are salves
for settlers, but also by a great many scholars that track neoliberal culture and policy. The
masses subject to neoliberal economy, argues Byung-Chul Han, “do not constitute a we
that is capable of collective action. The mounting egoization and atomization of society is
shrinking the space for collective action” (13), and cultural production is so often geared
towards that egoization and atomization. Alienation is not merely a consequence of the
capital relation; it is perpetuated by monied cultural production and by the very subjects
that are inculcated into neoliberal ideology, a no-exit prophecy perpetually fulfilled by
the imaginary of which open world spectacles are a part. Big budget Hollywood film, for
Benjamin, triggers “a therapeutic demolition of the unconscious” (31); this therapeutic
demolition is similar for open world games as compensating heterotopian fantasies. The
compensation in settler states (and their culture that empire has globalized), as previously
argued, necessarily revolves around the unconscious anxieties and desires produced by a
history and present built upon genocide which current neoliberal mores obfuscate. As
Audra Simpson argues, “[s]pectacles do all sorts of political work in every society but are
especially useful in settler societies because they continue to redirect emotions, histories,
and possibilities away from the means of societal and historical production,” which is the
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logic of elimination exercised in foundational and continuing “Indigenous dispossession,
disenfranchisement, and containment” (“Settlement’s Secret” 206-7). This is why open
world gaming spectacle so often depends upon the figure of the Indian: a technologically
represented fiction, borrowing Indian-ness’ association with freedom, atomizing gamers
in non-physical space, with repetitive expression of violent accumulation that inverts the
anxiety of a genocide that could turn inwards. The only difference between explicitly
fascist cultural outlook and settler neoliberal outlook, in this regard, is whether the
genocide is something to celebrate, or something to deny, a difference of discourse with
significant consequences. After all, if fascism supplies an expression in maintaining
capital rather than the material power to alter it, that expression can be located in the
illusion of capital’s spectacles: the anxiety of colonial violence turning inward is replaced
with a sense of victory, where the masses can believe no such inward turn is taking place,
or that they themselves are part of the inward turn rather than subject to it. After all, the
core economic structure of both fascism and neoliberalism sees no material change from
one to the other: they share an eliminative and appropriative form of property relations
(which, as argued in the first chapter, developed alongside colonialism’s founding
appropriations).
As Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder, and Maia Asheri have argued, fascism is in
fact fully consistent with the liberal capitalist structure’s “market economy” and its
primary foundation in “private property” (7), the relation to land that was used to
dismantle communalist Indigenous title as described in the first chapter. Benjamin’s
claim that fascism offers an illusory power to its subjects is comparable to the illusion of
gamers as “sovereign consumers” in the neoliberal market, and the highly successful
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spectacles of open world games that provide an equally illusory affect of autonomy in
expression of play. Prabhat Patnaik argues that the current wave of fascist rhetoric and
political organization is so easily partnered with existing neoliberal states “not because it
advances some alternative economic policy to the one being advanced by traditional
bourgeois political formations, but by bringing about a discourse shift” (n.p.). That
discourse shift, the allure of expression (be it in political sloganizing or open world
gratification as Spielraum) is meant to replace the desire for material change. This
explains why neoliberal political rhetoric increasingly resembles fascist rhetoric, and why
influential neoliberal thinkers have historically praised even overt fascist dictators for
their suppression of any attempts to alter these property relations (Slobodian 277). There
is a wealth of literature that underscores the neoliberal-fascist connection in the
confluence of the above factors and more.140 Most simplistically, as Bonn Juego writes,
the modern day neoliberal maxim of “free economy in a strong state” was first most
clearly articulated by influential Nazi theorist Carl Schmitt (108). Schmitt’s more detailed
fascist interpretations of political economy still find considerable traction in the
neoliberal cultural and political programming endemic to settler states. To close this
chapter, I argue Schmitt’s ideology is useful for examining how the settler cultural
imaginary so often expresses neoliberal-fascist principles, and thus important to my
concluding analysis of the Western big-budget open world game genre’s exemplification
of settler neoliberal-fascist compatibility.
As Lloyd and Wolfe explain, Schmitt’s use of the word nomos indicated a
people’s “ordering of the world” through “law and property” (113). Schmitt’s conception
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is not dissimilar from Turner’s view of American teleology, as Schmitt believed “every
nomos . . . is instituted on the basis of a primary appropriation . . . which establishes a
bounding line, or enclosure, and stands as ‘a constitutive act of spatial ordering’” (113).
The origins of America’s settler colonial project, its logic of elimination and
appropriation of Indigenous land into an America of borders, are the founding nomos for
Turner. Indeed, Schmitt, after the Nazis failed to reorder global politics into its own
nomos, believed the ascending world ordering of political power had its “very specific
origin in the conquest of the Americas, ‘the basic event in the history of European
international law—the land-appropriation of the new world” (113). Lloyd and Wolfe
argue that the neoliberal-styled Empire today is thus “the consolidation of a new ‘nomos
of the earth’ . . . [a] colonial-capitalist nomos” (113) that is built upon both the mythology
of settler civilizational progress, and on the necessary misremembering of the founding
genocides that Schmitt understood as absolutely crucial to that civilizational development
in the first place and in continuance.
The nomos of Schmitt (and retroactively applicable to Turner) is about reordering
the world into “specific and recognized geographical marker[s]” that “divide the world
spatially” (113)—necessitating the spatial illusion of spectacle to placate the masses. But
more than a physical border-line, the nomos simultaneously spatially as well as “legally
and morally” determines who is “subject to force” and who is “subject to law” (113).
Like Turner’s frontier, the nomos designates a “zone of free and empty space,” which is
“subject to a ‘state of exception,’ that is, ‘a suspension of all law for a certain time and in
a certain space’” (113) for violent appropriation—for Turner and Schmitt both—from an
unfit people to a fit people. Though nomos is a juridical concept, it is also a sociological
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one that structures the anxieties and desires of the settler colonial imaginary. Where my
introduction highlighted the frontier as an inviting but anxious space for its porous
danger, nomos is the colonial-capitalist ordering of that space into one of containment,
where there are areas of “law” and areas of “exception” where law may be suspended for
the continued maintenance of the nomos itself. Video games, taking place within their
magic circles, necessarily inhabit such a space of exception from law and morality, one
that is, in Schmitt’s phrasing, “beyond the line” (113) where people are subject to law.
For video games, this is simply the result of the space’s unreality, the nature of a game as
a voluntary fiction, where murdering thousands of people has no material effect on the
world on the other side of the line. These magic circles then can contain the desires and
anxieties, the fantasies and horrors of the settler colonial imaginary, and articulate them
in ways that are meant to aid play, pure expression without materiality. Again, that these
artificial frontiers beyond the line so often rely upon an illusion of Indigeneity for its
consumers gives away the connection between fascism and settler neoliberalism in their
genocidal logics. The virtual Indian, be it in the imagination of Hitler and his beloved
Winnetou, in the Hollywood Western, or in big budget open world games, represents a
desire for freedom, for authenticity, and communally held relationships to land, all of
which are fundamentally dismantled by fascist genocide and settler colonialism’s logic of
elimination, both of which are motivated by capital’s infinite expansion. If the nomos in
current globalized neoliberalism is a colonial-capitalist empire, it is only natural that its
spectacle salves would so often provide the illusion of triumph against the inward turn of
genocide and appropriation that fascism represents and inevitably threatens amidst
faltering neoliberal norms.
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HZD’s obsession with apocalypse, Indigenous inauthentic authenticity, extraction,
accumulation, and neoliberal-styled individualist triumph via technology and violence are
all elements that turn up in Western big-budget open world games in some combination
(or altogether) repeatedly. That I have neglected HZD’s specificity in this final section is
largely a result of its formulaic nature. The artificial frontier and its coherence with
fascist spectacle and ideology highlights exactly what settler desires and anxieties these
game replay, and have been exhibited in many media forms since Turner’s thesis, and
marketed worldwide. The artificial frontier’s non-physical containment is merely an
intensification of previous methods. These open worlds represent an economic and
cultural strategy, where artificial space for settlement contains consumers in
immateriality. In the first chapter I stressed the importance of “settling on empty space”
to both neoliberal finance in the real world and to the open world game production that is
impossible without that finance. Immateriality is precisely what makes these frontiers
expressive of neoliberal nomos, the exception beyond-the-line of the magic circle.
Immateriality is also what makes these hetero- and hyper-topian gamescapes, as
mentioned, a containment for signifiers of exception. That exception is required to
provide the parameters of the bordered and lawed whole, symbolically represented, and
meant to be broadly relatable and understandable outside the magic circle in the
neoliberal social contexts in which they are consumed. The simulated Indigeneity of
these games is an important, contradictory, and flexible category for that containment’s
specificity. Whereas for Turner Indigeneity is that antithesis by which settler identity is
formed in opposition, for open world games and the settler colonial imaginary of which
they are emblematic, Indigeneity can function as exception: both opposition and addition.
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These various forms of simulated Indigeneity are how neoliberalism’s atomizing
individualism and (“post-”)racial capitalism updates and reintegrates the principles of
Turner’s frontier thesis.
It is thus eminently predictable that these frontiers increasingly feature depictions
of Indigeneity, real and unreal, and of states of apocalyptic siege, both along formulaic
lines, and always subject to that moral and legal exception of video gaming and of settler
ideology. After all, as the first chapter cited Byrd arguing, zombie apocalypse and the
figure of the Indian are compelling concepts for the settler colonial imaginary because
they are both living and dead, they “exist in the no-man’s-land that constitutes the states
of nature and exception” (Transit of Empire 225). The exception of the magic circle
reveals that the Indian—and the Indigenous life and sovereignty of which that figure is a
reduced invention of spectacle—is still prominently beyond-the-line in the settler cultural
imaginary and settler states. The unreal space of video games provides the ludic
expression that compensates for both colonial guilt (over foundational genocide) and
neoliberal failure (to provide the “sovereignty” of consumers in real political power, or
economic prosperity to those consumers). Meanwhile, the games and their gamescapes
monetarily compensate the companies that produce them, everywhere from Rockstar’s
casino to the post-apocalyptic New World of HZD.
These fantasy containments and salves for anxiety are thus all similarly
motivated, and also similarly demonstrative of the priorities of the settler colonial
imaginary. The fissures between settler cosmopolitan neoliberal post-racialism and real
Indigenous sovereignty become all the more apparent: these games cannot actually attend
to the Indigenous real and their disruptive sovereignties and alternate forms of relations
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to land (be it tiospaye or hózhǫ́ǫ́jí). Instead, they necessarily cater to assuaging (at least
massaging) the fear of retributive apocalypse (figured as the disappearance of the
rancher/outlaw/Native, or outright global extinction as in HZD or the metanarrative of the
entire AC series): this compensation is accomplished via gameplay of constant poweraccrual and eventual narrative victory. These artificial frontiers attend to and demonstrate
the guilt and fear of the apocalypses inextricable from neoliberal property relations’
history, present, and future. They do this with equivocating mythology, where settlers are
Indigenized through multiple narrative formulas (settler-as-Indian in RDR, Indian-assettler in ACIII, Indian-as-technological-white-all-along in HZD) and gameplay formulas
that recapture the playing Indian Americans have engaged before the frontier’s genocidal
violence closed into the American nomos.
The allure of these games is visible in the way they play Indian in various oblique
and explicit ways, and represent an “invitation of access” and illusory freedom: they
allow gamers to taste the promise and dominance of the frontier while savouring the
antipodal innocence and authenticity of Indigeneity. The Western big-budget open world
games here studied—and the many examples that follow their patterns—are all playing
Indian and/or against the Indian on artificial frontiers that validate the settler colonial
structure (and its neoliberal-fascist development) while invalidating Indigenous
sovereignty on the lands that structure has appropriated. These Western big-budget open
world game frontiers show that the colonial-capitalist structure, and the settler colonial
imaginary exercised in the billion-dollar industry of play, revels in the same genocidal
logics along the lines of Schmitt’s nomos and global neoliberal Empire.
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Conclusion
At the beginning of the previous chapter I noted that even with the specificity of
the genre I analyze, with all of its modifiers, there is no lack of Western big budget open
world games that exhibit traits identical to the games I do cite. As I bring this dissertation
to a close, I would like to highlight just a few more examples, and note how their
particularities are fungible with the games I spent so many pages on. For example, the
latest entry of the open world series Infamous, called Infamous Second Son [ISS], was a
flagship title for the PlayStation 4 console, releasing only a few months after the console
came out, and was developed alongside the hardware itself (Kuchera). The game features
an Indigenous protagonist from an ersatz tribe; unlike Rockstar’s Wapitit, ISS
appropriates from one very specific tribe in the real world: the Duwamish. ISS is set in
Seattle, and its protagonist (a redface performance by white actor Troy Baker) is from the
“Akomish” tribe nearby. Going so far as to recreate the sign of the Duwamish Longhouse
and Cultural Center for the game’s Akomish Longhouse and Cultural Center, the game’s
appropriations are far from subtle (Gravning). There is, of course, very little cultural
information given about the Akomish. Instead, Indigenous lives are simply held at
ransom for the game’s central narrative, immobilized by superpowered stone shards, a
rather literal depiction of static Indigeneity. As Jagger Gravning points out, the real
Duwamish longhouse from the outside is an understated, contemporary wood paneled
building with a slanted roof, whereas the Akomish longhouse is a vision of fauxIndigenous excess, flanked by no less than three totem poles, bright colours splashed on
every surface, colored flags strung about its massive, animal-art façade. This overcommitment to a broadly Pacific Northwestern Indigenous “look” is visible in the
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opening minutes of the game, and does legwork that the white actors cannot fulfill: a
visual marker of authenticity for its played Indian-turned-superhero.
Infamous’ similarities to the RDR series are plentiful: a “Karma” system similar
to RDR’s “Honor” system alters the narrative outcome and gameplay. Just like the Honor
system, ISS’s Karma system awards positive Karma for essentially acting as ultra-violent
law enforcement: killing drug dealers makes the protagonist a good-guy, an emphasis on
superhero interdiction on petty street crime that would later be echoed by the open world
Spider-Man game released in 2018. Indeed, protagonist Delsin Rowe’s moral guide is his
brother, an Indigenous police officer (also played by a white actor). By the game’s
climax, if Rowe has more good karma than evil, he returns to the tribe and heals them. If
he has more evil than good, he kills them all in a rage after an Elder tells him he has
“disgraced our people, disgraced our ancestors.”141 Apparently the player’s level of
ingratiation to a settler social status quo of Seattle and its law enforcement is one
meaningful to his Indigenous “ancestors,” here. In other words, Indigeneity serves to
authenticate, symbolize, and provide affective depth for the Karma system’s “goodness,”
similar to how RDR2 uses Indigeneity for its Honor system. The gameplay otherwise is
firmly within the parameters of the Ubisoft formula, the only difference being the more
explicitly superhero nature of the protagonist’s abilities, including his hypermobility.
The Tom Clancy’s Ghost Recon series’ recent open world entries also feature
Indigeneity. Wildlands takes place in Bolivia, and players take the role of American
special forces arriving in the country to counter an absurd depiction of a Mexican drug
cartel having taken over the country. As Héctor Tobar points out, Hollywood’s recent
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obsession with Mexican drug cartels draws from American racialized siege mentality that
Donald Trump’s rhetoric hones in on: “the cartels are streaming across our undefended
border, and into . . . our video streams” (n.p.). Mexican drug cartels are used to signal
“inherent, pure evil” that can be the target of violence with no moral qualms. For
Wildlands, the drug cartel fulfills that role and another sanitization: invasion has already
taken place in Bolivia, so the players’ overwhelming destruction is always already a
lesser evil if not liberatory combat. From the very beginning of the game, the players aid
and are aided by people identified as the real-world Indigenous Aymara people, yet again
signaling the righteousness of the American military interdiction. Safehouses with
gameplay benefits fly the Wiphala, “the flag of [I]ndigenous self-determination”
(Ravindran) of multiple Indigenous groups in South America, easily imparting an
Indigenous warrant to American violence. The game’s climactic battle, however,
vanishes the need for Indigeneity, and sees the Aymaran resistance turn on the player,
who then leads an assault on a final location where Indigenous peoples can be killed at
will on the way to the drug cartel boss. Wildlands was released a few years before the
United States sponsored a coup in Bolivia, which led to protests by Indigenous groups,
and violent backlash from “white-mestizo elites” and “paramilitary organisations”
(Ravindran). Martha I. Chew Sánchez’s work suggests the settler colonial history of
Bolivia and the United States goes some way to explain neoliberal democracies’ support
of the coup and its regime, as well as its particular characteristics, which Bolivian
journalist Fernando Molina calls “fascist ideology” (128). The sequel to Wildlands,
Breakpoint, ejects the Indigenous real, and features only ruins of a fictional Indigenous
culture. Instead, the game achieves the usual affect of authenticity by having players aid a
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besieged group of settlers, Indigenized by living on a land empty of its actual (though
fictional) Indigenous lives. That group is called the “Homesteaders,” the same word used
to signal ACIII’s settlers-as-Indians (and vice versa) maneuver.
This dissertation’s arguments required rather broad foundation: analysis of settler
colonialism and neoliberalism’s shared history and development, and the use of the
enduring concept of the “frontier,” an invented spatiality in service of accumulative and
eliminative impulse. Its primary target is a specific genre, its context, and function:
Western big budget open world games as frontier-styled entertainment catering to the
colonial-capital cultural anxieties and desires regarding identity and Indigeneity, land,
freedom, exploitation, and extermination. My argument’s final expansion is also perhaps
broad: the ways this entertainment assuages those anxieties and desires reveals the
coherence with genocidal fascism just beneath the surface veneer of modern neoliberal
mores, expertly quality assurance tested by billion-dollar companies. That implication of
shared genocidal impulse under the auspices of capital (in settler states today as it was
under Nazi fascism) is conceptual, but so too are the very concepts culturally recycled in
this genre and elsewhere. The frontier has always been conceptual: the hard lines of
borders and the porousness of frontiers have never been as materially consistent as they
are psychologically important. That psychology is precisely what is given fullest
representation by the play of these open world games, beyond-the-line of the magic
circle. The sum total of these games’ use of Indigeneity and frontierism are all designed
for and propagate what I dubbed in the dissertation introduction as settler neurosis.
Taking place safely beyond-the-line of the magic circle, these open world spectacles
assuage the compromised national- and Self-sovereignty produced by economic and
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political structures of colonialism and capitalism. The inside/outside frontier’s historical
conditions, cultural legacy, and adoption by global capital produced this neurosis, and is
both exploited by and compatible with neoliberalism and fascism. The Turnerian frontier
symbolized a national identity built upon genocide and the misremembrance of a “fit
people’s” destiny in a land-to-be-privatized. The actual conditions of colonialism grew
and translated into neoliberal accumulation, where the world functions as global capital’s
non-physical frontier. The surviving and thriving sovereignties of Indigenous peoples
inside and between the borders of settler nation-states are necessarily problematic for
settler national identities, imperial states, and corporate interests whose originary forms
of sovereignty must dismantle all alternatives to continue. Indigeneity itself, for settler
cultural production and cultural production inspired by it, must be excised from those
problematic sovereignties, political frameworks, ways of being, and relations to land and
community. That way, Indigeneity can merely serve as vanishing impediment to
civilization, or savage warrior sieging the fort of settlement, or freely adoptable warrant
to land. Oftentimes it serves as a combination of all three. Western big budget open world
games, in their mechanics and uses of ersatz Indigeneity, highlight the frontier’s primary
conceptual use: space open for exploitation and resulting accumulation, and subject to
extreme, racialized violence in service of that accumulation.
The frontier’s spatiality is land coded for domination, which is why the artificial
frontiers of open world games so often repeat its formulaic settler colonial equivocations
and disavowals; the specific formulation of frontier domination in Western cultural
production was birthed by the vast mythology that sanitized, equivocated, and inverted
settler colonial history. Settler colonial structure is dependent on genocide, a fact Schmitt
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identified through his fascist framework that applies so easily to settler colonialism and
the empire of neoliberal global capital it developed alongside and into. Turner’s
narrativization of the frontier, a space of genocide, turns this logic of elimination into a
story of dogged triumph, “contest” rather than slaughter, “defense” rather than
extermination. Turner’s formulation, still so relevant to the supportive uses of the
“frontier” concept today by these videogames, is encoded with the rationalizations for
and omissions of genocidal violence foundational to settler colonialism. Turner waxes on
“that dominant individualism, working for good and for evil . . . that buoyancy and
exuberance which comes with freedom” (37). Instead, the frontier’s legacy is cultures of
individualism easily dominated by hegemonic authority and fascist allure rather than
dominant, societies defined by containments and racialized violence from inception to
today. Like the vaunted freedom and autonomy of these frontier games, self-sovereign
individualism is materially trapped in programmatic borders, be it the magic circle or the
market. These video games may at times attempt to critique frontier mythology, but their
narrative and mechanical forms, as well as their social and economic function, reveal the
exploitation and violence inextricable from their colonial-capital context. Regardless of
how settler colonialism’s logic of elimination and capital’s racist accumulation may be
equivocated, avoided, critiqued, or massaged in any particular instance, genocide is in the
heart of the Turnerian frontier. That heart beats in the power fantasies of Western bigbudget open world games as it does in the global frontier of empire today.
In revulsion and desire for Indigeneity, the settler colonial imaginary manages the
recognition of structural injustice. The continued existence, persistence, and resistance of
Indigenous sovereignties in the face of the settler colonial logic of elimination (by

277
historical frontier violence as well as modern neoliberal gene fetishism, legislated
containment, and corporate land exploitation, etc.) leads to the neurosis salved by the
open world’s repetitive patterns of representation and play. But the settler colonial
imaginary cannot cure that neurosis by re-making Indigeneity, simulating it as either
vanishing or assimilated into neoliberal and fascist futurities. These games are antithetical
to the futurity of Indigenous sovereignties. That futurity cannot be played in the context
and content of Western big-budget open world games. That futurity can be found in the
lives and labours, communities and creations of Indigenous peoples around the world,
and their contribution to what Vizenor in Manifest Manners calls “survivance”: “an
active sense of presence, the continuance of native stories, not a mere reaction, or a
survivable name . . . renunciations of dominance, tragedy, and victimry” (vii).
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